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Preface 
The 1994 symposium was the 12th in the series of biennial auditing symposia held 
at the University of Kansas. It gives me great pleasure to acknowledge the continued 
financial and moral support of Deloitte & Touche for the University of Kansas 
Symposium on Auditing Problems. In particular, I would like to thank Ed Kangas, 
Chief Operating Officer of Deloitte & Touche International, David Hunerberg, 
Managing Partner of the Kansas City Office, and Howard Cohen, Partner in the 
Kansas City Office, for their enthusiasm and support. 
Since I was on a one-year leave of absence from the University of Kansas during 
the 1993-1994 academic year to teach at the Institute for International Business 
Studies (IIBS) at Pordenone, Italy, taking care of the details for the symposium long-
distance was a bit challenging. Special thanks to Linda Taylor, Division of Accounting 
and Information Systems, for her painstaking efforts in keeping the planning process 
smooth and free of problems. Also, I would like to thank my colleagues and Ph. D. 
students in accounting and information systems for their assistance and support. In 
particular, I would like to acknowledge the help of, amongst the faculty, Bruce 
Bublitz, Joe Coate, Mike Ettredge, and David Plumlee, and amongst the Ph. D. 
students, Peter Gillett, Keith Harrison, and Margaret Reed. Special thanks are also due 
to Val Renault and Jun Zhang for their editorial assistance. 
Topics relevant to both academics and practitioners and the individuals who served 
as presenters and discussants were selected in consultations with faculty members at 
the University of Kansas, at other universities and with professionals in auditing prac-
tice. The 1994 Symposium was unique in one sense that Emeritus Professor Howard 
Stettler, the "Father of the Symposium," presented the first paper on "Accounting and 
Auditing History: Major Developments in England and the United States from 
Ancient Roots through the Mid-Twentieth Century." The symposium concluded with 
the paper "Evidence on Key Factors Considered in the Client Acceptance Decision 
Process." Maintaining the symposium tradition, we selected a practitioner to be the 
discussant for a paper by an academician and vice versa. A l l papers, except the 
keynote speech by A . A . Sommer, were distributed in advance and were formally 
critiqued by discussants at the symposium. Each paper was allocated about 90 
minutes: 20 minutes for the presenter to summarize the results, 20 minutes for the 
discussant's remarks, and about 50 minutes for open discussion with the participants. 
As expected, the open discussion resulted in lively debate by the distinguished partici-
pants on many of the major issues confronting the profession. Each discussant's 
remarks are published in this proceedings following the corresponding paper. 
However, for the paper "Evidence on Key Factors Considered in the Client 
Acceptance Decision Process," I am sorry to report that written remarks by the discus-
sant, Mr . Seymore Jones, are not available for publication because of health 
reasons. In fact, as I remember it, his remarks and his vibrant personality made 
this last session very exciting. I wish we had tape recorded his remarks for the 
proceedings. 
About fifty-five invited participants were present each day of the two-day sympo-
sium. A roster of the participants is given before this preface. Also, a number of 
observers, such as doctoral students, faculty members from accounting and other 
disciplines, and practitioners in the area, attended parts of the symposium. If you are 
interested in attending the next symposium in 1996 please write to me indicating your 
interest. 
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Proceedings are shipped only on a prepaid basis. The 1994 symposium proceed-
ings are priced at $20.00 each. The prepaid price covers mailing costs with the 
exception of orders outside of the United States and Canada, in which case an addi-
tional $3.00 for each copy should be included for surface transportation. For the last 
five symposia, we are listing below the papers included in each of the proceedings, the 
authors, and the prepaid price of each volume for the benefit of the users. 
The proceedings of each of the symposia except the first one are still in print and 
may be purchased by sending your request along with a check of appropriate amount 
payable to The University of Kansas to: 
K U Bookstores 
Kansas Union Level 2 
The University of Kansas 
Lawrence, Kansas 66045 
Rajendra P. Srivastava 
Professor and Deloitte & Touche Faculty Fellow 
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What's Really Wrong With The Accounting Profession? 
Keynote Speech 
A. A. Sommer, Jr. 
Chairman, Public Oversight Board 
It is a great pleasure and honor for me to be able to speak at this distinguished and 
respected symposium which has gained such stature within the accounting profession 
and which, over the years, has provided a means for exploring the important issues 
confronting the accounting profession. The topics on the program this year evidence 
the continuing commitment of the sponsors of this program to the discussion of themes 
which are of tremendous practical, as well as theoretical, importance to the profession. 
When I was asked for a title for my remarks, I thought for a few seconds and 
suggested, "What's Really Wrong with the Accounting Profession?" Only as I 
reflected on that title later did I fully realize that it might raise expectations different 
from what I intended to say. It is not my intention to "dump" on the profession or the 
fine people who practice accounting. What I am really going to talk about is how the 
financial reporting process may be strengthened and the dangers to professionalism I 
see in the present climate mitigated. For the most part I won't cover the ground the 
POB did in its March, 1993 Report. 
Strengthening Financial Reporting 
I am a fervent believer in disclosure as the foundation of our securities regulatory 
system in this country. At the core of meaningful disclosure is financial information -
reliable, timely, relevant, useful and understandable financial information. That 
truism, long-accepted, was reiterated in the 1973 Report of the Study Group on the 
Objectives of Financial Statements prepared under the aegis of Robert M . Trueblood, 
a distinguished partner of one of the predecessor firms of the co-sponsor of this 
conference. The importance of communicating that information was underscored by 
the Long-Range Objectives Committee of the AICPA some years ago: 
A satisfactory system for communicating financial and other economic data is an essential condition 
for the accumulations of capital from widespread sources in single enterprises - i.e. for a successful 
industrial economy. Persons who have an interest in resources are in varying degrees of remoteness 
from them and from the factors affecting them. The greater this remoteness, the greater the need for 
communication of data... In fact, without assurance of reliable economic data, the remote investor 
or creditor probably would not supply capital to the enterprise... (Emphasis in the original) 
The auditor's role in the "reliability, timeliness, relevance, usefulness and under-
standability" formula is principally the assurance of reliability and those assurances 
enhance the usefulness of the information. Along with the information itself, the 
extent to which the information may be relied upon must be effectively communi-
cated. I would say that while the quantum and quality of information about issuers 
that is being communicated to shareholders and investors have steadily improved 
(witness the SEC's recent rule changes concerning disclosure with respect to execu-
tive compensation), there has been scant improvement in communicating the extent to 
which the information is reliable. 
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In 1978 the AICPA-organized Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities published 
its report. A significant part of that report discussed the contents of the auditor's report 
on financial statements. In the course of its discussion of this subject it quoted the 
report of the auditors of the United States Steel Corporation in 1903. It is informative, 
detailed and provides an interesting contrast to the sterile and boiler-plate style which 
has prevailed since at least 1933 in various iterations. 
The Cohen Commission (the popular appellation for the Commission on Auditors' 
Responsibilities) included in its report an illustration of what it perceived to be a 
desirable form of auditor's report. It took up more than an eight-and-a-half by eleven 
page in the report (and the type was relatively small) and included eight meaty and 
informative paragraphs. The Auditing Standards Board, in response to the Report, 
undertook revisions of the standard report. What was the result? Instead of two stereo-
typed paragraphs, we now have three stereotyped paragraphs that nobody, but nobody, 
reads or heeds. 
Amid all the consternation (justified, I might add) within the profession about audi-
tors' exposure to litigation, I would suggest that means at hand to significantly reduce 
that exposure are being ignored. Let me elaborate. 
Every line in a balance sheet, income statement, cash flow statement looks like 
every other line. "Cash" looks just like "inventory", looks just like "property, plant 
and equipment" which may include huge amounts of "soft costs" that have been 
included on that line in the expectation of future benefits that are by no means assured 
of realization. And to the laymen, including some sophisticated users of information, 
the auditor's opinion is as much an assurance of the reliability of any line as it is of the 
"Cash" line. 
I have on occasion only half-facetiously suggested that financial statements should 
be prepared in varying shades of grey. Dark, dark ink and bold typeface should be 
used for cash. Inventories should be slightly lighter; capitalized costs uncertain of 
realization should be, not in disappearing ink, but in very light ink and type. And then 
the auditor's opinion should explain the significance in the degrees of shading. 
I would suggest to you that some of the woes of the accounting profession flowing 
from the savings and loan debacle in this country might have been avoided if the 
auditor had communicated the limits of extent to which people could rely on the 
financial statements of the savings and loans. How about this as a paragraph in the 
opinion of an auditor of a savings and loan: 
$ of the assets of the company ( %) consist of loans secured by mortgages 
with no provision for recourse against the borrower. Thus the company's ability to realize on these 
assets depends upon the ability of the borrower to make timely payments and the continued value of 
the underlying asset. While the documents in the files of the company indicate that the value of the 
real estate underlying the mortgages is presently in excess of the amount of the loans and that the 
cash flows from the properties (with respect to loans in the amount of $ cash flows have 
not commenced) wil l be sufficient to assure orderly amortization of the debt, there is no assurance 
that these conditions wil l continue. 
There is presently developing in securities law a doctrine called "bespeaks 
caution." In the words of one court, 
...The essence of the [bespeaks caution] doctrine is that where an offering statement, such as a 
prospectus, accompanies statements of its future forecasts, projections and expectations with 
adequate cautionary language, those statements are not actionable as securities fraud (Emphasis 
supplied). 
While this is a relatively new doctrine and one that does not yet enjoy the impri-
matur of the Supreme Court (although it has been approved by the Second Circuit 
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Court of Appeals, the preeminent commercial court in the country), it should provoke 
a renewed consideration by the accounting profession of how, through effective 
communications, it can enjoy the benefits of "bespeaks caution." This would entail a 
careful delineation of the uncertainties inherent in financial statements, a statement 
tailored to the issuer's statements, not new boilerplate. 
The POB in its report urged the Auditing Standards Board to revise the auditor's 
standard report to make the prospective nature of certain accounting estimates clear, 
including a caveat that the estimated results may not be achieved. This communication 
should not be written as a defensive retrenchment by the auditing profession, but 
rather as a more realistic and reasonable explanation of the limitation of assurance that 
can be provided on certain accounting estimates. 
Happily the Auditing Standards Board's Auditing Soft Information Task Force has 
undertaken consideration of this proposal. A significant step toward better communi-
cation with regard to these matters has been the approval recently by the Accounting 
Standards Executive Committee of its slightly modified exposure draft on risks and 
uncertainties. The POB in its report last year strongly advocated adoption of this state-
ment and we are most hopeful that the F A S B wi l l now approve i t .† While the 
application of the statement is somewhat narrower than I would like, I believe this 
statement will give a powerful tool to accountants in compelling client disclosure of 
important risks and uncertainties related to the business. I would hazard a guess that 
had this statement been in effect ten years ago some of the problems associated with 
the audits of savings and loans could have been avoided. 
The preliminary report of the A I C P A Special Committee's Study of the In-
formation Needs of Today's Users of Financial Reporting (the Jenkins Committee) 
indicates that "Users want companies to disclose information about the estimates and 
assumptions used to determine material assets and liability amounts." 
I am informed that this desire of users will probably be reflected in one or more 
recommendations of that Committee. The problem then will be to develop the neces-
sary consensus to implement the recommendation. That is the toughest task. 
Congressman Edward Markey of Massachusetts has recently asked the General 
Accounting Office to review the various reports which have been prepared by 
accounting bodies since 1975 and report on the extent to which the recommendations 
in them have been acted upon. While in many respects the profession has responded 
earnestly, I fear this study may reveal that other important recommendations have 
been ignored or only partially implemented. I wi l l cite as Exhibit A the matter I 
referred to earlier, the failure of the Auditing Standards Board to come to grip 
adequately with the recommendation of the Cohen Commission that the auditor's 
report be made more meaningful. 
I think it is imperative that top management assume greater responsibility for the 
internal controls and the internal auditing function of their companies, and that the 
external auditors assume greater responsibility for those controls and internal audit 
functions. I understand that the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations (COSO) of 
the Treadway Commission and the General Accounting Office have reached agree-
ment on what a management statement with respect to internal controls should 
embrace. This a great step forward, and I hope it will be followed by action from the 
SEC mandating, one, management reporting on internal controls in accordance with 
the COSO Report, Internal Control - Integrated Framework, and, two, external 
auditor reporting on the validity of management's representations. 
It has approved the Statement of Position. 
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In arguing against any requirement that the external auditor report on internal 
controls, Robert A . Bowman, executive vice president and chief financial officer of 
ITT Corporation and the spokesman for the Financial Executives Institute, at the 
hearing held by Senator Dodd of Connecticut on private litigation under the securities 
laws in July of last year said, 
Any public accounting firm, any firm, that suggests to you and this committee that it does not under-
stand a company's internal controls and they still sign that letter of opinion we think is engaging in 
sophistry. 
We would not expect any public accounting firm to sign its name without understanding fully and 
completely the internal controls of a company, large or small. (Emphasis added) 
I respectfully suggest that i f Mr. Bowman is correct, then there should be no 
problem - or significant added expense - in requiring auditors to opine on manage-
ment's representations with respect to the company's internal controls. I would 
therefore reiterate the recommendation which the Public Oversight Board made in its 
March 5, 1993 report: a company's auditors should be required to report on the repre-
sentations of management with respect to their company's internal controls. The SEC 
has indicated an unwillingness to mandate this. I would urge that some responsible 
large companies voluntarily move in this direction and pioneer a healthy and needed 
additional safeguard for investors - and themselves. 
Dangers to Professionalism 
The second problem I perceive with the accounting profession is one related to 
professionalism and emanates from a society-wide circumstance. Competition has 
always been present in the accounting profession, but I suspect it has never been as 
intense, as tough, as dangerous, as it is now. 
More intense competition has infected every corner of our society; my own profes-
sion is experiencing a measure of competition it has never before seen. Where the 
intensification of competition originated is not clear. Some ascribe it to the onset of 
more international competition which compelled enterprises in this country to sharpen 
their claws; others say it is an inevitable progression in a market economy. 
In the professions, I think there may be some unique circumstances. For one thing, 
I think professionals have become more concerned with their incomes than with their 
status as professionals. Sol Linowitz, a distinguished lawyer and former government 
official, in his recent book, The Betrayed Profession, which deals with events in the 
legal profession, quotes a young lawyer in a mid-size law firm: "The practice of law 
changed forever when lawyers decided they should be making as much money as their 
clients." That quote, I think, is equally applicable to accountants. 
When the increasing concern with income combines with the increased trans-
parency with respect to economic information concerning firms and their members, 
there is bound to be increased pressure on the management of firms to maximize the 
returns to their partners lest they lose them to seemingly more prosperous competitors 
or other kinds of occupations which can use their skills. 
Another factor, reenforcing these competitive forces, has been the determination of 
the federal regulatory authorities and the courts to regard the professions as no dif-
ferent from other ways of making a living. Thus, measures and rules once thought to 
be safeguards against unethical and unprofessional conduct were thrown out without 
any discerning examination of whether professions should be considered just other 
businesses. It was scant consolation when I heard a sitting FTC Commissioner at a bar 
meeting suggest that the FTC had grievously erred when it went down that road. 
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The more intense the competition, whatever the source of that intensity, the more 
pressure there is on law compliance, on ethics, and on judgment. We read daily of 
businessmen who cross the line between legal and illegal. They don't make that 
crossing because they are evil or malicious or indifferent; they often do it because they 
feel they must if they are to compete effectively and meet the expectations of their 
superiors. How much more fragile and elastic are the boundaries of ethics. And how 
much more easily infected is professional judgment. 
I have often posited the case of the rising young partner in a major firm who 
manages an office of his or her firm in, to bring it close to home, let's say Kansas City. 
He is also the engagement partner of the office's largest client which accounts for 
about a quarter of the revenues of the office. 
The financial statements prepared by the client classify as restructuring costs 
certain items which the young partner believes should be recurring period costs. He 
expresses this opinion to the chief financial officer, who challenges him to point to the 
accounting literature which compels that the costs be classified as recurring period 
costs. The young partner says he cannot point to such authority, but in his professional 
judgment the proper treatment is to classify the items as recurring period costs. The 
CFO mentions that he casually discussed this at a cocktail party with a partner of a 
competing firm, one which young partner knows has been lusting after the business, 
who indicated he agreed with the CFO as to the proper accounting treatment. 
The young partner's dilemma is clear. If he loses the client a substantial number of 
staff in the office will, at least for some time, be underutilized. He hopes the manage-
ment of the firm will realize that he has lost the client on a matter of principle and will 
not penalize him in his career, and hopes, in fact, they will back him. But what about 
next year i f the staff is still underutilized and no new clients have filled the void? And 
the year after, and the one after that? It is not difficult to empathize with the agony of 
that young partner. 
One would hope that if he acquiesced in the insistence of his client and opined on 
the financial statements as prepared by the client that the concurring partner would 
block approval, or that one or the other would consult on the issue. If the end of the 
process is that the client walks because of either the engagement partner taking a 
tough stand, or the concurring partner or consulting partner doing so, the problem 
confronting the young partner is the same: how to fill the void? 
I would hope that in this sort of situation the top management of the firm would set 
a "tone" by assuring that insistence on good accounting and financial reporting does 
not ever penalize a partner. I was told once of the head of a major firm who, at a 
partner's meeting, singled out a partner who had lost a major client because of an 
accounting disagreement and hailed him as the "partner of the year." 
There is no question that auditors today are more willing than before to take tough 
stands even at the risk of losing clients, and increasingly they state forthrightly the 
reasons for their departure in connection with the client's Form 8-K. But I fear there 
are still a troubling number of occasions when my scenario is a real one and an unde-
sirable accounting practice not clearly contrary to an articulated principle is accepted 
by the auditor. The number of such instances can only be reduced if it is made clear 
by the top management of firms that not only are those who generate and perpetuate 
business amply rewarded, but so are those who on reasonable grounds refuse to go 
along with corner-cutting clients. 
And I would urge that a firm which is approached to take on a client which has 
deserted another auditor because of an auditing or accounting disagreement consider 
carefully whether it really wants to reenforce the belief that exists in many quarters 
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that accounting principles and auditing standards are "for sale." Accounting is not and 
probably never will be exact and reducible to formulas so precise that there can not be 
disagreement among honest accountants. But I would suggest that the case for acqui-
escing in a potential client's wishes who is changing auditors because of disagreement 
should be an overwhelmingly compelling one before the auditor accepts the client. 
Audit committees, which have been a particular matter of interest and concern to the 
POB and to me personally, are important both from the standpoint of sound financial 
reporting and professionalism. I believe their potential for assuring honest financial 
reporting has been little realized and I believe the realization of that potential can only 
be accomplished by auditors. In undertaking that task I think auditors may not only 
contribute to sound corporate governance, but also reduce their exposure to liability. It 
is not enough for auditors to publish booklets on audit committees, excellent as those 
pamphlets generally are. In my experience, few audit committee members read them 
and study them and conform their conduct to the advice contained in them. 
I have urged in the past, and I urge again, that the auditor of every publicly held 
company with an audit committee arrange to meet with the audit committee for two or 
three hours to outline how an audit committee should function, the duties it should 
assume, the concerns it should have. The superb report prepared by Price Waterhouse 
for the Institute of Internal Auditors Research Foundation, Improving Audit Com-
mittees: What Works Best, would be an excellent guide for such a presentation. Also 
helpful would be the matrices in Appendix E of the POB's Report, In the Public 
Interest, and in the Price Waterhouse report, both of which are based on the Treadway 
Commission Report. These matrices provide the means for an audit committee to do a 
searching analysis of its practices and compare them to the excellent recommenda-
tions of that Commission. But I am convinced that without the initiative of the 
external auditors that sort of self-analysis simply will not occur. If audit committees 
did what they should, they would be immeasurably better able to assess the fairness of 
the presentation proposed by management, monitor disagreements between manage-
ment and the auditors, and provide an additional level of assurance that management 
is honest with its auditors. 
Let me close by remarking upon the response to the POB's Report, In the Public 
Interest. Soon after its publication, the AICPA and the "Big Six" endorsed all of its 
recommendations. This has been most gratifying to the members of the Board. Even 
more gratifying is the alacrity with which the SEC Practice Section has undertaken 
initiatives to strengthen the ability of auditors to detect fraud (a consequence of an 
audit expected by the overwhelming number of users of financial statements) and to 
use the information secured in the course of inquiries by the Quality Control Inquiry 
Committee to warn the profession of pitfalls they should avoid. 
Again, let me repeat how privileged I feel to have had this opportunity to meet with 
all of you and express a few thoughts of someone who, while closely associated with 
the accounting profession in a number of capacities for many years, is still just a 
lawyer and, from your viewpoint, a layman. 
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Accounting and Auditing History: Major Developments 
in England and the United States from Ancient Roots 
Through the Mid-Twentieth Century1 
Howard Stettler 
Professor Emeritus, University of Kansas 
Summary 
The history of accounting and auditing, as inextricably entwined disciplines 
concerned with the communication of information about economic events affecting 
governmental or private entities, is traced from the beginning of recorded history to 
recent times. Both disciplines have developed as a response to emerging needs of the 
times, and both have facilitated the development of capital markets that have supplied 
the tremendous amounts of capital to satisfy the demand that was an outgrowth of the 
Industrial Revolution. Closely associated with the development of the two disciplines 
has been the emergence of the accounting profession, playing a key role in more 
recent times in advancing the state of the art in both professional practice and in the 
development of accounting and auditing standards. 
The following chronological synopsis of major developments in accounting and 
auditing constitutes the framework for the more extensive treatment the paper gives to 
the evolution of the two disciplines. The rationale underlying these developments is 
likewise considered. 
Major Developments 
Means of communication 
Writing 
Accounting and auditing 
Accounts of transactions with others 
and of trading activity 
Accounting for owner equity-
double entry 
Formation of stock companies and 
reporting of results to third parties 
Chartering of companies with limited 
liability and subject to specified 
reporting requirements 
Principal Causes 
Communal activities 
Need for a record of economic goods 
Accountability for tribute exacted by 
ruling authority 
Economic benefits of trading activity 
arising from the development of private 
property 
Measurement of the increase in wealth 
from trading 
Demand for capital to extend trading 
abroad 
Extension of the need for capital accumu-
lation generated by the Industrial 
Revolution 
1 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Haskins Seminar in conjunction with the Third 
International Congress of Accounting Historians in London in 1980. 
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Audited financial information for 
third parties 
Professional organizations of 
accountants and auditors 
Shift of accounting emphasis from the 
balance sheet to the income statement 
Accounting and auditing standards; 
securities regulation 
Performance auditing 
Introduction 
Extended development of limited com-
panies with widespread ownership 
facilitated by stock exchanges 
Increasing number of accountants in 
response to growth and complexity of 
business operations 
Reliance on income as the source of 
dividends and capital growth 
Growth in Big Business and the ensuing 
Great Depression; dependence by investors 
on reported financial information 
Quest for improved efficiency and effective-
ness in all large organizations, including 
government and not-for-profit organizations 
By understanding the past, we incorporate it into our present thought and enable ourselves by devel-
oping and criticizing it to use that heritage for our own advancement. 
- Historian R. G. Collingwood 
Each new generation must learn for itself. But each new generation wil l think more intelligently if it 
knows what its predecessors have thought and done. 
- John R. Wildman, in his Foreword to Green's 
History and Survey of Accountancy 
This historical account of the development of accounting and auditing is dedicated 
to the precepts expressed by Collingwood and Wildman. As background for the 
account that follows, it should be recognized that in common with other skilled occu-
pations, accounting and auditing evolved in response to the needs of an increasingly 
complex and interdependent society; however, because the pursuits are intellectual as 
well as practical, accounting and auditing merit classification as a profession rather 
than as a trade. Early in the development of a profession that involves an element of 
skill, the emphasis tends to be on the practice of those skills: how to perform the 
necessary actions; only later do the professional aspects of knowledge, understanding, 
and judgment become evident. During those early stages of development, the training 
of neophytes likewise tends to reflect the preeminence of practical skills, with 
emphasis on what is to be done and how it is to be done. In the case of accounting and 
auditing, even when on-the-job training under the tutelage of a master gave way to 
classroom instruction, the principal change that occurred was in the environs rather 
than the instructional approach. Gradually, however, the description of procedures and 
techniques was supplemented with consideration of the objectives of the procedures, 
and eventually emphasis shifted to the professional, stressing knowledge, under-
standing and judgment. 
In tracing these and other developments related to accounting and auditing, atten-
tion first is directed to the roots from which accounting and auditing emerged as a 
response to the needs of the times, and a conscientious effort has been made whenever 
possible to indicate the probable causes of change along with presenting a description 
of the major changes and developments that occurred. 
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An Accountant's View of History 
The historical account that follows is clearly an accountant's view of history rather 
than an historian's view of accounting, and highlights the fact that accounting and 
auditing would seem to have played a more significant role in our economic develop-
ment than is often recognized—a role that can be traced from the beginning of recorded 
civilization to the present day. To facilitate comprehension of a sweep of such vast 
dimension, 6,000 years of history are subdivided into eras marked by milestones that 
are the more significant factors and events in the development of accounting and 
auditing: 
Forty centuries B . C . to fifth century A.D.—the development of writing and 
records. 
Fifth century A . D . to 1500 - the introduction of Arabic numerals and place value 
and subsequent use of that number system in the development of the double 
entry system of bookkeeping. 
1500 to 1790—from Pacioli's Summa to the beginning of the Industrial Revolution. 
1790 to 1900 — from the Industrial Revolution to the period of mergers and "Big 
Business." 
1900 to 1930 - the development of Big Business and its relapse with the onset of 
the Great Depression. 
1930 to the present - the advent of regulation in the United States; development 
and maturation of accounting, auditing, and the public accounting profession. 
Forty Centuries B.C.—Counting and Writing 
With the development of the ability to communicate through spoken language and 
the cooperation that communication made possible, people banded together and 
thereby became susceptible to some form of governance and control. Invariably the 
power of the ruling authority was used to exact tribute from the governed, and the 
resulting accumulated wealth presented problems of control that exceeded the ability 
to keep track mentally of what had been collected. Adequate control depended on a 
record of what was received and disbursed, and was probably a contributing factor to 
the development of writing. Indeed, Eric Hoffer (1966) was prompted to observe that 
writing was developed not to write books but to keep books. 
Some of the earliest known writings originated in the Mesopotamian Valley of the 
Middle East about 4000 B.C. (Keister 1965), and appear to be commercial records 
created to account for physical things by marks scratched into clay tablets. The 
writing and associated counting to record the quantity of things were representational 
in the form of pictographs—pictures of objects or parts of objects with each picture of 
an object representing a count of one. It is evident that the object of such writing was 
to keep track of accumulations of things (wealth), and it is the accounting for wealth 
that has ever been the focus of the keeping of records. 
Early records were scratched into stone or inscribed on tablets of moist clay, which 
were then dried in the sun to preserve them. Some records were made on the 
Egyptian-developed papyrus, but papyrus was more expensive and less permanent, so 
few papyrus records are available for study. 
Later, to simplify writing, whole pictures of objects were reduced to characteristic 
parts of objects, and ultimately curved lines were reduced to short straight wedged 
9 
lines to facilitate recording on the moist clay with the stylus, resulting in what we 
know as cuneiform writing, from the Latin cuneus, meaning wedge. At this point, 
representational counting was in the form of a tally system, with one mark for each 
object. The literal system of Roman numerals is a further development of the tally 
system, with other characters substituted for groups of straight lines in the interest of 
economy. 
Developing along with writing was the scribal profession—a most vital and 
respected occupation, for the scribe was usually the only person in the community 
who could read or write. The brightest children were selected to become scribes and 
were sent to the temple to learn reading and writing, as well as arithmetic, law, and 
moral precepts. Such learning had a strong commercial orientation, for the scribes 
were most often employed in temples and palaces to prepare and read the records of 
the religious and economic events that had occurred. These scribes were, of course, 
the forerunners of today's accountants. 
Control systems were developed to assure accountability and accuracy, and a 
"program flow chart" in picture form, found in the tomb of Chnemhotep, illustrates 
such a system. This picture shows corn being brought to a storehouse, weighed under 
the supervision of an overseer, and placed into sacks, with a record of the sacks 
prepared by a first scribe. Then, as the sacks are carried to the roof of the storehouse 
and emptied, a second scribe prepared a record of the sacks at that point (Brown 1905, 
21). Although the pictures do not show the two records being compared, it appears 
that the purpose of the second record was to serve as a check on the first, thus 
providing the basis for subsequent audit verification. 
Brown observes that similar checks occurred as grain would be issued from the 
storehouse. Issues required a written order, and as the requisitioned grain was 
measured out and released, a scribe recorded these events, with the written order 
serving as the supporting check of the recorded issues and providing the final element 
of a complete and verifiable stores record of all movements of the grain. Author ten 
Have (1976, 25) observes that such records of the quantity of goods made it possible 
to audit the custodians in terms of the quantity of goods received and the quantity on 
hand. 
Moving ahead to the time of the Romans and their audit activities, Brown (1905, 
32) states that "The quaestors (who handled all public funds) on demitting office 
rendered an account to their successors of the state of the funds and of the condition 
of the registers, and they also submitted accounts of their administration to the 
senate," (presumably for review and acceptance). Brown also mentions that the exten-
sive government operations to be accounted for resulted in the creation of a central 
accounting office called the tabularium, where the work was carried on under a 
superintendent by a host of bookkeepers or tabularie and their assistants, who were 
often slaves. 
The Greeks, at an earlier date, showed prescience in the use of published "financial 
statements." The cost of constructing the Parthenon, a storehouse and temple to the 
goddess Athena constructed 447-432 B.C. , was chiseled on a marble column placed 
on the Acropolis in Athens (ten Have 1976, 25). 
Fifth Century A.D. - Arabic Decimal 
Notation and Place Value 
Although early records seemed to pertain almost entirely to the large accumula-
tions of wealth by rulers or governments, private wealth also existed in limited 
10 
amounts where a parallel system of private property made that possible. Private prop-
erty existed primarily at the sufferance of the ruler or central authority to the extent 
that producers were permitted to retain that portion of the fruits of their labor that 
remained after the collection of taxes. Private property coupled with personal freedom 
to engage in activities of the individual's choosing in countries fortunate enough to 
enjoy those privileges opened the door to the abundance of material things enjoyed in 
many parts of the world today, and constitute what Weaver (1953) calls "The 
Mainspring of Human Progress." 
Trading was a natural concomitant of private property and provided the opportu-
nity to increase satisfaction and wealth. Although trading originated on a local basis, it 
gradually extended to distant locations in order to add to the supply and variety of 
goods available locally. One of the commodities frequently traded was gold because 
of its universal appeal, with the use of gold as a medium of exchange eventually 
leading to the development of money in standard units of value. When occasionally 
transactions were consummated on the basis of future money settlements, this use of 
credit (from the Latin credere, to trust) provided further facilitation of trading activity. 
Records of property inflows and outflows that had been developed for heads of 
state were found to be equally useful for the early traders of the Mediterranean area. 
"Accounts" of their trading activities in the form of narrative records were kept by 
means of tallies or cuneiform characters, but these eventually gave way to other 
systems, such as Roman numerals, as more efficient means of keeping track of the 
money amounts representing the ownership and movements of goods. Similar records 
of money itself were maintained in the case of banks, developed as "storehouses of 
money" and for the exchange of the various kinds of money in circulation. 
But arithmetic operations performed on Roman numerals were most cumbersome, 
and it was easier to count on one's fingers, or to convert the numbers to the place 
value symbols of the abacus and to perform the operations by that means than to 
perform the operations mentally (ten Have 1976). The breakthrough to the more effi-
cient and manipulable base-ten system that we know as the Arabic system of decimal 
character notation and place value is credited to the Babylonians (Cooley 1937), 
although Babylonian traders may have brought back knowledge of the system from 
their trading with the Hindus of India. Especially important to this system is the incor-
poration of the symbol for zero to replace the blank space representation of the 
absence of anything sometimes used by the Mesopotamians (Keister 1965), and has 
prompted one wag to remark, "thanks for nothing." 
The Babylonian system was carried by their traders to Spain, and eventually intro-
duced to all of Europe in the twelfth century as the system was copied from the Arabs 
of Spain. Dissemination of information about this new system was aided by a book on 
the Arabic system of numerals and their use in computation written by Leonardo of 
Pisa in 1202 (Littleton 1933). 
Italian merchants were said, however, to have been resistant to the new system at 
first because Arabic records and documents were easier to alter than those in which 
Roman numerals were employed (ten Have 1976). The use of Roman numerals also 
persisted in official and public documents for many years, since that was often consid-
ered to be the only proper form for important matters of public interest (Brown 1905). 
1494 — Pacioli and Double Entry 
The first readily recognizable accounting milestone appeared in 1494 with the 
publication of Frater Luca Pacioli's 210-page treatise Summa de Arithemetica, 
Geometria, and Proportioni et Proportionalita (Everything about Arithmetic, 
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Geometry, and Proportion) which included 36 segments on bookkeeping (Green 1930, 
ten Have 1976). Worthy of note in this connection is the indication that accounting 
was considered a part of the study of mathematics; that characteristic of the church as 
the center of learning, the book was written by a Franciscan friar; and that the signifi-
cance of the book is suggested by the fact that it was one of the early books set by the 
movable type system invented by Gutenberg about 1450. (Note that the Pacioli 
Society, in celebration of the quincentennial of the publication of Pacioli's treatise is 
planning a "pilgrimage" to Sansepolcro, Italy (the birthplace of Pacioli) in June of 
1994, where a symposium on accounting history will be presented by scholars from 
throughout the world). 
Although as a result of the bookkeeping section, Pacioli is sometimes referred to as 
the "father of double entry bookkeeping," Pacioli in preparing the book was largely 
engaged in writing down what was already known. Indeed, de Roover (1938) states 
that the Pacioli work was essentially a copy of a contemporary manuscript circulating 
in the schools of Venice, and that in many ways practice in the fifteenth century was 
far ahead of the theory reflected in what had been reduced to writing. 
Development Factors 
In some of the earliest record systems only personal "accounts" were kept, and a 
narrative form was common. The narrative form is perhaps traceable to the "log" 
maintained by trading ship captains. The principal function of the log was in deter-
mining and recording the ship's position by "dead reckoning" on the basis of direction 
and distance traveled. At regular half-hour intervals based on the sounding of the 
ship's bells according to the ship's chronometer, direction of movement was deter-
mined from the ship's compass and recorded. Distance traveled was determined by the 
ship's speed of movement, which was calculated by throwing overboard a log to 
which was attached a line with knots tied at fixed intervals. By counting the knots 
payed out as the ship moved away from the log during a given period of time, the 
speed in "knots" could be determined and recorded in the ship's log—which derived its 
name from the jettisoned log that established the starting point for the calculation. 
A l l major shipboard happenings were likewise recorded in the log, such as the 
hands signed on for the voyage, storms encountered, injuries or deaths that occurred, 
ports visited, supplies and wages issued to members of the ship's crew, and most 
important from our accounting point of view, the inventory of trading goods taken 
aboard at the beginning of the voyage, and the exchanges of goods that took place at 
the ports of call. The managerial role of the ship captain thus extended to operating 
the ship, looking after the safety of crew and cargo, effecting advantageous trades, and 
keeping a meticulous record of all noteworthy events so that at the termination of the 
voyage the profit (in the form of goods) could be determined and allocated among the 
venturers who had financed the voyage. 
These "accounts" of trades and other transactions eventually came to be main-
tained under a bifurcated system, with the narrative pertaining to increases in an 
account (historical record) of related transactions entered at the top of the page and 
decreases entered on the lower portion of the page (ten Have 1976). To this system 
was eventually added the convention of arranging the narrative so that amounts 
expressed in terms of money appeared in columns to facilitate addition of the figures 
(ten Have 1976). 
Among the developments that gave rise to the double entry system was the growth 
of merchant trading and banking in Italy during the Middle Ages. The promise to pay, 
or credit, was sometimes used in obtaining financing, but entrepreneurial capital was 
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mostly the result of personal accumulation. "Personal" accounts were maintained of 
credit transactions. Subsequently, impersonal accounts for things were added to the 
system, as well as an account to keep track of the merchant's own affairs—the amount 
invested and the results of household and trading operations. 
At about the time that impersonal accounts and the merchant's investment account 
were being added to the personal-account-only records, the advantages of a bilateral 
arrangement of each account became evident. To clearly distinguish between debitor 
accounts (he owes) and creditor accounts (he trusts), increases in the former were 
entered on the left side of the account and increases in the latter accounts were entered 
on the right. As perhaps the more important of the two accounts to the merchant 
trader, debitor accounts appeared first in the ledger, and since writing proceeded from 
left to right, it was apparently natural to have increases in the important debtor 
accounts on the left, with increases in the opposite type of account on the right. 
Although no contemporary rationalization has been found for the convention of debits 
on the left, the suggested relationship to the left-to-right writing convention is 
supported by the fact that in Arabic-language countries the custom is to record debits 
on the right, corresponding to the right-to-left convention of the written language. 
The technical terms debit and credit appear to be related to be two basic classes of 
accounts, with debits being increases to debitor accounts and credits being increases 
to creditor accounts. This debitor/creditor account system holds the explanation for 
the neophyte's confusion that readily attributes the abbreviation cr. to credit but leaves 
dr. unattributable to debit, whereas the terms are apparently abbreviations derived 
from creditor and debitor. 
Other Features 
One feature of the all-inclusive self-balancing system described by Pacioli was the 
"Memorial," or day book. A major purpose of this record was to show the conversion 
of barter transactions and transactions expressed in "foreign" monies to the particular 
currency chosen as the standard for succeeding entries in the journal and ledger 
(Green 1930). We no longer find such a record in accounting systems of today inas-
much as barter has been replaced by money exchanges, and the accounting for foreign 
branch and subsidiary operations has been decentralized, with currency translation 
handled as a worksheet operation associated with the preparation of consolidated 
statements. Foreign transactions entered into by a domestic unit are converted to local 
currency directly on source documents before the transactions are recorded in the 
journal. 
Another feature of the records of Pacioli's day was the validation of the bound 
books of account by the impressing of the state seal by the consul or other city official 
(Green 1930). This procedure was followed to establish the official nature of the 
books before they were "opened," with the importance of that act indicated by the fact 
that the record of the indebtedness of another in such official records could be suffi-
cient to hold the party for a debt at law. 
The forerunner of this notion of the credence of books of account is suggested by 
the record of trial involving one Roscius, who was defended by the renowned Cicero 
against a debt claimed to be owed to a C. Fannius Chaerea. Cicero makes a major 
point of the fact that Fannius was unable to produce a record of account showing that 
the amount in question was owed by Roscius (ten Have 1976, 28). To further establish 
the authenticity and correctness of legal documents in banking transactions, a witness 
to the transaction might be noted on the record, as an outgrowth of the practice 
described by ten Have (1976, 26): "It is probable that the evidence of the existence of 
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a credit relationship was generally not furnished by the existence of notes or book-
keeping entries, but rather by witnesses who were present at the time that the credit 
relationship originated." 
As has already been mentioned, the major advance in record keeping of the period 
under discussion was the addition of accounts other than personal accounts, with the 
key account being the record of the proprietary interest of the owner of the business. 
With the closing of the circle, double entry and the equality of debits and credits had 
become a reality. The earliest known records reflecting the double entry concept are 
the ledgers of Renieri Fini & Brothers (1296-1305) and Giovanni Farolfi & Company 
(1299-1300)(Lee 1977, 79). 
Proprietary Equity 
Merchant trading was but the outgrowth of simple peddler activity, but on an 
expanded scale and ever more widely ranging. Acquiring goods from distant places 
gave rise to agency arrangements, with agents entrusted with goods or money to carry 
on trading activities on behalf of their principal. If the capital to engage in such 
expanded activities was not available from personal sources, not infrequently the 
entrepreneur would seek additional resources by entering into partnership with others. 
Double entry bookkeeping incorporating the concept of the proprietary equity was 
developed to accommodate the entrepreneurial need for information about the 
expanding multiplicity of goods, activities, and relationships. Foremost among these 
were needs for records of the goods owned, credit transactions, and agency and part-
nership relationships, with the proprietary accounts necessary to make the record 
complete. It was not uncommon in these early days of double entry to include the 
owner's household transactions in the owner's capital account, suggesting that the 
household was the economic unit being accounted for. Green (1930) points out, 
however, that some merchants kept two sets of books - one for the home and one for 
the shop, and Littleton (1933, 36) notes that with the growth of trade there developed 
the practice of trading through agents or partners, with the attendant records likely 
containing only business transactions. 
The multitude of transactions in the owner's equity account suggested the desir-
ability of separately classifying and recording similar transactions and gave rise to the 
introduction of "nominal" accounts, which Lee (1977, 88) dates to the first half of the 
fourteenth century, and which in contrast to the "real" accounts in the ledger, were 
accounts in name only. 
In maintaining the ledger, as the page for an account became filled the balance of 
the account would be transferred to a new page and the record continued thereon, so 
that there was little order within the bound ledger. The books often were not "closed" 
until completely filled and a new book was opened, although closing the books at the 
end of the year was sometimes recommended (Green 1930). Closing the books 
involved the transfer of all nominal account balances to a profit and loss account, and 
the transfer of the profit and loss balance to the owner's capital account. A l l real 
accounts were then summed, balanced, and the balance transferred to a page of 
balances (balance sheet). If the totals of debit and credit balances agreed, the books 
were considered balanced and closed, at which point the balances of the real accounts 
were entered below the balanced and ruled amounts, ready for the next cycle of trans-
actions and entries. 
Joint venture and partnership arrangements began to emerge during the period of 
Pacioli as a means of assembling additional capital and entrepreneurial skills, and 
hence Pacioli set down the principles and recommended entries for the conduct of 
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partnerships as well as sole proprietorships (Green 1930). A partnership arrangement 
increased the importance of maintaining complete records that included the propri-
etary interest, in order to ascertain the division of profits (or losses) among the 
partners, and of course the partnership records would contain only the results of trans-
actions of the partnership, and not household transactions as in merchant trader 
records. 
English Developments to the 15th Century 
Accounting development in England in some ways paralleled the developments in 
countries of the Mediterranean region, although England's remoteness from the major 
trade routes tended to delay the introduction of the innovations of the merchant 
traders. Much of the following information is drawn from Michael Chatfield's (1968) 
own essay "English Medieval Bookkeeping: Exchequer and Manor" included among 
the collected readings in his Contemporary Studies as given in the references. 
Public Records 
In common with the situation in other areas of civilization, there existed the need for 
records of the public revenues to support the government. The earliest surviving 
accounting record in English is the sheepskin Pipe Ro l l or "Great R o l l of the 
Exchequer." The Pipe Roll was prepared each year from the Domesday Book, a census 
and record of real properties and the taxes assessed thereon, based on a survey in 1086 
after William the Conqueror took title to all property in the name of the crown. The 
Pipe Roll is a narrative covering seven hundred years, relating to taxes and other levies 
due the king, the amounts of such taxes collected and remitted by the county sheriffs to 
the Court of the Exchequer, and the expenses incurred in collecting the taxes. 
The Pipe Roll was maintained in the department of the Upper Exchequer as an 
accounting for all receipts and payments. The Upper Exchequer had the authority to 
examine the Lower Exchequer or Treasurer's Department that received all monies and 
payments in kind, either directly or through the sheriffs, who were the king's repre-
sentatives. It is from the relationships between the two divisions of the Court of the 
Exchequer and the sheriffs that we have obtained our word "audit" (hearing), even 
though the verification or checking functions performed are of much earlier origin. 
The sheriffs brought to Exchequer sessions at Westminster at Easter the portion of 
the year's taxes and rents for the king's lands collected to that time. The monies and 
payments in kind were paid into the Lower Exchequer and notched incisions were 
made in a "tally stick" to record the amounts. The stick was then split along its length, 
with the stock or larger piece taken by the sheriff as a receipt for the amounts 
deposited, and the smaller foil kept by the treasurer as a "carbon copy" for the 
Exchequer archives. At Michaelmas, the sheriff would bring the additional amounts of 
revenues collected since Easter and submit to an audit. Final settlement for the year 
took place across a chequered cloth patterned after the chess board, and it is after this 
chequered cloth that the Exchequer is named. The treasurer would read from the 
Exactory Roll (based on the Domesday Book) the amounts due for that year from 
each farm in the sheriff's county. An official called the "calculator" would place 
"counters" on a row of squares equal to the amounts called by the treasurer. Both 
sheriff and treasurer had to agree on the results of this operation, which showed the 
amount with which the sheriff had been charged. Then, on a row of squares pertaining 
to the sheriff, the calculator would lay out counters equal to the installment paid at 
Easter as shown by the matched pieces of the tally stick record that had been made 
earlier. On other rows, counters were placed for the Michaelmas collections being 
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remitted and for the amounts of the sheriff's expenses and allowances as evidenced by 
writs warranting those amounts. When the counters for the amounts due were fully 
balanced by counters for the payments made, the entire operation having been 
observed by all parties based on the hearing (audit) of the accounts, the sheriff was 
"quit" and the audited amounts were recorded by the Upper Exchequer on the Pipe 
Roll in summary form. 
Disbursements from the treasury were authorized by "writ" of the Exchequer, a 
written order to pay, and it is apparently from this practice that we derive the popular 
term for bank drafts as orders to pay, with the English referring to the draft as a 
"cheque" and Americans as a "check." 
Brown (1905, 75) reports the keeping of separate records as a check of one against 
the other, such as the Exchequer's Pipe Roll, the roll kept by the Chancellor's clerk, 
and a third by a special representative of the king. At the end of the year the records 
were compared and footed by the auditors, with the probatum abbreviation 
"Pb t " 
inserted beside each amount and sum so verified. 
Manorial Records 
In the private sector of England, the key activity on which the keeping of records 
focused was the landed estates or manors, rather than merchant activities as in the 
Mediterranean region. These sizable estates held by tided persons presented a major 
management challenge, and records were needed to aid in the functioning of the 
manors. Management of these large feudal estates often encompassing hundreds of 
people was normally placed in the hands of stewards, and the lord depended on the 
keeping of accounts as a check on the honesty and performance of the stewards. Thus, 
two major aspects of the manorial system were the charge and discharge statement 
pertaining to the principal/agent relationship and the management use of accounting 
information. The earliest developments of internal check (as a fundamental aspect of 
internal control) for private activities seem to have occurred in these circumstances. 
The lack of a double entry system in these records is probably attributable to the 
absence of the profit motive that propelled the trading activity of the Mediterranean 
region. As a consequence, the prime need was for accountability, and there was ap-
parently little interest in or need for any accounting for changes in ownership equity. 
The accounting use of "to charge" as the equivalent of "to debit" is probably attrib-
utable to the English influence, as reflected in the manorial responsibilities of the 
stewards and the meaning of the verb "debit:" to charge with, as a debt. The manorial 
audit involved an approach much closer to the audit of modern times than was true of 
the audit of public records, which involved more of a form of internal checking. For 
instance, Chatfield (1968, 37) writes: 
Even six hundred years ago it was realized that an auditor's opinion had more value if he stood inde-
pendent of the parties at interest. He began by carefully examining the accounts of all officers who 
handled money, checking their arithmetic and the reasonableness of expenditure warrants. If it had 
not already been done, he then combined these accounts into a charge and discharge statement for 
the whole manor, sometimes putting his initials beside subtotals and writing below the last balance, 
"heard by the auditors undersigned." 
Finally came the annual Declaration of Audit. The charge and discharge statement as verified by the 
auditor was read in the presence of the lord and the assembly of stewards whose discharge of duties 
was under scrutiny. Each might be called on to answer questions and substantiate facts from his 
personal knowledge. One reason for an oral summary of accounts is obvious: the manor, like the 
Exchequer, had to be tuned to the realities of a largely illiterate society. But a public hearing.. .also 
offered special protection against fraud, since the facts were being laid simultaneously before all 
those qualified to recognize omissions and errors. 
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It was, of course, necessary to train practitioners in the art of keeping accounts and 
making audits. Oschinsky (Littleton and Yamey 1956, 93-94) mentions 20 treatises on 
manorial accounting compiled for clerks and auditors. Although dating of treatises is 
difficult to establish, Oschinsky (Littleton and Yamey 1956) concludes that four of the 
treatises were compiled prior to 1270. The manorial treatises generally contained 
specimen account forms, instructions for keeping the accounts, and guidance for audi-
tors engaged in checking the accounts, including references to determining such 
things as the amount of salt to be allowed for salting specified amounts of meat and to 
investigating expenses for indication of possibly excessive eating and drinking by 
employees. Such was the need for manorial clerks that Oschinsky (Littleton and 
Yamey 1956) reports that teaching of manorial accounting was evidently a regular 
branch of the arsdictandi at Oxford by the end of the thirteenth century. 
From Pacioli to the Industrial Revolution 
During the period following the time of Pacioli, the activities of merchants, of the 
English manors, and later of the guilds, gradually increased in scope and volume. The 
accompanying accounting and auditing developments were similarly gradual and for 
the most part represented refinements of existing techniques. 
Significant economic developments were the initiation of joint ventures to conduct 
trading on a more extensive scale and for periods of time beyond the duration of a 
single venture. The English (as well as the Dutch), denied for geographical reasons 
early access to the trade routes to the East, later formed large scale companies which 
were granted monopolistic rights to exploit trade with the East. Also, of course, in 
England there was the rapidly developing trade with New World colonies. 
People in England who migrated from the feudal estates to the cities sought 
employment in the guilds that controlled hand making (manufacturing) of such neces-
sities as cloth, iron cooking utensils and tools, and leather goods, and here, too, 
economic development had its influence on accounting. 
Bookkeeping after Pacioli 
Although Pacioli, in describing the bookkeeping system of Venetian merchants that 
emerged as early as the thirteenth century (Previts and Espahbodi 1977, 74) empha-
sized double entry and the method that incorporated the proprietary capital account, 
the merchant orientation of the system was largely toward the early idea of main-
taining an historical record of assets and liabilities and the various events that affected 
the business. The setting of the keystone in the form of the capital account was more 
for the purpose of symmetry than for information to manage the business. 
Although Pacioli recognized that the books might be closed periodically, he 
emphasized the notion of closing the books only when they were filled and it became 
necessary to begin a new record. Previts and Espahbodi attribute to Pacioli major 
refinements in the Venetian system, most important of which was setting forth the 
basic elements of a balance sheet. Pacioli's instructions included preparation of this 
rudimentary statement in the form of a periodic trial balance, but it was "extra-
compatible" and intended solely to prove the equality of debits and credits to indicate 
whether bookkeeping accuracy had been achieved. 
Some merchants of that day had expanded their activities to the point where they 
established factors (agents) in other locations, but the regular statements required of 
the affairs of a factor seemed primarily for the purpose of recording the results of the 
factor's activity in the books of the merchant who was the principal and were appar-
ently put to no additional use. 
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As had been pointed out in the previous section, however, the operation of English 
manors involved considerable managerial use of the accounting records through the 
charge/discharge aspects and the efforts to control remotely conducted operations. 
Progress toward the preparation of periodic statements from records maintained 
under the Italian system of Pacioli is evident in the Flemish Ympyn's New Instruction 
published in 1543 (ten Have 1976, 60), although Ympyn recommended closing only 
every two to four years. The principal advance advocated by Ympyn was the incorpo-
ration of a balance account as a formal part of the system. The emphasis at that time 
was, however, still on the balancing aspect to prove bookkeeping accuracy. 
Other important advances were advocated subsequently by another Flemish writer, 
Simon Stevin in his Hypomnemata Mathematica (mathematical traditions) published in 
1605 (Brown 1905, 137). Stevin, like Pacioli, was a famous mathematician and wrote 
in his national language (rather than the more formal Latin) in the hope of dissemi-
nating knowledge more widely among his countrymen. In his youth, Stevin served as a 
bookkeeper and cashier, and for a period was an instructor at the University of Leiden. 
The breadth of his interests is suggested by the fact that he was a defender of the teach-
ings of Copernicus, one of the first to make use of decimal fractions "by which we can 
operate with whole numbers without fractions," inventor of a form of locks for canals, 
and author of a treatise on fortification that was long a standard. 
In his work in accounting, he advocated the use of double entry records in public 
administration and the segregation of business and private capital. He viewed book-
keeping as a sorting technique involving first a chronological recording and then 
posting on a systematic basis to accomplish the sorting. He also viewed business and 
its attendant bookkeeping as a continuous process, with a survey of affairs to be 
prepared as an "extra-compatible" matter whenever desired and disassociated from 
closing the books, thus suggesting the management orientation of these activities. 
User orientation is likewise evident in Stevin's early efforts at classification of items 
and in his advocacy of an annual reckoning, as observed by Woolf (1912, 130): 
"Interesting innovations to be noted are the grouping of items and the balancing of the 
Profit and Loss Account at the close of the year, instead of at the end of each enter-
prise or venture, which as we have seen, formerly obtained." 
In Stevin's balancing process, he computed the net worth on the staet, a separate 
sheet of paper on which was listed all the real accounts (assets and liabilities), with the 
credit amount needed to balance representing the net worth. The profit (or nonprofit) 
was then calculated as the increase or decrease from the balance on the previous staet. 
He then prepared the staet proef, which was a listing of all the profit and expense 
accounts and which must balance with the profit calculated by comparing the two 
staeten balances to complete the proof. 
Debits on the Right 
Curiously, in the staet, Stevin listed liabilities on the debit side and assets as 
credits, the excess credits being net worth, (ten Have 1976, 65), but he gave no expla-
nation for this reversal from customary practice. Of special note is the fact that the 
English followed an identical convention. It is uncertain whether the English 
purposely followed Stevin's arrangement in deviating from the arrangement of the 
accounts in the books, or whether this is simply English individualism comparable to 
driving on the left side of the road, the non-metric system of weights and measures, 
and the non-decimal system of money. Among other explanations are that the English 
followed their manorial system of charge and discharge in business affairs, with the 
sources of capital representing the amounts for which the management stewards were 
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charged and the discharge being the assets in which the capital had been invested. A 
related explanation is that these amounts with which the management stewards were 
charged were of primary importance and were therefore listed in reading order begin-
ning on the left. Yet another possibility is that the English chose to use the "new" sheet 
of balances looking to the year ahead rather than to the "old" sheet of balances 
portraying past results. The new balance account has been recommended as a proof of 
the balances in opening a new ledger, with the balances being shown reversed to offset 
the balances carried forward to the individual accounts in opening the new ledger. 
The Pattern is Set 
Whatever the reason for the "English" balance sheet, the pattern was set in 1657 
after Cromwell required the East India Company of London to value its assets at 
particular times and publish a report thereof (ten Have 1976, 67), for the company 
used the English arrangement. That arrangement was also specified two hundred years 
later in Exhibit B of the English Companies Act of 1862, indicating the persistence of 
the practice, and by adding the force of law, making the practice well nigh immutable. 
The East India Companies 
Of prime importance in the interregnum between Pacioli and the Industrial 
Revolution were the chartering of the London East India Company in 1600 and the 
Dutch East India Company in 1602. Both represented monopolies granted to exploit 
the growing trade with distant regions, an activity which eventually involved sending 
abroad fleets of ships suitably protected against the incursions of high seas piracy, the 
assembling of large amounts of goods and precious metals as the basis for trading 
activity, and the construction of fortified settlements abroad to protect what was 
wrested from the local populace when the demand for goods became so strong that 
voluntary exchange could not be effected (ten Have 1976, 53). It is quite possible that 
the development of these enterprises of substantial magnitude can be attributed to the 
influence of the model offered by the large-scale manorial operations that were unique 
to England. The trading companies and the guilds in turn may have been the impetus 
for the development of manufacture and the Industrial Revolution, and it is likely that 
these developments together were what propelled England into its position of leader-
ship in economic matters as well as in the development of accounting and auditing. 
Originally, the English East India Company operated under a system of terminable 
joint stocks, with each voyage involving separately subscribed capital. Littleton (1933, 
210) reports 113 such distinct voyages between 1600 and 1617, with the terminable 
arrangement continuing until 1657. The simplicity of venture accounting was fully 
applicable, with the assets divided among the venturers at the completion of a voyage. 
During this period, however, the function of the ship captain diminished from that of 
full responsibility for the venture including the trading activity and all accounting, to 
that of paid manager responsible only for the running of the ship and maintaining 
records of shipboard activities. 
Liquidation of the capital at the end of each voyage made it possible for those who 
so desired to drop out, with others admitted to take their place. The result was a form 
of quasi-permanent capital and continuity with the attendant problems of valuing 
those "remains" of the voyage to be utilized in succeeding voyages: the ships them-
selves, warehouses at each end of the route to store the goods, and the allocation of 
joint administrative costs. The distribution of capital to be effected—the sum of the 
original capital (or what remained if the voyage was unsuccessful) plus the profits of 
the voyage—was apparently accepted on faith in most cases, especially if the voyage 
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was profitable, equaling or exceeding expectations. As a joint venturer however, each 
venturer presumably had a right to inspect "his" books if any question arose. 
Further indication of permanency was evident in 1613, when the capital called up 
was subscribed for four years, with one-fourth to be paid in each year for the fitting 
out of ships during that year, and was the first step away from the "share-in-the-
goods" interest in affairs and toward the idea of capital as an invested sum represented 
by transferable shares of specified amount. "The bookkeeping skill of the day was 
unequal to the task of successfully juggling the assets and profits of a dozen distinct 
trading ventures in various stages of completion. The need for a policy of long-time 
investments was thus indicated as a prerequisite to intelligent current management." 
(Littleton 1933, 211) 
The full scale change came about in 1657 when the company secured a new charter 
based on non-terminable stock to be valued initially at the end of seven years, and 
then every three years thereafter. On the basis of such valuation, a shareholder who 
wished to withdraw was entitled to have his place taken by another, and that arrange-
ment opened the way to trading in the shares of the joint-stock company. 
Trading in the shares of the Dutch East India Company began in Antwerp the year 
the company was formed, and shortly thereafter in Amsterdam, but did not occur in 
the shares of the British East India Company until the latter part of the 17th century 
(Shultz 1942, 1), apparently sometime after the permanent capital arrangements of the 
1657 Charter became effective. The important distinction between capital and income 
became apparent when in 1661 the governor of the company stated that "...future 
distributions would consist of the profits earned (dividends) and not 'division,' as in 
the past." (Littleton 1933, 211) 
Permanent capital was a new development, however, only in the sense that it was 
applied to otherwise terminable activities. Permanency of investment was a natural 
consequence of such longer term undertakings as Mines Royal chartered in 1568 and 
New River Company, chartered in 1609 to bring spring water to London by conduit 
(Littleton 1933, 212). 
As there was no accepted definition of income, even though 19th century English 
statutes limited the distribution of dividends to income, differences of opinion over the 
matter were taken to the courts for resolution. "The courts were thus called upon to 
consider issues which were of importance to accounting before accounting literature 
(as contrasted with bookkeeping texts) began to appear." (Littleton 1933, 214) 
The South Sea Company 
Yet another major trading company was formed in 1711 to exploit trade in the 
South Seas and other parts of America. A secondary purpose of establishing the 
company was to convert the large floating debt of England into a funded debt by 
providing that holders of the debt could convert it into South Sea Company stock at 
par, with the interest paid on the company-held debt being added to the profits of the 
company (Hasson 1932). 
Trading activities ended when war broke out with Spain in 1718 and all company 
property in Spanish-American ports was seized. Subsequently, the acquisition of other 
state debts through exchange for stock occupied the company, as well as raising funds 
through the floating of bonds and sale of shares of stock. Offers of exchange for the 
various debts began at a conversion price per share of 114 pounds sterling and rose to 
a maximum of 1050 pounds, supported by rumors of profit potential and large divi-
dends, plus the paper profits of investors resulting from the increase in the speculative 
trading of the stock. 
20 
The brabble burst when the South Sea Company persuaded parliament to investi-
gate other companies that had been formed, often without obtaining a charter, since 
these companies were competing for investment funds. At this point speculators in the 
various stocks began to sell, and 1720 saw the bubble burst that had been inflated 
earlier that year, leaving the realization that little more than air had supported the 
bubble. Our interest in this sordid affair is in the reference to a Mr. Snell in the title of 
Hasson's article, which is discussed shortly. 
Reporting to Shareholders 
As has been pointed out earlier, merchant traders kept their own books and referred 
to the books for any desired information. Although an "extra-comptable" trial balance 
might be prepared, or an account of balances and an account of profit and loss might 
appear as pages in the ledger, these were primarily to prove bookkeeping accuracy and 
were apparently seldom consulted for information. With the fragmentation of owner-
ship that occurred with the inception of the East India companies however, changes 
were necessary. "The charter of the Dutch East India Company provided...for a 
'general accounting' every ten years. But the autocratic early-capitalistic merchants 
brazenly ignored this. Profits (which were undefined) were distributed and that was 
all...(these amounted to) about 18 percent distributed annually between 1602 and 
1798." (ten Have 1976, 54) 
The 1657 charter of the British East India Company issued during Cromwell's 
protectorate required the preparation of a statement of balances (balance sheet) after 
seven years, and after every three years thereafter, with the statements to be available 
to anyone who desired to inspect them. These requirements were met, and copies of 
the statements exist in minutes of the company that have been preserved (Sainsbury 
1925). 
The trading of shares that followed the inception of "permanent" ventures was 
largely speculative, and although a shareholder might have the right to inspect the 
books, that right was seldom, if ever, exercised. Instead, trading was based largely on 
the prospect of profits from rising prices of the shares of stock, or perhaps in a few 
cases on the annual distributions of profits. In time, reliance on such periodic distribu-
tions increased as a more meaningful basis for investment, and with that increased 
reliance there was growth in the importance of the calculation of the profit on which 
the distributions were based. Likewise, consideration was given to limiting distribu-
tions to the amount of calculated profit so that investors would not be misled by 
capital that was paid out in the guise of profit distribution. These were, however, 
developments of the next milestone era and are discussed in a subsequent section. 
Auditing 
The earlier hearing of the accounts gave way in time to the practice of reviewing 
the accounts after they had been prepared, although the two approaches were some-
times carried out conjointly, as suggested by the "report" resulting from the City of 
Aberdeen audits, 1586-1587: "Heard, seen, considerit, caculat, and allowit by the 
auditors" and "futit, calculat, and endit by Auditors," which appears in another audi-
tors' docquet (Brown 1905, 85). The latter statement is characteristic of the review of 
the records of manorial units by the lord's auditors, culminating in the preparation of 
the charge and discharge statement bearing the auditor's approval. In both situations it 
should be understood that the auditors were essentially officers of the person or 
organization for whom records had been kept and who desired assurance of the accu-
racy of those records. 
21 
The auditor who offers his services to the public seems to have been an outgrowth 
of the development of the joint-stock companies and their widely dispersed owner-
ship, as stated by ten Have (1976, 54), "In England...an auditing system was installed 
by an expert to be selected by the stockholders, and out of this 'auditor' there devel-
oped later the accountant with public responsibility." 
It is about this time that the Mr. Snell referred to earlier enters the scene. Hasson 
(1932, 128) writes that after the bursting of the South Sea bubble and the losses of 
millions of pounds by investors, "A parliamentary investigation resulted in the confis-
cation of property of many who had acted in bad faith. Charles Snell, a writing master 
and accountant, made a special audit and his report was published. It is interesting 
because it is perhaps the oldest English audit report of its kind." 
Although Snell is primarily remembered for his special South Sea Company audit 
work, he was a writing master who also taught accounts. In this capacity, he was the 
author of four texts on writing and eleven on bookkeeping, one of which could also 
have established his place in history, for the text was entirely in verse! 
The Industrial Revolution 
With the concept and framework of widespread ownership of company stocks 
established by the British and Dutch trading companies, the way had been shown to 
satisfy the voracious demand for capital generated by the Industrial Revolution, gener-
ally considered to have begun about 1760 but to have reached full bloom about 1790. 
Important in the transition from hand crafting to mechanized production were such 
inventions as the spinning jenny in 1767, the cotton gin in 1792, and James Watt's 
steam engine in 1769, which was a marked improvement over Thomas Newcomen's 
engine of 1705. 
Early companies formed to profit from the advantages of the use of machines in 
manufacture were joint-stock companies operating under charter of the crown. These 
companies apparently involved unlimited liability on the part of joint-stock members, 
but in 1825 the crown was empowered to grant charters with specific provisions 
regarding the liability or nonliability of members (Littleton 1933, 252). In 1844 
Parliament simplified the formation of joint-stock companies by substituting registra-
tion for the formal chartering required to that time, but no provision was made for 
limiting the liability of stockholders for the debts of the company. However, an 1855 
act of Parliament made it possible for companies registered under the 1844 act to 
obtain certificates of limited liability. 
The Companies Act of 1862 consolidated the British law on the formation of 
companies, providing for limited liability and requiring that the company use 
"Limited" or "ltd." as the last word of the corporate name, thus opening the doors to 
the limited form of incorporation that is the basis for most privately organized 
economic activity throughout the world today. 
Developments were also occurring in the United States, where the Buttonwood 
Tree Agreement of 1792 established a formal arrangement for the "Purchase and Sale 
of Public Stock" by the twenty-four brokers who signed the agreement (Shultz 1942, 
2). Early trading activity was concentrated in government bonds issued to refund 
Revolutionary War debts and in the shares of bank stocks, supplemented later by state 
and city bonds issued to finance such projects as the Erie Canal, the stocks of fire and 
marine insurance companies, and the stocks of railroad companies. By 1837, trading 
was taking place in the stocks of twenty-three different companies (Shultz 1942, 5). 
The securities of private companies were issued under charters of incorporation 
granted by the states on a more available basis than the earlier English charters 
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granted by the sovereign, but the arrangement was not unlike the registration require-
ments of the 1844 English Companies Act. The earliest statute for freely incorporating 
business enterprise was enacted by North Carolina in 1795 (Littleton 1933, 254). This 
and other statutes pertaining to incorporation under specified formal requirements for 
registration generally granted limited liability to the stockholders of all companies ex-
cept banks. Usually the company was required to include "Incorporated," "Inc.", 
"Corporation," or "Corp." in its name to place others on notice that liability was 
limited. 
With the advent of continuing organizations and the notion of capital as a perma-
nent contribution as opposed to a sum to be divided and distributed at the termination 
of the enterprise, attention was focused on maintaining such capital intact, distributing 
"dividends" rather than effecting divisions of the final capital, and this to maintaining 
a distinction between contributed capital and the income generated therefrom, with 
dividends to be paid only from such income. 
English Reporting Requirements 
Companies were not only required to observe the above legal requirements, but to 
issue reports so that all concerned might be able to ascertain that the requirements had 
been satisfied. Thus, the reporting requirements and related auditing requirements of 
the English Companies Acts are especially important. The following discussion of 
these reporting and auditing requirements is based largely on the article by Edey 
(1956) and an essay by Edey and Panitpakdi in Littleton and Yamey (1956). The Joint 
Stock Companies Act of 1844 specified that companies must keep books of account 
and present a "full and fair" balance sheet at each meeting of the shareholders, such 
balance sheet to be filed with the Registrar of Companies. There was no requirement 
for submission of a profit and loss account, although 1844 legislation pertaining to 
banks did require the submission of a profit and loss account as well as a balance 
sheet. Also absent was any specification of the content or arrangement of the balance 
sheet, and there was no grant of power to the Registrar to enforce the reporting 
requirement, possibly because the disclosure of company financial information was 
considered to be a matter to be decided between the shareholders and the directors. 
A surge of opposition to government regulation resulted in the striking of these 
accounting and reporting requirements in the Companies Act of 1856. The Act did 
include, however, as a supplement in Table B, a model set of articles of association 
containing exemplary clauses pertaining to the following matters: 
• The payment of dividends only out of "Profits." 
• The right of directors to set aside out of Profits, before recommending a divi-
dend, sums reserved for contingencies, equalizing dividends, or repairing or 
maintaining the "Works connected with the Business of the Company." 
• The keeping of "true Accounts...upon the Principle of Double Entry...(the 
accounts to be) open to the Inspection of the Shareholders during the Hours of 
Business." 
• The requirement that the directors "...lay before the Company in General 
Meeting a Statement of the Income and Expenditures for the past year" and also 
a balance sheet to "...contain a Summary of the Property and Liabilities of the 
Company arranged under the Heads appearing in the Form annexed to this 
Table..." 
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It is in the balance sheet form of Table B , which is classified and with suggested 
captions, that we see listed on the left as "Dr." capital and liabilities and on the right 
under "Cr." the following items in this order: property, debts owing to the company, 
and cash and investments. Worthy of note from Table B is 1) that the statements are to 
be something more than mere copies of the sheet of balances appearing in the ledger, 
2) the modern labeling of the income statement, 3) the position of the reference to the 
income statement ahead of the reference to the balance sheet, and 4) the retention of 
the idea from the earliest days of commercial activity that the account books be acces-
sible for inspection by the owner. 
The general company law was consolidated in the Companies Act of 1862, but 
there was no material change in the accounting provisions except to move the model 
articles from Table B to Table A. Subsequent attempts to reinstate mandatory provi-
sions for accounting and publication of financial statements were unsuccessful except 
in the case of special legislation pertaining to banking and insurance companies, rail-
roads, and gas and electric utilities. Company law remained essentially unchanged 
until 1900, which marks the beginning of the next milestone period. 
Reporting Requirements in the United States 
The reporting requirements of the various state incorporation statutes varied 
widely, although considerable similarity with English developments is evident, as for 
example that regulation and reporting requirements were more prevalent with respect 
to banks, insurance companies, railroads, and public utilities in recognition of the 
substantial public interest in such enterprises. 
Hawkins (1963) reports that by 1900 about half of the state incorporation statutes 
provided for either periodic reports to stockholders or reports to be issued at the 
demand of the minority stockholders. Of the other statutes, some required reports to a 
public authority (often the office of the secretary of state, which also issued corporate 
charters), but such reports were generally considered to be confidential communica-
tions between the state and the corporation and not available for public inspection. In 
other instances little more was required than the name and residence of the agent upon 
whom process might be served and the names of the directors. Competition between 
the states to attract the lucrative incorporation fees and taxes may have accounted for 
the reluctance in some instances to impose requirements that might be considered 
burdensome or objectionable. 
In the laissez faire economy of a developing nation, there was also much inclina-
tion to the privacy of affairs such as was prevalent during the time of the early 
merchant traders, and there was no tradition of financial publicity. The public was 
considered to have no right or interest in such confidential matters, and managers felt 
that revealing financial information might be of benefit to competitors (an attitude that 
still exists today, as indicated by business opposition to FTC line of business disclo-
sure requirements), and there was a feeling that caveat emptor was as applicable to 
buyers of securities as to buyers of horses. As a notable exception to the general incli-
nation toward secrecy, Bookholdt (1978, 9) notes that the railroads were one of the 
first businesses to have extensive investments in long-lived assets, necessitating 
massive amounts of outside capital, and were likewise one of the first to report on the 
custodianship of corporate management. He (Bookholdt 1978, 10) states that a report 
was issued by the Utica and Schenectady Railroad covering the period from its 
opening in 1836 until January 1, 1841, and that the report was partially reprinted in 
Hunt's Merchants Magazine. 
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Although in the U.S. a relative vacuum existed concerning government pressure for 
good accounting and financial reporting such as was evident in the Companies Acts, 
the New York Exchange sought to fill at least part of that gap. Shultz (1942) reports 
that the Exchange formed a Committee on Securities in 1861 that attempted to obtain 
information about securities on the trading list of the Exchange, and in answer to one 
such request in 1866 received the often quoted response, "The Delaware Lackawanna 
& Western R.R. Co. make no reports and publish no statements, - and have not done 
anything of the kind for the last five years." 
In 1869 the Exchange's Committee on Stock List adopted a policy to the effect that 
listed companies should agree to publish an annual financial report, although few 
companies endeavored to follow the recommendation. The Exchange was reluctant to 
attempt to enforce its policy because of the possible adverse effect on its trading activ-
ities, and in 1885 created the Unlisted Department — which placed no requirements 
on the issuers of stock being traded - in order to attract additional stocks for trading. 
The first listing agreement to include the reporting requirement was signed in 1897 by 
the Kansas City (MO) Gas Company (Shultz 1942, 14). The Exchange was more 
forceful on another matter, however, when in 1869 as a result of the overissuance of 
shares of stock in the fight for control of the Erie Railroad, it was resolved that the 
shares of all active stocks should be registered at some satisfactory agency, and, when 
the Erie did not comply, its stock was removed from the trading list. 
Developments in Accounting Theory 
The displacement of the merchant trading proprietorships and terminable joint 
stock ventures by organizations having the prospect of continuing existence and 
financed by absentee owners who had limited liability for the debts of the enterprise 
induced a number of important accounting changes. Foremost among these was the 
need to chop the income stream into discrete segments in order to ascertain what divi-
dends might be paid. Valuation of inventories, recognition of potential losses in the 
realization of receivables and inventories, the effect of deferred and accrued income 
and expense, and the limited life of the complicated machines of the Industrial 
Revolution all presented problems to the accountants of that day. 
Although Littleton (1933) recognizes evidence of the emergence of the accrual 
system in a book by Savary as early as 1712, and Lee (1977, 90) notes that the Farolfi 
ledger of 1299-1300 contains an account "Prepaid Rent," considerable time elapsed 
before the methodology of adjusting for accrued and deferred items became reason-
ably well developed. Littleton (1933) cites a book by Pilsen in 1877 as an example. 
On the whole, accruals and deferrals, inventory valuation, and depreciation were 
considered primarily in terms of their effect on the balance sheet. The balance sheet 
was the most complete statement, for it also contained the balance of the profit and 
loss account, it showed the accounting for the stewardship that had been placed in the 
hands of the company managers, and it displayed the various amounts to be taken into 
consideration in making a dividend distribution. In this view, what the stock of inven-
tory would be likely to bring, and the effect of depreciation on the property listed as 
an asset are matters of prime importance, as suggested by a bookkeeping text by 
Harris published in 1842 in New York and the book by Pilsen in 1877. Bookholdt 
(1978, 10) quotes from The Railway Times (England) of 1841, "The declaration of a 
dividend without making allowance for depreciation of stock, cannot in our opinion 
be regarded as other than fallacious." Littleton (1933) reports legal cases in 1879 and 
1880 that involve an allowance for depreciation in calculating profits available for 
dividends. 
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Auditing Requirements 
Previously noted has been the growing importance of financial information 
abstracted from the books of account and used in connection with decisions by both 
directors and investors. Given this change, it would be expected that the center of 
interest for auditing would shift from the books themselves to the statements prepared 
from the books, although a change in audit approach would not necessarily be 
implied. The functioning of the auditor as an integral part of the entity being audited 
gives way during this change to the auditor as a practicing professional providing 
auditing service to clients. These professionals were also handwriting and book-
keeping experts who stood ready to teach others the art of writing and bookkeeping or 
to assist merchants who were unable to keep their own records. Since these profes-
sionals could prepare an exemplary set of records, they could obviously determine the 
correctness of the records prepared by someone else, and it is out of this situation that 
the specialist in accounts and the auditing thereof emerges as a public accountant. 
Prior to the Companies Act of 1844, the joint-stock company organized under a 
specific charter granted by the crown was subject only to such reporting and auditing 
requirements as were specified by the charter. With the relatively simply registration 
requirements to form a company set by the 1844 act, it was deemed desirable to estab-
lish certain controls over the companies so formed. Some of these controls were for 
the protection of investors since their relationship with the company was a relatively 
impersonal one. 
A certificate of registration was to be issued only if the shareholders in their orig-
inal agreement appointed one or more auditors. Subsequent auditors were to be 
appointed at the annual shareholders' meeting. The directors were required to make up 
a "full and fair balance-sheet," sign it, and deliver it to the auditors. Subsequently, the 
directors were to send a printed copy of the balance-sheet to the shareholders prior to 
the general meeting. 
A revision of the 1844 act the next year provided that "Every auditor shall have at 
least one share in the undertaking, and he shall not hold office in the company, nor be 
in any other manner interested in its concerns, except as a shareholder." Sec. 108 of 
the act provided for the employment of outside experts by the shareholder-auditors: 
It shall be lawful for the auditors to employ such accountants and other persons as they may think 
proper, at the expense of the company, and they shall either make a special report on the said 
accounts, or simply confirm the same; and such report or confirmation shall be read together with 
the report of the directors at the ordinary meeting. 
The stated provision is reminiscent of the earlier English situation when the lord of 
the manor would hear the audited accounts of his stewards. As in the earlier day, the 
typical audit consisted largely of ascertaining that a supporting voucher existed for 
every payment, marking those vouchers and the corresponding entries to show that 
they had been audited, proving the accuracy of the bookkeeping, and ascertaining that 
the directors' balance sheet agreed with the balances in the ledger (Littleton 1933, 
290). 
The Companies Act of 1856 and the consolidating Act of 1862 which replaced it 
included essentially the same audit provisions as the 1844 act, but they appeared only 
in Table A accompanying the act that set forth the model set of bylaws. An important 
addition to the wording of the earlier act was that the auditors were to report "whether 
in their opinion the balance-sheet is a full and fair balance-sheet containing the partic-
ulars required by these regulations and properly drawn up so as to exhibit a true and 
correct view of the state of the company's affairs." 
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The 1862 act was the last act of that century of general significance, and at this 
point attention is directed to auditing developments in the United States. 
U.S. incorporation statutes made no reference to required audits, and hence 
auditing developed purely as a service activity, available to those who sought such 
services. Most early audit activity in the United States was by English accountants 
sent here to look after the interests of English companies that had established opera-
tions in the colonies. These visits were in circumstances not unlike the audits for the 
lord of the manor at the location of his various lands. Bankruptcies were, however, 
another matter, and often the visits by the English accountants were in connection 
with the winding up of the affairs of unsuccessful English companies which had 
invested in operations in the States, or unsuccessful U.S. corporations in which the 
English had invested. 
Richard Brown (1905, 198) mentions the commercial crisis in Glasgow in 1777 
that resulted from the revolt of colonies in America and the close relationship of 
Glasgow to trading in that part of the world, suggesting that accountants may have 
been involved in visits to America even in that early day. 
Professional Development 
City directories help to pinpoint the entry of accountants into public practice. The 
following counts of listings of accountants in English directories selected from 
Littleton's tabulations (1933, 269) suggest the timing and scope of this emergence: 
Accountant 
City Year Listings 
Edinburgh 1773 7 
London 1776 1 
Glasgow 1783 6 
London 1820 44 
Edinburgh 1821 58 
London 1840 107 
The first issue of The New York Directory in 1786 contained an accountant listing 
according to Edwards (1960, 44), and he states that there were fourteen accountant 
listings in the 1850 edition of that directory and thirty-one in 1880. The Philadelphia 
directory for 1850 contained four listings, and the Chicago directory for 1865 listed 
only two names (Edwards 1960, 46). 
Edwards (1960, 48-9) mentions the formation of the firm Veysey and Veysey in 
New York in 1866 by the Englishman William H . Veysey. The firm Barrow, Wade, 
Guthrie and Company was established in New York in 1883 after Guthrie had come to 
the U.S. as receiver for a bankrupt financial concern in England. Guthrie's firm was 
apparently the first to accept engagements in other locations, and hence the first 
"national" firm. The English firm of Price Waterhouse & Co. undertook work in the 
U.S. as early as 1863, and in 1890 opened an office in New York (Edwards 1960, 50). 
Edwards also mentions security offerings in the New York Times in 1890 that con-
tained an indication that the accounts had been certified by Price Waterhouse & Co. 
With the appearance of public accountants, organization of societies for the mutual 
benefit of the members and advancement of the profession could be expected to 
follow, and such has been the case. The first steps toward formation of The Society of 
Accountants in Edinburgh were taken in 1853, and the Royal Warrant for incorpora-
tion was given in 1854. The Incorporated Society of Liverpool Accountants was 
formed in 1870, and shortly thereafter in that year the Institute of Accountants in 
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London was formed. As an outgrowth of these activities, The Institute of Chartered 
Accountants in England and Wales was granted a charter of incorporation in 1880. 
The Scottish and English societies were responsible for the publication of the first 
accounting periodicals. The Society of Accountants in England, formed in 1873 and 
one of the several forerunners of the Institute of Chartered Accountants, began 
publishing The Accountant in 1874 as a monthly newspaper that was shortly changed 
to weekly publication and has continued on that basis (Brown 1905, 245). The 
Scottish societies joined together to begin publishing The Accountants' Magazine in 
1897 on a monthly basis. 
Outside this "cradle of the accounting profession," The Association of Accountants 
in Montreal was incorporated under the statutes of the province of Quebec in 1880, 
The Institute of Chartered Accountants of Ontario was incorporated by an act of the 
legislature of the province of Ontario in 1883, and the Canadian Institute of Chartered 
Accountants was incorporated by an act of Parliament in 1902 (International Practice 
Executive Committee 1975, 110). In the United States, the American Association of 
Public Accountants was incorporated under the laws of the state of New York in 1887. 
The Association was instrumental in obtaining the first CPA law in the United States, 
passed by the state of New York in 1896. Certificates recognizing qualified candidates 
as certified public accountants were authorized to be issued by the Board of Regents 
of the University of New York. 
Textbooks on auditing also made their appearance during the period under consid-
eration, and as with the earlier textbooks on accounting, they were written by 
practitioners to assist in teaching the art to others. Auditors, Their Duties and 
Responsibilities by F. W. Pixley was published in London in 1881, and Auditing by 
Lawrence R. Dicksee of the London firm of Price and Dicksee was published in 1892. 
Although the next book of interest was not published until the next milestone period, 
it is mentioned here because of its association with the Dicksee text. Robert H . 
Montgomery (1939) prepared an American Edition of Dicksee's Auditing that was 
published in 1905, and his own Auditing Theory and Practice fully reflecting U.S. 
practices was published in 1912. 
1900-1930: Accounting and Auditing Come of Age 
The seeds of accounting, planted when writing was developed to keep records, 
germinated during the merchant trader era of Pacioli's time, emerged during the 
period of the Industrial Revolution, and reached their final stages of development by 
the time of the Great Depression. 
Industrial activity outgrew the limitations of the simple corporate form developed 
to accommodate the demands of the Industrial Revolution, just as extensive merchant 
and foreign trade activity outgrew the limitations of the sole proprietorship. The scene 
of major developmental activity that had shifted from Italy to England shifted once 
again—this time to the United States, which by 1900 was revealed to be an awakening 
industrial giant that had hitherto gone relatively unnoticed. 
Notable among the many developments of the post-1900 period was the merger 
movement to form giant industrial complexes—often for the purposes of gaining 
monopolistic control over a major group of products. Mega-corporations created 
during this period included United States Steel, General Motors, and International 
Harvester Company. 
Beginning about the turn of the century, the pace of all development increased 
rapidly, with accounting and auditing sharing in that increased pace. Accounting 
became recognized as an essential tool of successful industrial management and as the 
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source of information which could serve as the basis for more rational credit and 
investment decisions. Auditing, as a companion activity, was seen to be vital as a 
means of assuring the reliability of the reported financial data used by all parties who 
were external to the business organizations whose affairs were of interest to them. 
With the above brief introduction, the discussion considers some highlights of the 
many developments that occurred within this milestone period. 
Accounting Theory 
During this period the focal point of accounting slowly but inexorably shifted from 
the balance sheet to the income statement. The offering of securities to finance the vo-
racious demand for capital brought a realization that the important question was not 
the legality of dividends in terms of their source (whether they were paid from profits 
or by a return of invested capital), but rather the annual amounts of that source - the 
profits generated by operations. Littleton (1953, 22) asserts in his Structure of 
Accounting Theory that the determination of income is the central purpose of account-
ing and offers the hypothesis "That the extensive need for dependable determination 
of periodic net income makes the income statement the most important product of 
enterprise accounting." Similarly, Sanders, Hatfield, and Moore (1938, 1) begin their 
landmark work A Statement of Accounting Principles with the observation that "The 
distinction between capital and income.. .is fundamental in accounting." 
In addition to the interest of investors and theorists in the determination of income, 
the appearance of a tax on the income of individuals and corporations in the United 
States in 1913 made believers of any who had not yet recognized that the determina-
tion of income was of signal importance. 
Attendant questions that had to be faced and resolved were the distinction between 
capital and revenue charges - whether expenditures resulted in additions to the capital 
assets of the business or were directly related to the generation of current revenues 
and to be charged against those revenues. Accounting for the allocation of capital 
costs to the revenue generated in the form of depreciation charges and the allocation 
of the cost of goods purchased to inventory and cost of goods sold were matters of 
particular importance. Merger activity and the appearance of holding companies and 
parent/subsidiary relationships introduced questions about the determination of 
income on a consolidated basis and the presentation of consolidated financial con-
dition. 
Internally, efforts by management to control the escalating costs of production led 
to the development of cost accounting, which also had important implications for 
income determination through inventory costs. Meaningful determination of produc-
tion costs on a job or process basis involved questions of cost allocation, predeter-
mined burden rates, and estimated and standard costs. 
Internal control (internal check as it was called in those days) also increased in 
importance as management became separated from the control of liquid assets and 
their attendant inflows and outflows, as well as from all other aspects of operations. 
Interest in this aspect of management was, of course, simply an extension of the ques-
tion of maintaining control by management in the face of separation from the site of 
day-to-day operations as experienced by the lords in the English manorial system. 
Interestingly, there is little indication of management interest in internal control; the 
principal interest was indirect in the form of references to the subject in the auditing 
literature, where it was recognized that when it existed, internal control could simplify 
and reduce the auditor's testing of the records. 
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Financial Reporting 
As the nineteenth century drew to a close matters were stirring in the area of finan-
cial reporting in both England and the United States. In England, 1900 marked the end 
of the swing away from government regulation instituted with the Companies Act of 
1856. The Companies Act of 1900 made an annual audit obligatory for all registered 
companies, and by implication imposed an obligation to prepare an annual balance 
sheet (Edey and Panitpakdi 1956, 371). Although there was growing interest in 
requiring that "annual accounts" be prepared, such a requirement was not introduced 
until the Companies Act of 1907. One of the reasons for hesitancy over requiring 
compulsory filing of annual accounts with the Registrar of Companies was reticence 
about making generally available through such filings information about what were 
essentially family businesses operating in corporate form. These "private" companies 
were subsequently exempted from the filing requirements of the 1907 act (Edey and 
Panitpakdi 1956, 372). The 1907 act also provided that any shareholder should be 
entitled to obtain, upon payment, a copy of every audited balance sheet laid before the 
general meeting of the company, and extended the same right to debenture holders 
except in the case of private companies. 
The Companies Act of 1929 contained a provision requiring for the first time that 
an annual profit and loss account as well as a balance sheet be laid before the 
company in general meeting. However, only the balance sheet was required to be filed 
with the Registrar, and thus the profit and loss account remained restricted informa-
tion. Also required was disclosure in the prospectus for a new stock issue of a report 
by a company's auditors of the past profits and dividends of the company and on the 
past profits of any business to be acquired. The act also defined a holding company 
and required disclosure of the manner in which profits and losses of subsidiaries were 
accounted for, but did not require disclosure of the amount of such profits (Edey 1956, 
141). 
Developments in the United States 
The growth of public ownership of industrial corporations is perhaps best indicated 
by figures reported by Hawkins (1963, 256). He reports an estimated 500,000 corpo-
rate stockholders in 1900, 2,000,000 in 1920, and 10,000,000 in 1930. The interests of 
stockholders and others were recognized as early as 1900 in the Preliminary Report of 
the Industrial Commission on Trusts and Industrial Combinations (1900, 6), which 
made recommendations that did not become realities until some thirty years later: 
The larger corporations—the so-called trusts-should be required to publish annually a properly 
audited report, showing in reasonable detail their assets and liabilities, with profit or loss; such 
report and audit under oath to be subject to Government inspection. The purpose of such publicity is 
to encourage competition when profits become excessive, thus protecting consumers against too 
high prices and to guard the interests of employees by a knowledge of the financial condition of the 
business in which they are employed. 
A major obstacle to financial disclosure requirements was the fear referred to 
previously that disclosure of information considered to be confidential could be detri-
mental through providing helpful information to competitors. This attitude toward 
confidentiality may also be traced back to the days of the merchant trader, when the 
information memorialized in his books of account was accepted as being for his use 
and for his use alone. Consequently, managers believed that the public had no right of 
access to information on such matters, and some cavalier managers even failed to 
perceive any real difference between the general public and those members of the 
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public who had provided capital for the business enterprise in question. As mentioned 
earlier, the doctrine of caveat emptor seemed to apply to securities as well as to 
tangible items of property and to relieve managers from any responsibility for 
disclosure. 
In marked contrast to these views was the announced decision of United States 
Steel Corporation to present comprehensive financial information to its stockholders, 
as exemplified by the thirty-five page report presented at the first annual meeting of its 
stockholders in 1902. The condensed general balance sheet in this report was audited 
by Price Waterhouse & Co., the auditors reporting the statement to have been 
"Audited and found correct" (Previts and Merino 1979, 176). In issuing the report, 
Judge Gary, Steel's first president, stated "Corporations cannot work on a principle of 
locked doors and shut lips" (Griedinger 1950, 4). At the same time and reflecting the 
prevailing view, McLaren (1947, 5) states that between 1897 and 1905, Westinghouse 
Electric and Manufacturing Company neither published an annual report nor held an 
annual meeting. 
The New York Stock Exchange was a significant force seeking to obtain financial 
disclosure, although in a discussion of the activities and developments of the 
Exchange, Hawkins states that the threat of government regulation was a motivating 
force behind some of the Exchange's actions. Hawkins also points out that beginning 
with the Exchange's policy set in 1869 that listed companies should agree to publish 
an annual financial report, and the first inclusion of such a requirement in the listing 
agreement with Kansas City Gas Company in 1897, all new listing agreements there-
after were to include such a provision. Its Unlisted Department was created, however, 
to permit trading in stocks not subject to the reporting requirements of the Exchange's 
listed stocks, but the department was abolished in 1910. Therefore, the Exchange 
actively sought to improve the reporting practices of its listed companies. Noteworthy 
in this regard was the agreement by General Motors in 1916 to publish semiannually a 
consolidated income statement and balance sheet. In 1924 Inland Steel Company 
agreed to issue quarterly statements of earnings, and two years later the Exchange 
officially recommended the publication of quarterly reports by all listed companies. 
Most such requirements were by individual agreement with the companies, and 
Hawkins reports the following status of these agreements in 1926 with respect to the 
957 listed companies: 
242 making quarterly reports 
79 reporting semiannually 
339 issuing annual reports 
297 no agreements with respect to the issuance of financial statements 
The Investment Bankers Association of America encouraged minimum standards 
for financial disclosures in prospectuses, but the Association had no leverage by which 
to gain acceptance of its recommendations, and many investment bankers apparently 
preferred to continue the nineteenth century practice of selling securities on the sole 
basis of the investment banker's reputation rather than on the merits of the security 
issue itself (Hawkins 1963). 
Auditing Requirements 
The Companies Act of 1900 made an annual audit obligatory for all registered 
companies, the intention of this provision apparently being to assure such audits for 
the protection of shareholders. The auditors were required to sign a certificate at the 
foot of the balance sheet stating whether or not all of their requirements as auditors 
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had been met and to make a report to shareholders on the accounts that had been 
examined and on every balance sheet laid before the general meeting during their 
tenure of office (Edey 1956). 
The Companies Act of 1907 required that an audited balance sheet be filed with the 
Registrar of Companies. The auditor's report was to state whether the balance sheet 
was a "true and correct view of the state of the company's affairs," and the auditors 
were to state whether the balance sheet was presented "according to the best of their 
information and the explanations given to them, and as shown by the books of the 
company" (Edey 1956). The act also required that no new auditor might be appointed 
without due notice of intention to nominate the auditor being given to the company by 
a shareholder. The company had in turn to give due notice of such intention to all 
shareholders and to the retiring auditor. 
The Companies Act of 1928 required not only the disclosure of past profits in 
connection with a prospectus, but also a report by the auditor on those figures. 
Although the act also required that a profit and loss account be laid before the 
company in general meeting, there was no requirement that the profit and loss account 
be audited (other than as an element of the shareholders' year-end equity) and confi-
dentiality was maintained in that the profit and loss account did not have to be filed 
with the Registrar of Companies. The act also stated that the auditors were to be 
allowed to attend the general meeting at which the audited accounts were presented 
and to make any statement about the accounts that they desired. 
In the United States, the main pressure for independent audits of financial state-
ments came from the New York Stock Exchange. May (1926, 322) reports that by 
1926 most listed companies had adopted the practice encouraged by the Exchange of 
issuing annual reports covered by the opinion certificate of an independent auditor. It 
was not until 1933, however, that the audit requirement was made mandatory by the 
Exchange. 
Auditing Practice Developments 
Audit emphasis continued on bookkeeping accuracy and agreement of financial 
statements with the books, with the detection of any fraud in the accounts a major 
auditing concern. Training of auditors was primarily on the job, but books by practi-
tioners describing auditing practice made their appearance in the United States, 
following the lead in England. Robert H . Montgomery of Lybrand, Ross Bros. & 
Montgomery (now Coopers & Lybrand) prepared an American edition of Dicksee's 
Auditing published in 1905, but Montgomery concluded that sufficient differences in 
terms of the amount of audit work being done in the United States justified writing his 
own book, and his Auditing Theory and Practice was published in 1912 
(Montgomery, 1939). Reflecting the changes occurring in his own book, Montgomery 
(1939, 91) quotes from a Journal of Accountancy review of the second edition in 
1916: "It is evident that the day of the old system of 'holler and tick' (as graphically 
epitomized by a late revered leader of the profession) is passing rapidly. It is not 
enough for the modern auditor to check, verify and state that the accounts are correct. 
He must be able to tell the connected and lucid story revealed to him by the figures; in 
other words, he has become, or should become if he thoroughly grasps the principles 
of auditing expounded in this book, a translator, or better, an interpreter." 
Other important books by practitioners were Principles of Auditing by John R. 
Wildman of Haskins & Sells, published in 1916, and Auditing by William H . Bell of 
the same firm, published in 1924. Other books published about that time and written 
by men who were as much teachers as they were practitioners were Auditing by Eric 
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L. Kohler and Paul W. Pettengill published in 1924 and Auditing Procedure by Dewitt 
Eggleston published in 1926. 
The use of testing, or sampling, rather than complete inspection of all entries began 
to make its appearance in the last decade of the nineteenth century in both England 
and the U.S., but rapidly became widely accepted with the increasing size of business 
concerns, especially the giant corporations formed as a result of the extensive period 
of merger activity at the turn of the century (Brown 1962, 698). The 1892 edition of 
Dicksee's Auditing, however, includes no mention of testing in the tracing or vouching 
of transactions, although Brown (1962, 698) cites the London and General Bank case 
of 1895 as approving the notion of sample selection of items for detailed examination 
when there is nothing to excite suspicion. 
Dicksee is equally silent on internal check, but in the 1905 American edition of 
Dicksee, Montgomery states that a proper system of internal check wil l frequently 
obviate making a detailed audit of all transactions. 
The suggestion that the auditor might wish to go beyond the books themselves and 
supporting documents appears as early as 1882 in G. P. Greer's Science of Accounts, 
where he refers to seeking proof outside the books that the balances shown in debtor 
and creditor accounts are correct (Moyer 1951, 4). 
Professional Developments 
The English professional associations had reached their essentially final form by 
1900, but much change was still evident in the United States. The American 
Association of Public Accountants, formed in 1887, became the American Institute of 
Accountants in 1917, but continued to admit both CPA's and non-CPA's to member-
ship until 1937. In 1905, the Association began publication of the Journal of 
Accountancy, and in 1916 formed its Board of Examiners, which was charged with the 
responsibility for preparing an examination to be used in evaluating applicants for 
membership in the Association, in much the same manner as in England. The first 
examination in 1917 and succeeding examinations were also offered to state boards of 
accountancy for use as the examination for the CPA certificate, with the encourage-
ment that state candidates who passed the Board examination would automatically be 
admitted to membership in the by then American Institute of Accountants. The first 
examination was offered in seven states (CPA Examination Appraisal Commission 
1961, 1). The Commission's report (1961, 71) states that by 1926 thirty states were 
using the uniform examination prepared by the Board of Examiners. 
As a result of the introduction of CPA legislation and the administration of either 
state or Institute Board of Examiners examinations, the Commission on Standards of 
Education and Experience for Certified Public Accountants (1956, 5) reported the 
following estimated numbers of CPA's: 
Accounting education at the collegiate level in the United States also developed 
during this period. The Wharton School of Finance and Commerce was founded prior 
to the period under study, in 1881, and the School of Commerce, Accounts and 
Finance of New York University was founded in 1900. The formation of both schools 
was closely tied to the developing accounting profession, and accounting was the veri-
table backbone of these schools (Stettler , 1979). Other schools also developed, and by 
1926 there were 60 schools that recognized an accounting major for the baccalaureate 
1900 
1920 
1930 
243 
4,997 
13,560 
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degree and 30 schools that accepted credit in accounting courses for the masters 
degree. These schools offered a total of 106 courses in auditing, and 335 courses in 
accounting (Stettler 1979). 
During this period a number of highly regarded university professors began 
exploring the logic and theory underlying accounting practices and writing on this 
subject. Especially notable in this regard during this period were William Morse Cole 
and Henry Rand Hatfield. Montgomery, in his Auditing Theory and Practice, dealt 
extensively with accounting matters, as auditors came to realize that a fair presenta-
tion of a company's affairs depended heavily on how transactions were treated in the 
accounts, the reasonableness of estimates and other year-end determinations that had 
to be made, and the manner in which information was presented in the financial 
statements. 
Similar concerns were reflected in a project undertaken by the American Institute of 
Accountants at the behest of the Federal Trade Commission, which in the course of its 
investigations of business matters had become concerned about the lack of uniformity 
of balance sheet audits and financial reporting (Hawkins 1963). A report of recom-
mendations prepared by an Institute committee chaired by George O. May received 
the approval of the Commission, and presumably to give the report wider acceptance 
by the banking community, was published by the Federal Reserve Board in 1917 
under the title Uniform Accounting. The pamphlet was reissued in 1918 under the more 
descriptive title Approved Methods for the Preparation of Balance Sheet Statements. 
Despite the balance sheet accounting orientation of the title, much of the pamphlet 
related to the conduct of audits and covered the audit of the income statement as well 
as the balance sheet. The pamphlet also included suggested forms for comparative 
balance sheets and income statements. 
The major concern of the Federal Reserve Board in improving the usefulness and 
reliability of financial statements submitted in support of applications for bank credit 
is suggested by the Institute's revision of the original pamphlet. The revision was 
published by the Board in 1929 under the title Verification of Financial Statements, 
the new title indicating the emphasis of the revised pamphlet on auditing. 
1930 to the Present Date - Continued Growth and Maturation 
The Great Depression brought a rude awakening to all segments of the highly inter-
related world-wide economy that had evolved. A consequence of this experience was 
the realization that in addition to outright speculation, one of the factors that led to the 
runup of prices in the stock market (at least in the United States) related to the finan-
cial information used in making investment decisions. Although there were many 
examples of both good and bad reporting, attention was concentrated on the situations 
where the financial information reported was inadequate, incomplete, or downright 
misleading. An important contributing factor in this situation was the still prevailing 
philosophy that financial information was essentially confidential and likely to be of 
more value to competitors than to investors or creditors. 
Yet, despite this natural reluctance and resistance, recognition of the importance 
and usefulness of historical financial information has resulted in continuing advances 
and improvements in financial accounting and the related reporting and disclosure 
practices. Government influence on behalf of the investing public has played an 
important part in these advances; sometimes through overt action, and other times 
through pressure backed by the threat of overt action. 
These accounting problems were further compounded by the increasing 
complexity of business financing and operations, as well as innovative methods of 
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financing developed to obtain needed capital funds. Some financing and accounting 
schemes were developed with the accompanying objective of presenting company 
affairs in a highly favorable manner, as the results would be viewed by the financial 
community. These efforts directed toward the appearance of financial soundness and 
operating results were based on the recognition that reported financial information 
was playing an increasingly important role in financial analysis as a basis for invest-
ment and credit decisions. 
The focal point in this final section on the historical development of accounting 
and auditing shifts almost entirely from England to the United States. Not only does 
the U.S. represent the environment within which this account is being written, but 
England with its earlier start and premier position seemed to have reached a point of 
relative maturity and willingness to accept things as they were. As a consequence, the 
U.S. with its vigorous and highly competitive economy became the hub for change, 
but before proceeding to the developments that occurred there, one major devel-
opment in England demands attention. 
The Companies Acts of 1947-8 and 1967 
The foundation for the 1947 act was laid by the Cohen Committee on Company 
Law Amendment, which in its 1945 report (as quoted by Edey 1956) stated: 
We consider that the profit and loss account is as important as, i f not more important than, the 
balance sheet, since the trend of profits is the best indication of the prosperity of the company, and 
the value of the assets depends largely on the maintenance of the business as a going concern. 
As a consequence of this concern, the act of 1947 specified in considerable detail 
the content of the profit and loss statement as well as the balance sheet and required 
holding companies to prepare group accounts. A l l such statements were to be audited 
and filed with the Registrar of Companies and hence became public information. 
An important new provision of the 1947 act was to limit the persons eligible for 
appointment as auditors to "a member of any body membership of which has been 
designated by the Board of Trade as qualifying its members to audit the accounts of 
companies" or to persons "designated by the Board of Trade as qualified to audit the 
accounts of companies." The act also defined a "private company" and exempted such 
companies from the above limitation on the auditors eligible for appointment, but the 
exemption was removed by the 1967 act. 
The 1948 act also changed the formerly specified wording of the auditor's report 
that the company's statements were "true and correct" to "full and fair," but the 
requirement was retained that the report should state whether the statements are in 
agreement with the books of account (Hein 1978, 78, 138, 157, 176). 
Private Sector Action in the U.S. 
Although a primary objective of publishing Uniform Accounting was to encourage 
banks to insist on audited statements prepared in conformity with the recommenda-
tions of the pamphlet, Hawkins (1963, 268) states that banks were reluctant to insist 
on audited statements for their customers out of the fear that doing so would cause 
customers to go to other banks that were more lenient, thus acting in accordance with 
a creditors' version of Gresham's Law. Business managers were equally reluctant to 
disclose the amount of information prescribed by Uniform Accounting. Nevertheless, 
by 1926 George O. May (322) was able to state that it had become almost universal 
among prominent industrial companies to have audits (and presumably to make the 
disclosures called for by Uniform Accounting and its subsequent revisions). 
35 
The stock market crash of 1929 and the resultant urgings of May and J.M.B. 
Hoxsey, the executive assistant on stock list of the New York Stock Exchange, resulted 
in the appointment of an American Institute committee in 1930 to cooperate with the 
Exchange in consideration of problems of common interest to investors (Hawkins 
1963, 269). This committee was chaired by May, and understandably considered 
views that May had expressed earlier. One of these was that the time had come for the 
American Institute to render a higher service to the community by bringing about the 
adoption of the disclosure standards of the English Companies Acts. May did not 
favor the direct legislative approach, however, and instead championed cooperative 
efforts with other interested groups, such as the stock exchange. 
The report of May's committee was published in 1933 under the title Audits of 
Corporate Accounts, and included among the recommendations for the universal 
adoption of certain broad principles of accounting was a belief that May continued to 
hold that there should be no restrictions on the right of corporations to select the 
methods of accounting deemed by them to be best adapted to their business, but that 
corporations should disclose the accounting principles that they had elected to follow. 
As a result of the committee's report, the Exchange announced on January 6, 1933 
that henceforth corporations seeking listing must submit financial statements audited 
by independent public accountants, and that all future reports to stockholders must 
likewise be audited (Hawkins 1963). 
In general, however, there was no power to force reforms on those who opposed 
them, but that deficiency was remedied by the Securities Act of 1933 and the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Early in 1933, President Roosevelt had requested 
Congress to enact a federal securities bill that would supplement the doctrine of 
caveat emptor by requiring the issuer of securities also to beware-of the consequences 
of failure to fully and fairly disclose all information that would be essential to the 
distribution of securities sold in interstate commerce. The 1933 act pertaining to the 
issuance of securities (stocks or bonds) and the 1934 act pertaining to securities traded 
on the organized exchanges were the result. 
The Securities and Exchange Commission, created by the 1934 act to administer 
both acts, was given broad authority to state and enforce accounting rules for regis-
tered companies and to require that the reports be audited. When the 1933 act was 
under consideration, the Congress was persuaded, largely through the testimony of 
George O. May and Col. A . H . Carter, President of the New York Society of Certified 
Public Accountants, that financial statements relating to a proposed issue of securities 
should be audited and that the public accounting profession rather than government 
auditors should most logically be designated to provide the audits quickly and 
economically. Accordingly, the 1933 act gave the Federal Trade Commission authority 
to require the certification of financial statements to be filed with the Commission, 
and similar authority was included in the 1934 act (Rappaport 1972, see chapter 1, p. 
5 and chapter 8). Subsequent regulations of the SEC (created by the 1934 Securities 
Exchange Act) implementing this requirement provided only that the certifying 
accountant must be independent; there has been no regulatory reference to the pro-
fessional qualifications of the certifying accountant. 
Numerous disclosure requirements have, however, been specified in great detail in 
the registration and reporting forms required to be submitted to the SEC, and in the 
related Regulation S-X governing the preparation and submission of those forms. In 
addition, various accounting and auditing matters have been covered in an increas-
ingly frequent stream of Accounting Series Releases. 
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American Institute Activities 
Somewhat paralleling the activity generated by the securities acts has been the 
ever-widening scope of the activities resulting from the voluntary assumption of 
professional responsibility by the American Institute of Accountants which as a result 
of restricting membership to Certified Public Accountants beginning in 1936, changed 
its name in 1957 to American Institute of Certified Public Accountants to more clearly 
identify its membership and professional concerns. 
In response to the formal adoption by the Institute of the recommendations of its 
Special Committee on Cooperation with Stock Exchanges, Verification of Financial 
Statements was revised and published, this time by the Institute itself, in 1936. To 
more accurately reflect the absence of certitude inherent in both the accounting under-
lying the preparation of financial statements and in the process leading to the auditor's 
professional report on the statements, the revision was entitled Examination of 
Financial Statements. Another important response was to constitute in 1939 a contin-
uing Committee on Accounting Procedure which was to deal with accounting 
problems in an effort "to narrow areas of difference and inconsistency in accounting 
practices, and to further the development and recognition of generally accepted 
accounting principles." 
During the period of its existence, the committee issued a series of fifty-one 
Accounting Research Bulletins until 1959, when it was supplanted by the Institute's 
Accounting Principles Board. The new Board was created to give the Institute's 
accounting rulemaking body broader representation, and through an extensive 
research program, hopefully to gather more widespread support for its efforts to iden-
tify acceptable accounting principles and further narrow areas of difference. The 
resulting pronouncements by the Board were thirty-one Opinions of the Accounting 
Principles Board and four Statements of the Accounting Principles Board. 
The most recent development reflected the reemergence of many of the problems 
of the Committee on Accounting Procedure, including dissatisfaction with the 
progress being made and dissension over the positions taken in some of the 
pronouncements. Such dissension frequently reflected the complaints of "those whose 
ox was being gored." In recognition of the renewed disenchantment with the 
Institute's accounting rulemaking machinery, the Institute appointed, under the chair-
manship of former SEC Commissioner Francis M . Wheat, a blue-ribbon group to 
study the means of establishing accounting principles. The report of this group, which 
became know as the Wheat Report, resulted in the formation of the independent 
Financial Accounting Foundation in 1972. The Foundation was to be supported by 
financial contributions from all segments of the accounting profession, including 
recognized professional associations of accountants, and financial executives and 
analysts in industry and education. The trustees of the Foundation were empowered to 
appoint the seven full-time, adequately compensated members of the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board. This Board was charged with directing the investigation 
and research that would serve as the basis for the issuance of Statements of Financial 
Accounting Standards after full and open consideration of underlying issues and the 
opinions of all interested parties. The euphoria that greeted the launching of the A P B 
was repeated in the case of the FASB, but the seas encountered have been equally 
stormy and some of the same disenchantment has arisen - tempered only by the real-
ization that this is probably the final opportunity to retain the responsibility for the 
determination of accounting principles in the "private sector." 
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Auditing Developments 
The pace of change in auditing has been equally as rapid as in accounting in this 
period beginning with the 1930's. The auditor's report in the U.S. changed from 
wording that stated that an audit had been made and "I certify that in my opinion" that 
the statements had been properly prepared, to the form that has become today's stan-
dard. A major change was first proposed in the Institute pamphlet Audits of Corporate 
Accounts issued in 1934. The first paragraph of the report referred to the scope of the 
auditor's examination (rather than audit), including a statement indicating that testing 
was employed rather than the traditional detailed audit of transactions. The second 
paragraph stated the auditor's opinion as to whether the statements "fairly present," 
"financial position and results of operations," in accordance with "accepted principles 
of accounting consistently maintained." 
A 1939 modification set forth in Extensions of Auditing Procedure issued by the 
Institute as a consequence of the monumental fraud perpetrated within McKesson & 
Robbins, Incorporated, added a phrase indicating that the auditor had reviewed the 
client's system of internal control and another phrase that stated (if such was the case) 
that the auditor's examination had been made "by methods and to the extent we 
deemed appropriate." As a further aftermath of the McKesson case, SEC Regulation 
S-X in 1941 required that the "accountant's certificate" must state "whether the audit 
was made in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards." 
Various other modifications in the auditor report followed, all of which are fully 
recounted in the paper by Carmichael and Winters (1982) in Auditing Symposium VI. 
The most recent major revision in the standard form of auditor's report was introduced 
in 1988 by Statement on Auditing Standards No. 58. 
In the 1920's, American auditing had changed from the British preoccupation with 
the detection of fraud and accounting errors to a primary concern for whether the 
financial statements fairly presented the financial condition and earnings of an enter-
prise. Also, the increasing size and activity of major business enterprises had led to the 
introduction of testing, and subsequently a recognition that the amount of such testing 
should appropriately depend on the internal check (now internal control) present 
within the client's accounting system (Brown 1962). 
As a direct result of the McKesson & Robbins fraud, the American Institute 
membership voted to require that audits intended to result in the expression of a favor-
able opinion on a concern's financial statements must include confirmation of 
receivables by correspondence with the concern's debtors and observation of the 
client's physical inventory taking. The 1939 pamphlet Extensions of Auditing 
Procedure was the vehicle for publishing these new requirements and became the first 
of a series of Statements on Auditing Procedure to be issued by a newly formed 
Institute Committee on Auditing Procedure charged with recommending any needed 
changes in auditing procedure. Through its life the committee, which paralleled the 
Committee on Accounting Procedure formed about the same time, issued a total of 
fifty-four such statements, including a codification of the statements in 1963 orga-
nized around its 1954 publication Generally Accepted Auditing Standards. The latter 
publication was a direct result of the need to delineate the standards after the SEC 
required the auditor's certificate to state whether an examination had been made in 
accordance with such standards. 
In 1973 the Committee on Auditing Procedure was supplanted by the Auditing 
Standards Executive Committee. The new committee continued essentially the same 
activities as its predecessors, but its pronouncements have been published as 
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Statements on Auditing Standards. In 1978 the committee was modified slightly in 
structure and renamed the Auditing Standards Board to indicate more clearly its func-
tion and to parallel the title of its by then independent counterpart, the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board. 
Other developments related to the matter of auditing standards include changes 
made at the time of the extensive restatement of the AICPA Code of Professional 
Ethics adopted by the Institute membership in 1973. Especially worthy of note is a 
new Code section "Competence and Technical Standards" that requires members to 
comply with (1) the general standards of practice stated in the Code, and (2) in audit 
engagements to comply with generally accepted auditing standards promulgated by 
the Institute, as well as with generally accepted accounting principles promulgated by 
any body designated by the Counci l of the Institute (currently the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board), unless financial statements would thereby be made 
misleading. 
Somewhat parallel developments with respect to standards were also occurring in 
England, although at a later point in time. In 1942 the Taxation and Financial 
Relations Committee of the Institute of Chartered Accountants began preparing a 
series of "Recommendations on Accounting Principles" which were submitted to the 
Institute's Council for approval. Once approved and published, the recommendations 
became guides as to what was regarded as preferred practice, but the recommenda-
tions were not binding on Institute members. After the committee had issued 15 such 
recommendations by 1953, the function of preparing the recommendations was trans-
ferred to the Research and Publications Committee. In 1970 the Institute formed the 
Accounting Standards Steering Committee to prepare "Statements of Standard 
Accounting Practice." Members of the Institute were expected to abide by these stan-
dards after their formal adoption (Benston 1976, 30-33). 
With respect to auditing practice, prior to 1960 the Institute Council "...felt that 
official guidance on auditing would be an improper intrusion into the sphere of the 
auditor's professional judgment" (Zeff 1972, 26). However, this attitude gave way to a 
position similar to that of the AICPA in the U.S., and in 1960 the Council began 
issuing "Statements on Auditing" as a continuing series. 
Reflected in both U.S. and U . K . auditing practice and in the official pronounce-
ments of the professional bodies of both countries were a number of important 
changes which are enumerated below and listed in the approximate sequence of their 
occurrence: 
1. Displacement of the detailed audit by one utilizing testing. 
2. Increase in reference to external evidence in support of financial statement 
figures, rather than relying solely on verifying the recording of transactions and 
related supporting vouchers. 
3. Recognition of the importance of internal check and control in generating reli-
able accounting records and as a basis for determining the extent of auditing 
testing of supporting evidence. 
4. The use of statistical techniques in setting sample size based on a quantification 
of the reliability and precision desired from the testing process. 
These developments, in what is generally referred to as commercial auditing, are 
directly related to the constant growth in the magnitude and complexity of the enter-
prises subject to audit. Similar organizational growth was occurring in the government 
sector. A concomitant of such growth in both the private and government sectors was 
to force managers and legislators to place increasing reliance on reports of finances 
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and operations for the units with which they were concerned. To provide assurance of 
the representativeness and accuracy of such reports, internal or intra-organizational 
audits of the reports and underlying accounting processes were introduced by most 
large private and public organizations. Subsequently, some of the more aggressive 
service-oriented audit groups recognized other opportunities to assist management in 
the exercise of control, and there emerged an audit function that was broadly 
concerned with all organizational activities. Analyses, appraisals, and recommenda-
tions concerning efficiency and operating controls were typical outputs of such 
service-oriented comprehensive audits. In the government sector, where the discipline 
of the marketplace and the profit motive were lacking, yet another audit function 
emerged: appraising the effectiveness of the programs developed by the various agen-
cies being funded by the legislative body (Churchill et al. 1977). 
Although such expanded audit activity invariably retained the fundamental concern 
with the appropriateness and accuracy of reported financial information, emphasis on 
the performance of the unit being audited in terms of efficiency and effectiveness 
rapidly became the primary concern of these comprehensive intra-organizational 
audits. Largely responsible for this shift in emphasis were the constructive benefits of 
the performance audit, in contrast to the passive benefits of audit activity directed only 
to the propriety of financial reports. 
Professional Developments 
The U.S. profession continued to grow at a rapid rate, with the long-term growth 
rate in the number of CPA's estimated to be about six percent per year (Stettler 1968). 
The large CPA firms continued to grow in size nationally, and the largest firms be-
came international in scope. A 1960 Fortune Magazine article by T. A . Wise 
originated the appellation "Big Eight" (now the "Big Six") to designate the largest of 
these. 
Preparation for entrance into the profession also underwent substantial change. 
From the earliest days, training was accomplished "on the job," or under tutelage of 
practicing members of the profession. As some indication of that state of affairs, 
Webster (1938) reports that of the 7,371 CPA candidates in the state of New York in 
the years 1929-1934, only 604 held a college degree. By 1953 the situation had 
changed to where the American Institute reported that 74 percent of the candidates 
were college graduates (Commission on Standards of Education and Experience 1956, 
57). Later figures show 88 percent with college degrees in 1966 and 95 percent in 
1970 (National Association of State Boards of Accountancy 1971, 31). 
With the growing importance of higher education in preparation for accounting and 
auditing careers, the writing of textbooks on auditing shifted from practitioners to 
educators. Although the auditing texts by Kohler and Pettengill published in 1924 and 
by Eggleston published in 1926 were transitional, in that these authors were engaged 
both in practice and in teaching, Auditing Principles and Procedures by Arthur W. 
Holmes was the first popular text written by an educator for use in college classrooms, 
and henceforth nearly all of the auditing texts published were written primarily by 
educators, although sometimes with the collaboration of practitioners. 
Internal auditors, who are in a sense the descendants of the English manorial audi-
tors, formed an international organization in 1941 to advance their professional 
interests and development: The Institute of Internal Auditors, Inc. In 1974, through its 
Board of Regents, that Institute began offering its two-day examination leading to the 
designation Certified Internal Auditor. In 1978 the Institute published Standards for 
the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing, a document that had been in prepara-
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tion since 1974 by the Institute's Professional Standards and Responsibilities 
Committee. 
Within the U.S. federal government, the long-established General Accounting 
Office became the auditing arm of the Congress—an evolutionary process that began 
with the Government Corporation Control Act of 1945 and the establishment of the 
Corporation Audits Division of the GAO. In 1949 the Comprehensive Audit Program 
was established by the Comptroller General, whereby the G A O began divesting itself 
of activities not directly related to audit and control. In 1950 the G A O was instru-
mental in forming the Federal Government Accountants' Association, now the 
Association of Government Accountants. In 1972 the Comptroller General published 
Standards for Audit of Governmental Organizations, Programs, Activities & 
Functions, which has set the standard for government auditing worldwide and fostered 
the development of performance auditing. 
Meanwhile, the American Institute concluded that given the vast amount of change 
manifested since the thirties, it would be desirable to take stock in the form of an inde-
pendent review of private sector auditing. Accordingly, a blue ribbon panel of 
knowledgeable and interested persons was assembled for the Commission on 
Auditors' Responsibilities under the chairman ship of Manuel F. Cohen, onetime 
chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission. The report of the Commission 
was published in 1978 after Cohen's death, but is generally referred to as the "Cohen 
Commission Report." This highly significant report is directed "toward improvements 
in the future auditing environment," as stated in an explanatory paragraph that intro-
duces the Commission's Report, Conclusions, and Recommendations. The report 
received much attention and has had a continuing influence on developments in the 
field of independent audits. 
The attention that has been devoted to the performance of the audit function, both 
within and outside the public accounting profession, is an indication of the importance 
of this function in an increasingly complex financial and economic environment. 
Additional indicators of that importance are present in the investigations of the public 
accounting profession completed in 1977, by the Subcommittee on Reports, 
Accounting, and Management of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 
conducted under the chairmanship of the late Senator Lee Metcalf, and by the 
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the Commerce Committee of the 
House of Representatives, conducted under the chairmanship of Representative John 
E. Moss and continuing into 1978 at the time of Moss' retirement from the House. 
A n especially significant outgrowth of the Metcalf committee hearings and of pres-
sure from the SEC was the creation of a practice division of AICPA with two practice 
sections, each of which is designated to set standards of practice and oversee the activ-
ities of section members. The SEC Practice Section includes a Public Oversight Board 
of prominent public figures intended to assure responsiveness to the interests of the 
public, and the Private Companies Practice Section addresses itself to problems asso-
ciated with the audit of clients that are privately held—in other words, not subject to 
SEC jurisdiction. For the first time, it is possible through the policing actions of these 
oversight bodies to impose sanctions or censure a firm of accountants rather than indi-
vidual Institute members, and both bodies have established mandatory peer review 
and mandatory continuing education requirements. The primary objective of both 
sections is quality assurance in the provision of public accounting services. 
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Some Concluding Observations 
Communication has been essential in the development of civilization, and the 
invention of accounting as a specialized means of communicating information about 
sets of economic events has contrbuted to that development, The central role of 
communication in the practice of accounting and auditing has created an interesting 
contrast with most other professions in that professional services in most instances 
involve doing something directly to or for a client, whereas financial accounting and 
auditing involve communicating a result to third parties. 
Accounting and auditing have attained their prominent position through the ability 
of the members of the profession to cope with the constant challenges presented by an 
increasingly complex business environment throughout the long history of the profes-
sion. Accounting information, as the service provided by the accounting profession, 
has been invaluable to business profitability on an internal basis by helping to identify 
inefficiency and by aiding in the control of widely dispersed operations. 
Supplementing the direct use of accounting information by management has been the 
development of performance auditing. On a macro basis, communication of reliable 
information about profitability has contributed to the productivity of capital and to 
economic well being by helping to channel capital to the most profitable (and hence 
most productive) opportunities. Furthermore, the availability of comprehensive reli-
able financial and operating information to those who supply business with capital has 
fostered confidence in the selection of investment opportunities and thereby helped to 
entice the vast amounts of capital needed to finance the industrial complex that 
resulted from the Industrial Revolution. The consequence of these interactions has 
been a tremendous outpouring of goods and services for the satisfaction of human 
wants and needs in an ever expanding society with constantly rising expectations. 
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Discussant's Response to "Accounting and Auditing 
History: Major Developments in England and the 
United States from Ancient Roots Through the 
Mid-Twentieth Century" 
G. William Graham 
Arthur Andersen L L P 
Summary 
Professor Stettler's paper on accounting and auditing history is a fascinating histor-
ical account. I believe it should be required reading for any business student; 
particularly those specializing in accounting. In fact, as a frequent lecturer and part-
time faculty member, I would use this paper in my classes. This historical account is 
very well written. And, unlike many academic and research oriented papers, the 
grammar and terminology is very reader friendly. 
I really liked this paper. It made me feel proud to be a member of the accounting 
profession. Indeed, the reader comes away with a rich understanding of the origins of 
the profession. However, while the paper certainly gives a thorough historical account 
through the 1970's, it does not develop the significant environmental changes facing 
the profession in the 1980's and 1990's. As a result, the student may be left wondering 
how this historical account relates to a current environment which looks so different. 
Many believe, and I agree, that our profession is at a crossroads. With the dramatic 
changes in the environment in which we practice, accountants and auditors have little 
choice but to change their historical behavior described in this paper. Students will 
benefit greatly from a strong link of the historical base to the current environment. To 
do so gives the student an appreciation for the past, an enriched understanding of the 
present, and the tools to face the significant challenges that lie ahead. 
This is an excellent historical account. Yet, there is an opportunity to make it even 
richer by expanding the discussion, bringing the historical account current, and 
linking the historical account to the challenges and opportunities of the profession. 
This will ensure the relevance of the paper to the business and accounting student. 
A Fascinating Historical Account 
The first known commercial records came from the Mesopotamian Valley around 
4000 B . C . Some were scratched into stone; others were recorded on Egyptian 
papyrus. These records evidence the development of writing which evolved from a 
need for a record of economic goods. The "scribes" of the day were the forerunners of 
today's accountant. Later, financial statements were used by the Greeks. And, double 
entry bookkeeping emerged, attributed by many to Pacioli. 
A l l of this, along with the many historical facts thoughtfully developed in this 
paper add a richness to the student's understanding of the roots of the accounting and 
auditing disciplines. Reading this paper helps to give a student perspective, a perspec-
tive that includes the role of the accountant in the capital formation process, the 
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elements of public trust and professionalism, and how accountants and auditors help 
to satisfy the need for financial information. 
Must Reading For Business Students; 
Particularly Accounting Students 
I would encourage any business student to read this paper. As mentioned above, it 
brings perspective to the role of accounting and auditing in today's business environ-
ment. In particular, it thoroughly develops the relationship of auditing to accounting. 
In my experience, this relationship is one that business students often struggle with. 
Many students have told me that their auditing classes are amongst their most 
demanding. In particular, students have difficulty relating auditing, which involves the 
examination of someone else's work, to accounting, which involves only original 
performance. The historical account helps to bridge this gap by developing the histor-
ical link between the two. Once a student gains an improved understanding of this 
link, the role of auditing in modern society is easier to put into perspective. 
This Paper Is Very Well Written 
Many academic papers are written in very technical terms. Often their audiences 
are other academics or specialists with appropriate credentials to understand the tech-
nical presentation. This paper, however, is written in a way that is suitable for the 
layman and the student. Professor Stettler does an outstanding job of writing this 
paper using a very readable style. In fact, the writing style develops the historical 
account much like a well written novel. This style significantly enhances the ability of 
this paper to be used in a classroom setting. 
I Really Liked This Paper; It Made Me Feel Good, 
Maybe Too Good 
In addition to being easy to read, this paper inspires a very positive feeling towards 
the accounting profession. The descriptions of the important role of accounting and 
auditing in the capital formation process are eloquent. As I read this paper it made me 
feel proud to be an accountant. For students, the paper is motivational. The positive 
spin on the importance of accounting and auditing wil l no doubt encourage students to 
consider the accounting profession as an attractive career opportunity. 
Yet, I found that the paper made me feel a bit too good. After all, I was aware of 
the enormous litigation problem facing the profession. And, I was aware of a some-
what diminished stature of the auditor in the public's mind. Also, the expectations 
gap, despite sincere efforts to narrow, continues to be a challenge. I knew that there 
were many needs and expectations of users of financial information that were going 
unmet. Relatedly, I knew the relevancy of historical-cost financial statements and the 
value of an audit to credit and investment decisions is on the decline. But, I also knew 
that the profession was taking important measures to begin addressing these critical 
issues. 
Importantly, none of this awareness came from this paper, but from my own 
research and experience. It made me wonder if the feeling you get from studying this 
paper was consistent with the realities of the environment in which the profession 
operates today. I concluded that it was not. Yet this made sense to me since it was 
clear that Professor Stettler's paper was not intended to venture into the present. But, 
would this satisfy the curiosity and information needs of a student? In my opinion, the 
student would react very positively to the historical account, but would immediately 
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wonder how that relates to the current environment. To be most relevant, students will 
want to understand how the history of accounting and auditing links to the present; 
and where appropriate use that linkage to point to the future. I believe there is a signif-
icant opportunity to expand this paper to bring the historical account current, provide 
the linkage from past to present and set the stage for the future. And, there is an 
opportunity to identify how the profession has responded to past expectation or 
performance gaps. 
An Opportunity To Expand the Discussion 
Most business students, particularly accounting majors, will be aware of some of 
the significant challenges facing the accounting profession. They will have learned of 
the expectations gap, the litigation problem and diminishing value of traditional finan-
cial statement information and the related auditors' report. By picking up where the 
paper presently leaves off, it would be possible to explore the roots of the problems 
now facing the accounting profession. In particular, the consolidation of the big firms 
could be examined, the litigation explosion considered, legislative developments could 
be discussed, the expectations gap could be further developed and the profession's re-
sponse to these issues described. And, the further development of the historical 
account could be linked to the challenges facing the accounting profession in the 
future. 
I suggest expansion of this work in the following areas: 
1. Consolidation - The paper could discuss how the Big 8 became the Big 6, the 
failure of several large firms and expansion into broader consulting services in the 
midst of a "mature" audit business. 
2. Litigation - The litigation explosion should be explored, including how it is af-
fecting the profession and capital formation, why it occurred and how the 
profession is responding. For example, such a discussion could include considera-
tion of the accounting profession's role in the S & L crisis in the U.S. 
3. Legislative - The discussion of legislative developments could be expanded to 
include the only significant enacted legislation affecting auditors, the FDICIA and 
how it has impacted practice. It could also mention the various proposals in 
Congress to further regulate the profession. 
4. Expectations Gap - The expectations gap should be explored, including what it is, 
how it arose, how it has broadened over time and how the profession has re-
sponded. 
5. Profession Activities - The profession has been involved in numerous activities 
addressing many of these issues. They include the issuance of new accounting and 
auditing standards, tort reform efforts, the AICPA's Special Committee on 
Financial Reporting, the McFarland report in the U.K. , the Cadbury Committee on 
corporate governance, responses to the POB report including the Kirk report, and 
the AICPA's Special Committee on Assurance Services. 
Truly, the profession is at a crossroads. A very significant chapter in the history of 
the accounting profession has been written in the last fifteen years. The changes in the 
environment have been dramatic. To expand this paper to include this period and deal 
with these changes wi l l greatly enhance its relevancy to today's business and 
accounting students. 
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Concluding Remarks 
I believe "Accounting and Auditing History...." is an important paper. It gives the 
student a sense of history that helps put the role of the accounting and auditing disci-
plines in perspective. It is both thoughtful and well written. However, I see a 
significant opportunity to broaden its scope, to delve into the last fifteen years, to link 
the past with the present, and to leave the reader with a sense of what all this means to 
the future of the accounting profession. 
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An Exploratory Analysis of the Determinants of Audit 
Engagement Resource Allocations 
Timothy B. Bell 
K P M G Peat Marwick L L P 
W. Robert Knechel 
University of Florida 
John J. Willingham, Jr. 
University of Texas at Austin 
Introduction 
The purpose of this study was to gain a better understanding of characteristics that 
impact total audit work performed on domestic financial statement audits. Prior 
studies have investigated the determinants of audit fees (see, e.g., Elliott and Korpi 
(1978) and Ashton, Elliott and Willingham (1989)). A more recent study by O'Keefe, 
Simunic and Stein (1994) (hereafter OSS) examines how client characteristics affect 
both the amount and mix of labor used on financial statement audits. OSS estimated 
five regression equations using as the dependent variables each of four types of labor 
input hours and total audit fees. Our study uses the same data as used by OSS-data 
from the period 1986 through 1989 for 249 clients of a large international accounting 
firm with primary operations in the manufacturing, merchandising and high tech-
nology industries. 
Our study extends the OSS and other prior studies in the following ways. OSS 
studied the determinants of total (domestic plus foreign) audit hours for four different 
personnel levels (partner, manager, senior and staff hours) and total audit fees. We 
limit our investigation to domestic audit hours for the following reasons: (1) statutory 
audit requirements may differ across jurisdictions, (2) differences in legal environ-
ments could affect the extent of audit work across jurisdictions, (3) differences in 
audit market conditions may exist across jurisdictions (e.g., fixed vs. variable fee 
markets), and (4) technology (e.g., audit processes) may differ across jurisdictions 
even within the same audit firm.1 We expect the existence of client foreign operations 
will impact the quantity of domestic audit work performed. Even though domestic 
auditors might not perform the actual audit work on foreign subsidiaries, consolida-
tion of these subsidiaries into a domestic parent's financial statements could lead to 
additional domestic audit work, especially administrative work dealing with the coor-
dination of the full audit. 
OSS estimated separate models for each of the four labor inputs mentioned above. 
We primarily focus on total domestic audit hours aggregated across all personnel 
1 For example, we know that the calculation of planning materiality for certain foreign jurisdictions differs 
from the domestic calculation for the firm whose data are being studied. This could directly affect sample 
sizes and the resulting extent of audit work performed. 
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Table 1 
Relationship Between Client Size and Total Audit Hours-Average and (Standard Deviations) 
Total Total Total Domestic Domestic Average 
Domestic Domestic Audit Hours Per Audit Fee 
Size Assets Sales Domestic Audit Hours and Percent of Hours @ Rank to Total Hours $1000 of Total Fees Per 
Interval (Thousands of Dollars) Partners Managers Seniors Staff Total Domestic Assets Billed Hour 
Smallest 1,330 1,854 19.0 7% 47.3 18% 109.4 43% 80.9 32% 256.6 .193 15,446 59.96 
10% (578) (1,958) (15.9) (41.7) (43.0) (34.0) (106.1) (7,628) (13.21) 
10% - 20% 2,627 5,568 16.0 5% 45.0 13% 151.6 44% 135.1 39% 347.7 .132 19,123 57.42 
(322) (2,981) (9.0) (19.6) (56.7) (92.1) (153.9) (7,002) (14.30) 
20% - 30% 3,941 8,867 21.0 5% 56.3 15% 156.7 41% 152.3 39% 386.3 .098 20,509 54.35 
(437) (4,857) (8.6) (25.0) (55.8) (69.9) (119.0) (8,964) (16.43) 
30% - 40% 6,428 14,512 20.3 5% 53.1 13% 159.4 39% 170.8 42% 403.6 .063 25,494 62.20 
(1,017) (9,331) (12.8) (26.2) (52.2) (95.9) (140.1) (12,482) (15.64) 
40% - 50% 10,168 17,249 24.5 5% 66.6 13% 208.7 40% 227.4 43% 527.2 .052 35,122 66.33 
(1,224) (7,913) (13.1) (25.6) (88.5) (126.2) (224.4) (18,887) (15.32) 
50% - 60% 16,378 40,238 42.0 6% 86.5 13% 235.5 34% 320.6 47% 684.6 .042 44,121 65.80 
(2,680) (51,871) (40.3) (63.7) (90.4) (121.7) (266.6) (18,877) (16.72) 
60% - 70% 24,241 44,652 39.3 5% 105.3 14% 284.8 37% 348.7 45% 778.1 .032 49,377 63.88 
(2,765) (27,061) (25.7) (52.3) (101.1) (188.7) (300.7) (21,888) (14.85) 
70% - 80% 40,331 81,679 55.3 6% 131.5 14% 318.5 34% 428.8 46% 934.1 .023 60,972 65.73 
(7,604) (57,829) (33.7) (86.4) (160.7) (384.0) (585.6) (40,888) (13.54) 
80% - 90% 100,423 145,438 74.9 6% 162.2 12% 350.7 27% 726.2 55% 1314.0 .013 88,323 66.74 
(43,380) (135,024) (42.9) (78.0) (129.2) (418.4) (603.7) (45,921) (13.21) 
Largest 1,016,002 1,407,242 292.7 5% 684.7 12% 1585.4 28% 3137.1 55% 5699.9 .006 421,235 73.02 
10% (1,189,569) (1,595,802) (279.0) (583.1) (1702.6) (3695.5) (5835.0) (418,251) (15.82) 
Note: Each size interval comprises ten percent of total sample and intervals are arrayed from ten percent of sample clients to largest ten percent. 
50 
levels. We tested (reported later) whether the four-equation modeling approach 
provided more explanatory power than the model estimated using aggregate hours and 
found no significant difference in proportion of explained variability in total audit 
hours. 
Finally, prior studies of audit production and pricing have applied the logarithmic 
transformation to both the dependent variable and the client size variable (and other 
independent variables) to linearize the relationship between client size and total audit 
hours. We tested several different functional forms of the size relationship and 
observed that both a two-equation approach (separate linear models for small and 
large clients) and a linear model using the square root of client size outperform the log 
model for our sample data. 
The remainder of the paper contains sections reporting on (1) the relationship 
between client size and audit hours, (2) the functional form of this size relationship, 
(3) the relationship between residual audit hours, after controlling for client size, and 
other engagement characteristics, and (4) multivariate models of total audit hours for 
small and large clients. The paper concludes with a summary and discussion of our 
research findings. 
Relationship Between Client Size and Total Audit Hours 
Prior studies have documented the predominance of client size as the most signifi-
cant determinant of the extent of audit work performed on financial statement audits. 
Table 1 presents details of this size relationship for our sample of 249 audit engage-
ments. In Table 1, the sample has been separated into ten equal intervals ranging from 
the smallest ten percent of the sample, as measured by total domestic assets, to the 
largest ten percent. For each interval, averages are presented for: client total domestic 
assets and total domestic sales, domestic audit hours by personnel rank and in total, 
total domestic audit hours per $1,000 of client total domestic assets, and domestic 
audit fees billed and average fee per hour.2 
Table 1 shows that total audit hours are increasing in client size, but at a decreasing 
rate. For the smallest ten percent of the sample whose average assets is $1.3 million, 
the average time required to perform audits was 257 hours. For the largest ten percent 
of the sample whose average assets is $1 billion, the average time required to perform 
the audits was 5,700 hours. On the smallest engagements, about l/5th of an hour of 
audit work is performed for each $1,000 of assets. For the largest engagements, this 
amount declines to six one-thousandths of an hour, or about 6 hours per $1 million in 
assets. The two right hand columns in Table 1 indicate that audit fees billed and 
average audit fee per hour both increase with client size. 
Table 1 also indicates that the mix of labor hours is different for small and large 
clients. For the smallest clients, partners and managers performed 25 percent of the 
total audit work, seniors 43 percent and staff 32 percent. For the largest clients, part-
ners and managers performed 17 percent of the total audit work, seniors 28 percent 
and staff 55 percent. Figure 1 illustrates the change in labor mix across the 10 size 
intervals.3 The figure reveals that, except for the smallest size interval, the proportion 
of partner and manager time remains roughly constant as size increases. The propor-
2 For the remainder of the paper, reference to "total assets" or "total audit hours" implies domestic amounts 
only. 
3 OSS document this change in labor mix and test the stability of regression model coefficients across the 
four models. We investigate differences in models by personnel rank in a later section. However, we do not 
perform direct tests of the homogeneity of coefficients. 
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tion of staff time steadily increases with size up to $100 million in assets. Based on 
discussions with auditors, this phenomenon can be explained as follows. 
Figure 1 
Relationship Between Client Size and Proportion of 
Total Domestic Audit Work Performed by Different Levels of Personnel 
0.6 
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$1.3 Million $2.6 Million $3.9 Million $6.4 Million $10.2 Million $16.4 Million $24.2 Million $40.3 Million $100.4 Million $1 Billion 
Size Intervals For Total Domestic Assets 
(Average Domestic Assets Given for Each Consecutive Size Interval Containing 10% of Total Sample) 
For small clients, most of the work performed by seniors is procedural in 
nature-tests of details and workpaper documentation. Little time is spent by seniors in 
a supervisory capacity, as the audit is too small to warrant cost-effective use of staff 
with an intermediate layer of supervision. As clients (and audits) increase in size, the 
senior's role changes to one involving more supervision and less procedural work. The 
expected result is that by employing a greater proportion of lower-cost staff and inter-
mediate supervision, profit is increased.4 
In the next section, we investigate alternative functional forms of the relationship 
between size and total audit hours. 
Functional Form of Relationship Between Client Size and 
Total Audit Hours 
Different transformations can be employed to linearize a relationship that increases 
at a decreasing rate. In this section, we evaluate models of the relationship between 
client size and audit hours using three transformations and a two-equation approach 
involving the separate linear modeling of small and large engagements. Prior studies 
have used what we wil l call the log model to estimate the nonlinear relationship 
between audit hours (or total fees) and client size.5 The log model involves taking the 
4 Auditors have expressed concern that this staff "leveraging" approach will not continue to be a profit 
increasing approach. Clients' internal audit operations continue to expand. The quality and accuracy of elec-
tronic processing of routine transactions has improved greatly over the last 20 years. As a result, large 
sophisticated clients are becoming less willing to pay for staff time involving the testing of routine transac-
tions where audit differences seldom arise. 
5 See, for example, Ashton, Elliott and Willingham (1989) and O'Keefe, Simunic and Stein (1994). 
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natural logarithm of both thedependent variable (hours) and the independent variable 
(size), as shown in (1) below: 
ln(Hours) = α + β * 1n(Assets) (1) 
Taking  the antilog of both sides of this equation shows its functional form 
expressed in terms of the original dependent variable, audit hours, i.e., 
Hours = eα * ( A s s e t s )β (2) 
When  expressed as a function of hours, instead of 1n(Hours), the log model con-
tains no intercept, and involves the mul iplication of a slope (eα) times assets raised to 
the power β.6 Therefore, the log model is similar to a no-intercept model with the 
independent variable being transformed by taking its nth root.7 
We  compare the explanatory power of the log model and two other transforma-
tions-taking the square root, and the cube root, of assets and leaving the dependent 
variable, hours, in itsoriginal form. The three functional forms, as estimated on the 
sample data using these three transformation methods, are depicted in Figure 2 along 
with a plot of the linear model.8 As shown in Figure 2, the estimated log model 
dampens to the greatest extreme. The square root and cube root models fall above the 
linear model up to a client size of about $2 billion, after which they fall below the 
linear model. The log model falls below the linear model at an asset size of about 
$600 million. 
Figure 2 
Four  Alternative Functions Estimating Relationship Between Client Size 
and Total Audit Hours 
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6 The log model, as estimated using ordinary least squares regression, requires the assumption that errors 
are normally distributed, as is customary. This implies that the distribution of errors from the multiplicative 
model given in equation (2) is log normal. 
7 β>1 implies a relationship that is increasing at an increasing rate, and 0<O implies a decreasing relation-
ship. Therefore, we expect 0<β<1 if the size relationship is to increase at a decreasing rate. 
8 Sample data points have been excluded because most of the client data points would cluster near the 
y-axis in this plot. This is because a few very large clients greatly expand the plot scale. Data points are 
presented in Figures 3 through 8 where small and large segments of the overall sample are separately 
plotted together with the estimated functions. 
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In addition to the transformations described above, we estimated a covariance 
model of the size relationship－2 different linear models, one for small and the other 
for large clients. Determination of the size cutoff was made by examining various 
plots of the relationship between hours and size. We defined small clients as those 163 
clients with total assets below $25 million, with the remaining 86 clients being 
defined as large. 
Table 2 presents the model slope and the R2 measure of goodness-of-fit for the 
linear, log, square root, and cube root models estimated on the total sample of 249 
clients, and for the two-equation model separately estimated on the small and large 
samples. Models of each form are also presented for different personnel ranks. 
The R 2 for the log model is not directly comparable to the R2s for the other models 
because it expresses the proportion of explained variation in the log of hours whereas 
the others express the proportion of explained variation in original hours. So, we 
computed a quasi-R2 for the log model by using the antilog of the right hand side of 
the estimated log model equation to estimate audit hours. Residuals were then 
computed using these estimates, and the resulting quasi-R2 w  computed by: 
R 2 = 1 - (ESS/TSS) (3) 
where ESS  is the error (residual) sum of squares, or the unexplained variation in hours 
and TSS is the total variation in hours. The adjusted R2 for the two-equation model 
was calculated using the squared residuals from a full covariance model where the 
model intercept and slope on size are allowed to change for large clients.9 Since thi  
full covariance model contains two additional independent variables, the adjusted R2 is 
presented in Table 2.10 
Table 2 shows that the two-equation model has the highest R2s, both for total audit 
hours and for the four models of total hours by personnel rank. The R2s for the linear 
model estimated on the total sample are very close to those for the two-equation 
model. The poorest model interms of proportion of explained variation in total hours 
is the log model. Although the proportion of explained variation in ln(hours) is close 
to the other models, when we compute residuals for original hours using the antilog of 
this model, the proportion of explained variation significantly diminishes. The square 
root model performs equally as well as the two-equation model for manager hours, 
and almost as well for total hours and other models by personnel rank. Incidentally, 
the size exponent estimated from the log model rang s from .36 to .52,which is not 
substantially different from the square root power of .5. Presumably, the square root 
model fits better than the log model because it allows for estimation of an intercept, 
which also changes the estimated slope coefficient. Goodness-of-fit is lower for the 
cube root model, although it st ll outperforms the log model. 
Figures 3 through 5 illustrate the dispersion of total audit hours around plots 
representing the linear model, the separate small and large client models, and the log 
model. Figure 3 contains the subsample of all 163 small clients. Figure 4 contains 51 
of the large clients with total assets ranging from $25 million to $100 million, and 
Figure 5 contains the remaining 35 largest clientswith as ets ranging from $100 
million to $4.2 billion. The plot was separated into hese three segments so that we 
could clearly depict the points representing each client. 
9 This is equivalent o using the combined sum of the squared residuals from the small and large models as 
the ESS in equation (3), with the usual adjustment for two additional independent variables to derive the 
adjusted R2. 
10 Both the dummy  variable that captures a shift in the model intercept for large clients and the slope adjust-
ment  on assets for large clients are significant in the covariance model at the .10 level. 
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Table 2 
Five Alternative Functions Estimating Relationship Between Client Size and Total Audit Hours 
(Models Estimated on Total Sample of 249 Audit Engagements) 
Linear Model Log Model Antilog of Log Model Square Root Model Cube Root Model Two-Equation Model 
Slope R-Sq Slope R-Sq Slope Exponent R-Sq Slope R-Sq Slope R-Sq Slope Slope R-Sq 
Total Audit Hours .0046 .82 .4406 .76 8.9990 .44 .55 7.2378 .75 80.5705 .66 .0242 .0044 .83 
Total Partner Hours .0002 .75 .4480 .62 .4199 .45 .55 .3561 .73 4.0147 .66 .0012 .0002 .76 
Total Manager Hours .0005 .74 .4132 .61 1.4993 .41 .56 .7969 .76 9.0476 .70 .0027 .0004 .76 
Total Senior Hours .0012 .72 .3635 .67 6.8582 .36 .44 1.9192 .66 21.3648 .58 .0076 .0012 .73 
Total Staff Hours .0027 .76 .5161 .71 1.7826 .52 .53 4.1656 .68 46.1434 .59 .0127 .0026 .77 
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Figure 3 
Relationship Between Client Size and Audit Hours for 163 Clients 
with Total Domestic Assets Less Than $25 Million 
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Legend: Large Model Fit on 86 Clients with Over $25 Million in Total Domestic Assets 
Small Model Fit on 163 Clients with Total Domestic Assets Less Than $25 Million 
Log Model is Antilog of Log Model 
Linear Model Fit on All 249 Client Observations 
Figure 3 shows that the log model and small model follow essentially the same 
path through the center of the client data points. The log model passes through the 
origin whereas the small model has an intercept at about 264 hours. The ratio of the 
Figure 4 
Relationship Between Client Size and Audit Hours for 51 Clients 
with Total Domestic Assets Between $25 Million and $100 Million 
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Legend: Large Model Fit on 86 Clients with Over $25 Million in Total Domestic Assets 
Small Model Fit on 163 Clients with Total Domestic Assets Less Than $25 Million 
Log Model is Antilog of Log Model 
Linear Model Fit on All 249 Client Observations 
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Figure 5 
Relationship Between Client Size and Audit Hours for 35 Clients 
with Total Domestic Assets Over $100 Million 
26000 
20800 
15600 
10400 
5200 
0 
Log Model 
100000 920000 1740000 2560000 3380000 4200000 
Client Total Domestic Assets (In Thousands) 
Legend: Large Model Fit on 86 Clients with Over $25 Million in Total Domestic Assets 
Small Model Fit on 163 Clients with Total Domestic Assets Less Than $25 Million 
Log Model is Antilog of Log Model 
Linear Model Fit on All 249 Client Observations 
small model to log model residual sums of squares is .98 for these 163 small clients, 
which confirms that the small model minimally outperforms the log model over this 
size range. Clearly, both the linear model and the large model tend to overestimate 
hours for small clients. 
Figure 4 shows that the small model, when extended into the large client range, 
significantly overestimates total audit hours. The large model has roughly the same 
slope as the linear model, but its intercept is about 350 hours higher. The log model is 
closer to the linear model when client size is just over $25 million, and it passes 
through and closely approximates the large model toward the upper end of this range 
where size approaches $100 million in assets. The ratio of the large model to log 
model residual sums of squares is 1.14 over this range, indicating that the log model 
has a better fit over the lower range of large client sizes. 
Figure 5 shows that the log model significantly dampens at the extreme upper end 
of the range of large clients, indicating that it is not descriptive of the relationship 
between size and hours for the very largest audit clients. The linear model and the 
large model trace similar paths over this upper range for the largest clients. The ratio 
of the large model to log model residual sums of squares is .36, confirming the inferi-
ority of the log model in this upper range of size. 
Figures 3 through 5 indicate that the two-equation model and the log model are 
approximately equivalent in terms of proportion of explained variation in audit hours 
for all but the very largest clients. The two largest sample clients "swamp" the models 
in that total hours are more than twice that of any other sample client. The log model 
is the least sensitive to these two observations. In fact, the sum of the two squared 
residuals for these observations when estimated using the log model (in antilog form) 
account for 82 percent of the residual sum of squares from that model in this upper 
size range. We investigated the sensitivity of results to these two "mega-clients" by 
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temporarily dropping them from the sample and recomputing the R 2s for all models. 
Both the two-equation and log models explain 69 percent of the total variation in audit 
hours for the remaining 247 clients. The linear model explains 62 percent of total vari-
ation, which is significantly lower than the two-equation and log models. The square 
root model had the best fit on this truncated sample with an R 2 = .76. 
Figure 6 
Relationship Between Client Size and Audit Hours for 163 Clients 
with Total Domestic Assets Less Than $25 Million 
1300 
1040 
780 
520 
260 
0 
Small Model 
Square Root Model 
— Log Model 
0 5000 10000 15000 20000 25000 
Client Total Domestic Assets (In Thousands) 
Legend: Small Model Fit on 163 Clients with Total Domestic Assets Less Than $25 Million 
Log Model is Antilog of Log Model Fit on 247 Client Observations 
Square Root Model Fit on 247 Client Observations 
Figures 6 though 8 illustrate the dispersion of actual total audit hours around plots 
for the separate small and large client models and the log and square root models 
when estimated on the truncated sample of 247 observations. A l l three models appear 
nearly identical for the subset of 163 small clients depicted in Figure 6. In Figure 7, 
the square root and log models appear similar for the subset of 51 clients with assets 
between $25 million and $100 million. The large model appears to slightly overesti-
mate hours within this range. For the remaining 33 large clients with assets greater 
than $100 million, the square root model depicted in Figure 8 appears to outperform 
the other two models. 
Based on the analyses presented in Table 2 and Figures 3 through 8, we make the 
following observations. First, R 2s should be cautiously interpreted when transforma-
tions are made to a dependent variable, as in the case of the log model. Reliance on 
the proportion of explained variation in the transformed dependent variable may be 
misleading. Second, the estimated two-equation model fits the relationship between 
client size and audit hours at least equally as well as the log model, and better when 
the largest clients are not truncated from the sample. Third, the square root model 
significantly outperforms both the two-equation and log models for all but the largest 
"mega-clients". 
We utilize the two-equation model for our remaining analyses of the impacts of 
other engagement characteristics on residual audit hours because it explains the 
largest proportion of total variation in the complete sample. We do not wish to exclude 
"mega-clients" from our analysis because other characteristics may explain some of 
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Figure 7 
Relationship Between Client Size and Audit Hours for 51 Clients 
with Total Domestic Assets Between $25 Million and $100 Million 
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Legend: Large Model Fit on 84 Clients with Total Domestic Assets Greater Than $25 Million 
Log Model is Antilog of Log Model Fit on 247 Client Observations 
Square Root Model Fit on 247 Client Observations 
their residual variance. However, we recognize that the square root model may 
provide slightly better control for the effect of client size on audit hours for the 
majority of clients in the sample. In the next section, we analyze the relationship 
between other engagement characteristics and residual audit hours after controling for 
client size using the two-equation model. 
Figure 8 
Relationship Between Client Size and Audit Hours for 33 Clients 
with Total Domestic Assets Over $100 Million 
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Legend: Large Model Fit on 84 Clients with Total Domestic Assets Greater Than $25 Million 
Log Model is Antilog of Log Model Fit on 247 Client Observations 
Square Root Model Fit on 247 Client Observations 
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Relationship Between Residual Audit Hours and Other 
Engagement  Characteristics 
In order to investigate the association between characteristics other than size and 
total audit hours, we computed residuals from the two-equation size model and coded 
each residual as negative or positive for both the small and large models. Negative 
residuals indicate the size model overestimates hours and positive residuals indicate 
underestimation of hours. Next we examined the association between other engage-
ment characteristics and residual signs for the small and large clients. Significant 
associations provide preliminary indications of the existence of other characteristics 
that may help explain over- or underestimation of audit hours based on size alone. For 
example, consider two clients of approximately the same size, with one having signifi-
cant foreign operations and the other having no foreign operations. If the existence of 
foreign operations necessitates more audit work, we would expect total audit hours to 
be greater for the client w th foreign operations. A suming both of these observations 
influenced the intercept and slope of the size model, it is reasonable to expect that the 
model would overestimate hours for the client with only domestic operations, and 
underestimate hours for the client with foreign operations. 
Twenty-seven engagement characteristics were investigated in the manner 
described above－17 qualitative indicators and ten continuous measures. Table 3 
reports the association between the 17 qualitative characteristics and residual signs for 
small and large clients, and for the total sample taken as a whole. Characteristics have 
been grouped into the following categories: client complexity, client controls and 
assistance, risk characteristics11 and audit characteristics. For each qualitative charac-
teristic, Table 3 reports the proportion of clients with negative residuals exhibiting the 
characteristic, the proportion of clients with positive residuals exhibiting the charac-
teristic, and the probability for a Pearson χ2 test for significant differences in observed 
and expected frequencies. Characteristics whose proportions are s g ificantly different 
for negative and positive residuals at the .05 level have been highlighted in Table 3. 
Table 3 indicates that qualitative client complexity measures are ignificantly 
correlated with residual audit hours for large clients, but not for small clients. A 
significantly higher proportion of large clients with positive residuals exhibit the exis-
tence of foreign operations, of a partially or ful  decentralized accounting and 
financial control system, and of a high degree of operational complexity, as compared 
with large clients with negative residuals. For example, sixty-three percent of those 
large clients with positive residuals have a high degree of operational complexity, 
compared to only 22 percent of large clients w th negative residuals. 
Table 3 indicates that neither quality of, and extent of reliance on, client internal 
controls nor client assistance are significantly associated with residual audit hours for 
either small or large clients. However, severalrisk characteristics appear to affect total 
audit hours. A significantly greater proportion of large clients that are public compa-
nies have positive residuals.12 A significantly larger proportion of small clients with 
excessive employee turnover have positive residuals. A higher proportion of large 
clients with low overall inherent risk have negative residuals, and a higher proportion 
11 This paper does not investigate the issue of whether, or how, auditor business risk impacts audit fees. See 
Bell, Lansdman, and Shackelford (1994) for a detailed analysis of this related topic. 
1 2 Obviously, many of the client and audit characteristics ould be assigned to more than one category. For 
example, a public company typically is a more complex client han a private company, e.g., SEC filings 
would require additional audit work. However, we include this characteristic n the risk category for 
obvious reasons. 
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Table 3 
Relationship Between Residual Audit Hours and Client and Audit Characteristics — Qualitative Variables 
(Sample Proportions Reported for Subsets of Clients with Negative vs. Positive Residual Audit Hours) 
163 Small Clients 86 Large Clients All 249 Clients 
Engagement Characteristics Neg. Pos. Prob. Neg. Pos. Prob. Neg. Pos. Prob. 
Client Complexity 
Client Has Foreign Operations (DFOROPS) 4% 11% .103 24% 45% .039 11% 23% .009 
Client's Accounting & Financial Control 
Is Partially or Fully Decentralized (DCENTRAL) 11% 14% .579 24% 51% .011 15% 27% .023 
Client's EDP Environment is Complex (DEDP) 5% 5% .954 29% 38% .382 13% 17% .411 
Operational Complexity, as Measured by the Number 
and Location of Operating Units and Diversification of 
Product Lines, is Fairly or Very Complex (DCOMPLEX) 2% 6% .258 22% 63% .000 9% 26% .000 
Client Controls & Assistance 
Client Has Poor or Virtually No Controls (DCTRL) 8% 10% .646 7% 3% .377 7% 7% .962 
Reliance on Internal Controls is Moderate to Extensive (DICRELY) 3% 4% .770 22% 20% .843 9% 10% .930 
Assistance from Internal Audit is Moderate to Extensive (DIAST) 1% 1% .867 17% 13% .528 7% 5% .689 
Client Assistance is Moderate to Extensive (DCLNAST) 69% 61% .278 74% 70% .687 71% 64% .273 
Risk Characteristics 
Client Is Public Company (DPUBLIC) 8% 15% .125 15% 58% .000 10% 30% .000 
Client Is New Company (DAGE) 3% 4% .770 2% 0% .348 3% 3% .909 
Client's Employee Turnover is Not Low (DTURN) 42% 58% .049 36% 57% .061 40% 58% .007 
Overall Inherent Risk is Low (LOWIRISK) 36% 26% .179 57% 23% .001 43% 25% .003 
Overall Inherent Risk is High (HIIRISK) 3% 11% .048 2% 5% .476 3% 9% .041 
Consolidated Shareholders' Equity is Negative (DEQUITY) 9% 11% .621 4% 3% .641 7% 8% .828 
Audit Opinion is Other Than Unqualified (DOPIN) 21% 26% .409 13% 15% .794 18% 22% .425 
Audit Characteristics 
Audit Procedures Primarily Performed Subsequent to 
Client's Fiscal Year-End (DTTMING) 100% 97% .108 74% 62% .267 91% 84% .111 
Number of Overtime Hours for Engagement is Moderate to High (DOVER) 18% 28% .163 40% 84% .000 26% 48% .000 
Boldface Indicates Pearson Chi-Square Test is Significant at the .05 Level. 
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Table 4 
Relationship Between Residual Audit Hours and Client and Audit Characteristics — Continuous Variables 
(Means Reported for Subsets of Clients with Negative vs. Positive Residual Audit Hours) 
163 Small Clients 86 Large Clients All 249 Clients 
Engagement Characteristics Neg. Pos. Prob. Neg. Pos. Prob. Neg. Pos. Prob. 
Client Complexity 
Percentage of Foreign to Total Assets (FORASST) 0.23% 2.51% .018 4.11% 7.58% .203 1.53% 4.32% .016 
Percentage of Foreign to Total Sales (FORSALES) 0.18% 2.11% .015 5.09% 9.68% .164 1.83% 4.81% .021 
Total Number of Separate Audit Reports for This Engagement (TREPORTS) 1.4 1.9 .020 3.9 5.3 .479 2.2 3.1 .224 
Audit Characteristics 
Number of Years as a Client (CLYRS) 8.3 8.8 .758 12.5 13.4 .690 9.7 10.4 .559 
Number of Years Current Partner Has Worked on 
This Engagement (PTRTOT) 4.2 4.3 .952 5.1 4.7 .699 4.5 4.4 .884 
Number of Years Current Manager(s) Has Worked on 
This Engagement (MGRTOT) 2.4 2.7 .510 3.4 3.0 .453 2.8 2.8 .986 
Number of Years Current Senior(s) Has Worked on 
This Engagement (SNRTOT) 1.7 1.6 .520 1.8 2.4 .104 1.8 1.9 .537 
Number of Calendar Days Between Client's Fiscal Year-End and 
Date of the Audit Report (URGENCY) 67.2 78.4 .121 62.7 53.3 .184 65.7 69.4 .492 
Domestic Audit Fees Billed Divided by Domestic 
Audit Hours (FEEPERHR) 62.42 59.25 .208 67.28 69.61 .430 64.05 62.95 .579 
Risk Characteristics 
Book Value of Total Liabilities Divided by Total Assets (LEVERAGE) .747 .687 .554 .590 .622 .534 .694 .664 .662 
Boldface Indicates t-test for Differences in Means is Significant at the .05 Level. 
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clients with low overall inherent risk have negative residuals, and a higher proportion 
of small clients with high inherent risk have positive residuals. 
Finally, Table 3 indicates that timing of the performance of audit procedures, i.e., 
whether significant interim work is performed, does not appear to significantly impact 
residual audit hours from the size models. However, a significant amount of overtime 
is spent by the engagement team on large clients with positive residuals. 
Table 4 reports means for characteristics measured on continuous scales for clients 
with negative and positive residuals, and the probability from t-test's for significant 
differences in observed means.13 Characteristics whose means are significantly 
different for negative and positive residuals at the .05 level have been highlighted. 
Table 4 indicates that none of the characteristics measured on continuous scales are 
significant for large clients. Three client complexity characteristics are significant for 
the small client subsample. These are: percentage of foreign to total assets, percentage 
of foreign to total sales, and the number of separate audit reports issued for the 
engagement. For each of these complexity measures, small clients with positive resid-
uals have significantly larger means. 
OSS test for auditor learning effects by evaluating the incremental contributions of 
a set of dummy variables capturing the tenure of the audit firm with the client. They 
find no evidence of the effect of audit firm learning on total audit hours. We supple-
ment their learning tests by investigating the tenure of current audit personnel, as 
opposed to audit firm tenure. In Table 4, we report tests for significant differences in 
the mean number of years personnel have worked on the current audit engagement for 
clients with negative and positive size-model residuals. The learning hypothesis would 
imply that audits being staffed by the same personnel for several years should take 
less time to complete, compared to audits with a less experienced engagement team. 
The section in Table 4 labeled "Audit Characteristics" reports the mean number of 
years partners, managers, and seniors have worked on the current engagement. These 
average experience measures are not significantly different for clients with negative 
and positive residuals, regardless of size, indicating that familiarity with the client's 
operations does not result in a reduction of audit hours. 
Summarizing to this point, preliminary tests for identifying engagement character-
istics impacting total audit work performed indicate that client complexity and certain 
audit risk characteristics are significantly associated with residual audit hours after 
controlling for client size. No initial evidence exists that quality of client internal 
controls, level of client assistance on the audit, or other audit characteristics (except 
overtime) significantly impact total work performed on financial statement audits. In 
the next section, we report the results of tests of multivariate models of total audit 
hours. 
Analysis of Multivariate Equations of Total Audit Hours for Small 
and Large Clients 
The analyses presented in the previous section provide a preliminary indication of 
those engagement characteristics other than client size that might provide significant 
incremental explanatory power in multivariate models of total audit hours. In this 
section, we report the results of our specification of a final model of total audit hours. 
We also investigate those engagement characteristics most significantly associated 
with the allocation of audit hours for different personnel ranks. 
1 3 Pooled within-groups standard deviations are used where warranted. 
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Table 5 
Multivariate Models for Total Domestic Audit Hours and Hours by Personnel Rank 
(Signed Coefficient t Statistics and Model R-Squares) 
Total Domestic 
Audit Hours 
Partner 
Hours 
Manager 
Hours 
Senior 
Hours 
Staff 
Hours 
Client & Audit Characteristics Slope t-Statistic Signed t-Statistics 
Large Clients 
Total Domestic Assets (In Millions) 1.06 3.33 1.31 (NS) 1.72 (NS) .56 (NS) 3.30 
Total Number of Separate Audit Reports 78.45 4.91 8.12 5.22 5.79 .81 (NS) 
Low Inherent Risk (Shifts Intercept) -669.83 -3.10 -1.26 (NS) -.94 (NS) -.65 (NS) -3.14 
High Operational Complexity (Shifts Intercept) 738.05 3.24 2.40 2.33 1.85 (NS) 2.20 
Slope Adjustment on Total Domestic Assets 
for Public Cos. with Foreign Operations 3.60 12.00 6.27 5.52 6.90 9.55 
Sub-Model R-Square .94 .87 .83 .83 .90 
Small Clients 
Total Domestic Assets (In Millions) 23.08 11.00 5.36 6.96 9.16 9.87 
Total Number of Separate Audit Reports 16.12 1.61 (NS) 1.46 (NS) .81 (NS) 1.14 (NS) 1.42 (NS) 
Public Company (Shifts Intercept) 118.95 2.74 5.01 5.88 .99 (NS) 1.25 (NS) 
Percentage of Foreign Sales 8.72 3.20 2.50 3.52 3.05 1.81 (NS) 
Slope Adjustment on Total Domestic Assets for Clients 
with High Inherent Risk 20.90 3.16 .54 (NS) 3.76 1.03 (NS) 3.33 
Sub-Model R-Square .54 | .31 .44 .40 .46 
Combined Model R-Square .95 .95 
(NS) = Not Significant at the .05 Level. 
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Table 5 reports our final multivariate models of total audit hours for small and large 
clients. We tested many combinations of engagement characteristics, including inter-
actions among characteristics, using our analyses of residual hours to guide our 
choices. However, we did not limit our search for significant incremental variables to 
those significant variables identified in the preliminary residual analysis. A l l of the 27 
engagement characteristics were given a chance to enter the final model in various 
forms. 
The large client model presented in Table 5 contains a set of client complexity 
measures, including size, and a low inherent risk indicator variable. A l l variables are 
incrementally significant at the .05 level and coefficient signs are consistent with our 
intuition. The model indicates resources are allocated to large audit engagements in 
the following manner. For each $1 million in total assets, one hour is added to total 
audit hours. Each audit report issued for a large engagement results in the addition of 
78 hours to the audit. On average, i f a large client is rated as exhibiting low inherent 
risk, total audit hours decline by 670.14 On average, if the client exhibits a high degree 
of operational complexity, 738 hours are added to the audit. Finally, for those large 
public clients with foreign operations (22 percent of our sample of 86 large clients), 
total audit hours increase by about five for each $1 million in total assets. The large 
client model explains 94 percent of the total variation in total audit hours for the 86 
large clients. 
The lower section of Table 5 reports our final model estimated on the 163 small 
clients. As with the large client model, this model contains a set of client complexity 
measures, including size, and an inherent risk indicator variable (slope adjustment on 
size for high, instead of low, inherent risk). A l l variables are incrementally significant 
at the .05 level except for total number of separate audit reports (t-test probability = 
.11), and all coefficient signs are consistent with our intuition. The model indicates 
resources are allocated to small audit engagements in the following manner. For each 
$1 million in total assets, 23 hours are added to total audit hours. Each audit report 
issued for small engagements results in the addition of 16 hours to the audit. On 
average, if a small client is a public company, total audit hours increase by 119. For 
each percentage point of foreign sales to total sales, audit hours increase by nine. 
Finally, for those small public clients with high inherent risk, total audit hours 
increase by about 21 for each $1 million in total assets. The model explains 54 percent 
of the total variation in total audit hours for the 163 small clients.15 
1 4 Dummy variables that shift the model intercept capture "average" effects on hours for the entire subset of 
clients exhibiting the characteristic. In reality, the effect would likely vary across engagements depending 
on the size of the client and the existence of other engagement characteristics. For some characteristics our 
model only includes a term that captures the intercept shift because additional variables that attempt to 
capture related slope changes were not statistically significant. 
15 Table 5 indicates that the large model explains a much higher proportion of total variation in hours for the 
86 large clients as compared to the proportion of total variation explained with the small model for the 163 
small clients. We can only guess as to why this is true. One explanation is that the two "mega-clients" 
discussed in an earlier section contribute a large proportion of the total variation in hours for large clients, 
and influence model fit to the extent that much of this variation is explained. We dropped the two largest 
clients from the large sample and re-estimated the final large model. The R 2 dropped to .79, still signifi-
cantly higher than for the small model. Based on discussions with auditors, we suspect the principal cause 
for higher unexplained variability in hours on small clients relates to the high degree of variability in the 
quality of the accounting support function within small clients. Some small clients have implemented high 
quality reporting systems, and others have not. For those clients who have poor systems or none at all, a 
large portion of the total audit work involves accounting work. This characteristic is virtually nonexistent 
for large clients. 
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The R 2 for the full two-equation model is .95 (adjusted R 2 = .94).16 If we delete the 
two "mega-clients" from the large sample, the R 2 for the full two-equation model 
drops to .84 (adjusted R 2 = .84), but the coefficient signs and significance levels are 
unaffected. We also estimated the full two-equation model using the square root of 
assets as the client size measure. The R 2 for this model (not shown is Table 5) is .89 
when estimated on the full sample of 249 clients, and .88 when estimated on the trun-
cated sample of 247 clients. These results indicate that the two-equation model with 
total assets used as the client size variable performs slightly better than the two-equa-
tion square root model for the full sample of 249 clients, but the two-equation square 
root model performs slightly better on the truncated sample of 247 clients. 
Table 5 also reports the t-statistics for coefficients in separate models of partner, 
manager, senior and staff hours. Client size for those large clients that are not public 
companies with foreign operations is not significant in determining the allocation of 
partner, manager and senior hours. Size most significantly impacts the allocation of 
staff hours for large clients. The same phenomenon exists for the low inherent risk 
characteristic for large engagements-staff hours are the only hours that are signifi-
cantly reduced. Partner, manager, and senior hours are significantly increased by the 
total number of separate audit reports, but staff hours are not significantly affected by 
this characteristic. For large clients with a high degree of operational complexity, allo-
cations of hours for all four personnel ranks are significantly positively impacted, but 
for seniors only marginally (t-test probability for seniors = .06). Allocations of hours 
for all personnel ranks is significantly impacted by size for those large public clients 
with foreign operations. 
For small clients, Table 5 indicates that allocations of hours for all personnel ranks 
are significantly impacted by client size. The total number of separate audit reports 
does not significantly impact allocations of hours for any rank of personnel. Sixty-
nine percent of the sample of 163 small clients have only one audit report, whereas 74 
percent of the large clients have more than one audit report. We included the variable 
in the small client models because it was marginally significant for the total hours 
model (p = .11) and because the preliminary analysis of residual hours (reported 
above) indicated significance. Partner and manager hours are significantly higher for 
publicly traded small companies, but allocations of senior and staff time are not 
significantly impacted by this characteristic. For each percentage point of foreign 
sales to total sales, audit hours for partners, managers and seniors are significantly 
increased, but not for staff. Finally, allocations of hours for managers and staff are 
significantly impacted by client size for those small clients with high inherent risk, but 
not allocations of hours for partners and seniors. 
In order to investigate whether the use of separate models by personnel rank might 
explain more of the variation in total audit hours, we estimated total hours using these 
separate models for small and large clients, and computed the proportion of total vari-
ation in total audit hours explained by the aggregate estimates. Estimated hours for 
each personnel rank were first summed for each sample client, yielding an estimate of 
total audit hours. Residuals were then computed by subtracting these estimates from 
actual hours. The squared residuals were then summed and the R 2 for total audit hours 
was computed using equation (3) given above. As indicated in Table 5, this R 2 is .95 
and is not significantly different from the R 2 resulting from application of the total 
hours model without concern for personnel ranks. In fact, the residual sums of squares 
for both approaches are almost identical. 
See footnote 9. 
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Summary 
In this study, we investigated the association between many audit engagement 
characteristics and quantity of work performed on domestic financial statement audits 
to better understand the determinants of audit resource allocations. We observed that 
for a sample of 249 manufacturing, merchandising, and high technology clients, 
different characteristics appear to impact quantity of audit work performed for small 
and large engagements. For small engagements with total assets up to $25 million, 
client size, ownership status, the percentage of foreign to total sales, and whether the 
client exhibits high inherent risk appear to significantly impact the quantity of work. 
For large engagements with total assets over $25 million, client size, the total number 
of audit reports, a high degree of operational complexity, whether the client exhibits 
low inherent risk, and whether the client is a public company with foreign operations 
appear to significantly impact the quantity of work. 
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Discussant's Response to "An Exploratory Analysis of the 
Determinants of Audit Engagement Resource 
Allocations" 
Jane E Mutchler 
Pennsylvania State University 
Introduction 
The authors provide a thought-provoking analysis of the determinants of labor hour 
allocations on audit engagements and I thank Raj for asking me to serve as a discus-
sant. I view my role as one of providing a critical analysis of the research. Thus, 
although I do believe the research is interesting and important, my comments center 
on ways in which the research could be made even more interesting and useful. I 
begin by focussing on the lack of motivation for the research question and on the rela-
tion between this research and the O'Keefe, Simunic and Stein (OSS; 1992) work.1 
Finally, I provide detailed comments on the research design and data analysis. 
Importance of the Question 
This paper is an extension of earlier work by O'Keefe, Simunic and Stein. In the 
OSS work, the authors provide four reasons why research investigating the determi-
nants of the allocation of audit hours is important. 
1. To validate previous work on the determinants of audit fees, 
2. To increase the power of tests for "learning effects" and "knowledge spillovers," 
3. To aid in understanding the supply side of the market for audit services, and 
4. To fuel the interest of those who want to analyze the audit production process. 
In the paper being reviewed, there is no discussion of the importance of the ques-
tion. One of the reasons I enjoy auditing research is that it has the potential to have 
real-world effects. As I was reading this paper, I kept asking myself, what effect will 
this have on practice? This paper describes characteristics of resource allocation deci-
sions. Is the purpose an academic exercise or is there potential for audit firm impact? 
Is the question interesting in and of itself? Is the question interesting as a test of 
economic theory? Is this theory-building research? Wil l the results allow as to set 
standards for the most efficient and/or effective allocation of labor resources? Would 
one expect differences across firms? The auditing firm that provided the data did so at 
a cost. What were they expecting from the analysis? 
Whatever the case, in making attempts to bridge the research-practice gap, the 
research should be motivated by discussing its direct or indirect effects on practice. 
Relation With Previous Research 
There are three basic differences between this paper and the OSS paper. First the 
authors focus on total domestic hours while OSS combine foreign and domestic hours. 
Second, this paper investigates different functional forms of the client size relationship 
1 Oss used the same sample and focused on similar issues. 
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while OSS used only the log transformation, and third, the focus in this paper is on 
total hours aggregated across the personnel levels while OSS estimate separate equa-
tions for each personnel level. There are also other differences in the two papers such 
as the use of residual analyses by Bell, Knechel and Willingham, but I want to focus 
this part of my discussion on the three differences that are most likely to affect the 
results. 
Domestic versus foreign hours 
Although the reasons given by the authors for deleting foreign hours are reason-
able, I find it very difficult to accept. The purpose of the study is to analyze the 
determinants of audit engagement resource allocations. For this particular sample, 
foreign hours were part of the resource allocation and should not be omitted. At this 
early stage of research on the audit production process, it would perhaps be best to 
begin the analysis with a sample of clients for whom only domestic hours were used. 
After the basic framework is developed, more complex situations using a sample of 
clients, such as used in this paper, with both domestic and foreign hours, could be 
investigated. 
Nonetheless, as this paper stands, I would like to see a better link between the OSS 
paper and this work. Some descriptive statistics on the amount of foreign hours across 
the categories would have been useful information as well as some specific tests and 
discussion of what differences were forced by the removal of foreign hours. 
Differential form of the size relation 
I have no problem with exploring different functional forms of the size/audit hours 
relation but I would like to discuss the use of the two equation model. The two equa-
tions distinguish between small and large clients with the cutpoint at $25,000,000, 
determined by examining various plots of the relation between hours and size. OSS do 
not distinguish between small and large clients but did examine the relation between 
size and hours. They found that partner and manager hours remained relatively 
constant over client size categories while senior and staff hours varied with the inter-
section of the two curves occurring at about $12,000,000. Why the difference in 
cutpoints? Is it due to the removal of foreign hours? 
Regardless of the cutpoint used, I would like to see some sensitivity analysis. How 
much does the cutpoint influence the results? How much different is a company with 
$24,000,000 in assets from a company with $26,000,000? In this research, the former 
would be considered small and the latter, large. In the end I believe much power is lost 
by categorizing the observations as small and large and believe that it should not be 
done. 
Total versus disaggregated hours 
OSS develop an a priori model and test it on each personnel level. They then test 
for differences of regression coefficients across labor categories and conclude: 
The fact that different grades of labor are not used in fixed proportions as certain client characteris-
tics vary implies that it is inappropriate to use a simple sum of labor hours as the dependent variable 
in the type of tests performed. 
In this research, the multivariate model is developed by testing many combinations 
of variables. The R 2s are then compared across total hours and the separate levels of 
labor and no differences are noted. First, I do not understand why the OSS results 
were ignored and second, I believe no differences were found in this work simply 
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because of the design. Again, I would like to see a better link between this paper and 
the OSS paper and some careful analysis of the differences between the two papers. 
Research Design and Analysis 
I would like to turn my attention now to some questions I have on the research 
design and analysis including issues related to variable choice and measurement and 
data analysis. 
Variable choice and measurement 
There is no theory which guides the choice of variables for testing the determinants 
of audit engagement resource allocations and thus we must rely, for the most part, on 
intuition and expertise. Although I acknowledge that many of the variables are 
obvious choices, I do believe that time should be spent on motivating and justifying 
the variable choices. In addition, I believe there are some alternative variables and 
measurements which should have been considered. 
Hours: Although it is not made clear, hours appear to be actual hours charged to an 
engagement rather than budgeted. It would seem that hours budgeted would be more 
reflective of basic labor resource allocation decisions. Any variance would then be 
reflective of unanticipated problems encountered in the course of the audit or antici-
pated problems not encountered. A separate analysis of the budgeted and actual would 
give more insight into factors affecting labor resource allocation decisions and 
responses of the firm to unanticipated labor allocations. 
Industry: Companies from the high tech, manufacturing and merchandising indus-
tries are included in the sample. I see no reason to believe that total audit hours for a 
standard audit would necessarily be the same across these industries. Industry differ-
ences will surely affect the results and evidence should be provided on industry effects 
or the lack thereof. OSS did test for industry differences and found that high tech 
companies were weakly significantly different than manufacturing and merchandising 
firms. They do not clarify what they mean by weakly significant, but nonetheless, 
evidence should be provided in this paper on industry effects. 
Client Size: Although both OSS and this paper use assets as a client size measure, I 
am wondering if sales might not provide a better measure of the effect of size on labor 
resource allocation decisions. Some justification should be provided for the use of 
assets rather than sales and a sensitivity analysis should be conducted indicating that it 
does or does not make a difference. 
Learning Effects: This paper uses the tenure of an individual on the audit to 
measure learning effects while OSS used audit firm tenure. It seems to me that 
learning effects would be related to tenure within a given industry and not within a 
given company. Just as a rose is a rose is a rose, a standard audit in a given industry is 
a standard audit in a given industry is a standard audit in a given industry! If a firm 
concentrates and is an expert in the merchandising industry, for example, there is no 
reason to expect significant learning effects i f they take on a new merchandising 
client. 
Opinion Variable: A variable is used to indicate when the opinion is other than 
unqualified and is found to be insignificant in the multivariate analysis. Surely an 
audit which results in an nonstandard opinion will result in more total labor hours, 
ceteris paribus, than the standard audit resulting in an unqualified opinion. I believe 
that an analysis which is designed to help us better understand the audit production 
process should initially be confined to the standard audit which results in the standard 
unqualified opinion. After learning about labor resource allocation decisions on stan-
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dard audits the analysis can then be expanded to determine effects of an nonstandard 
audit. A sample of companies receiving nonstandard opinions could be then compared 
to similar companies receiving standard unqualified opinions. This design would help 
not only to determine the specific effects of a nonstandard audit but also would ensure 
that a sufficient sample of nonstandard audits would be available for analysis. 
Years: In the paper by OSS they note that the data are from audit firm engagements 
in 1989. The same data are used in this research and are described as being from 
engagements spanning the period from 1986 to 1989. That obviously needs to be clar-
ified. If, however, the data span the 1986 to 1989 time period, then I wonder if there 
may be time period effects. As we move into 1989 there are increasing competitive 
pressures to cut costs and changes in audit technologies. These changes could affect 
resource allocation decisions across the years. 
Inherent Risk: Although clearly the assessed level of inherent risk for a given 
client wil l affect the labor resource allocation decision, I hesitate to consider the 
inherent risk measurement used in this research to be informative. I understand the 
problems but I find it difficult to accept the assumption that a client with inherent risk 
just below average is similar to a client with little if any inherent risk or that a client 
with inherent risk that is just above average is similar to a client with inherent risk 
significantly above average. We must find a way to develop a continuous measure of 
inherent risk and to use it not only in academic research but also in audit planning. 
Data analysis 
The part of the data analysis I find very troublesome is the data mining in the 
multivariate analysis. I believe it is inappropriate to use the sample to determine the 
variables of importance and then to use the same sample for the multivariate analysis. 
Such an approach clearly inflates the R 2s and they should not be relied upon as a valid 
measure of the explanatory power of the model. A holdout sample technique should 
be used where one sample can be used to investigate variables and the other can be 
used to test the validity of the resulting model. 
Conclusions 
In conclusion, I return to my initial comment that the authors provide a thought-
provoking analysis of the labor resource allocation decisions. I do believe, however, 
that a more careful and rigorous approach to the design and analysis wil l lead to 
important and useful insights into the audit production process. 
Finally, I would like to return to comments made by Richard Kreutzfeldt (1992) 
when he was discussing a paper on time pressures encountered in an audit during the 
1992 Deloitte & Touch/University of Kansas Audit Symposium. In discussing 
strategic choices such as staffing decisions made by auditing firms he suggested that 
the research agenda should be expanded to investigate strategic choices. 
It would seem appropriate to begin with descriptive studies of the strategic choices. For example, 
there are many rich variables considered in staffing decisions. An interesting research project would 
be to interview staffing directors at various firms to learn about the considerations that go into 
staffing decisions-considerations such as the risk level of the engagement, industry experience of the 
individuals, auditing experience, continuity on the engagement, availability of personnel, leveling of 
schedules between individuals and over the year, etc. Once this descriptive information is obtained, 
it could be used in further studies of time pressure (Kreutzfeldt 1992, 94). 
Kreutzfeldt also comments that audit firms know a tremendous amount about 
strategic choices. I do not have access to a copy of the questionnaire used to gather 
data for the Bell, Knechel and Willingham research nor do I have information on how 
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the questionnaire was developed. OSS do comment, however, that the objective of the 
original questionnaire was to develop a database on audit engagements for internal 
purposes, independent of their research. It would seem to me that the first step in gath-
ering information on the audit production process should be indepth interviews prior 
to the collection of client data. Researchers should rely on the "tremendous knowl-
edge" of practitioners to formulate research questions, to develop research programs 
and to help us all better understand the audit process and to investigate ways of 
improving both its effectiveness and efficiency. 
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A growing body of research (e.g., Mock and Wright 1993; Bedard 1989) has exam-
ined evidential planning decisions in auditing, reflecting the importance of these 
decisions to the design of an efficient and effective audit. Accordingly, auditing stan-
dards (SAS 31 and 47) stress the importance of adaptability1 in program planning. 
This study examines the effect of two pervasive factors in the audit environment that 
may significantly impact evidential planning: client industry and required procedures. 
Prior research suggests that the level of risks, changes in risks, and evidence diag-
nosticity are likely to vary by industry. In addition, the incidence, magnitude, direction 
and cause of audit errors differ cross-sectionally (Maletta and Wright 1993). Thus, the 
importance of considering industry setting in evidential planning is widely recognized 
in auditing. However, little empirical findings exist as to the level of adaptability of 
evidential planning in practice to industry conditions. 
In contrast to industry factors, generally considered functional in appropriate plan-
ning, required procedures may impair program planning. The performance of required 
procedures, which can be quite time consuming, may serve to limit the auditor's 
ability to adapt to unique client risks. Further, these procedures may be over relied 
upon, since their sanctioning may imply greater diagnosticity than provided.2 
Specifically the following two broad questions are examined. Are program plan-
ning decisions tailored to the client's industry? Further, do required procedures inhibit 
planning adaptability? This research studies evidential planning decisions as reflected 
in the working papers of a sample of 155 actual engagements. Two industries (manu-
facturing and merchandising) and accounts (accounts receivable and accounts 
payable) are examined. 
The findings suggest that auditors adapt the nature of procedures to be performed 
to the client's industry. However, planning decisions were not found to be strongly 
linked to the level of and changes in risk. This finding has important implications for 
audit efficiency and effectiveness and suggests that additional training and/or the use 
of decision tools may be needed. 
*The authors would like to gratefully acknowledge the comments and suggestions provided by participants 
of the research workshops at the University of Southern California and Northeastern University and by 
Jeffrey R. Cohen and Arnold Schilder. We also acknowledge the support received through KPMG Peat 
Marwick's Research Opportunities in Auditing Program. 
1 Adaptability, for purposes of this study, reflects the extent to which auditors develop their evidential plan 
in response to the level and changes in risk, as well as, evidence diagnosticity and competency associated 
with the client's industry and the audit area being examined. 
2 The data utilized in this study was collected prior to the issuance of Statement of Auditing Standards 
Number 67 "The Confirmation Process" which provides additional guidance on the use of confirmations. 
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The level of planning adaptability was not significantly affected by the need to 
perform required procedures. However, a disproportionate amount of audit effort 
appears to be devoted to these procedures (confirmations), which have been found to 
be of limited diagnostic value in detecting errors (e.g. Hylas and Ashton 1982). This 
finding suggests a need to reevaluate the cost/benefit associated with such procedures. 
The remainder of the paper is presented in four sections. The next section intro-
duces a simplified model of adaptability and identifies the research questions to be 
addressed. The method of investigation and findings are then presented. The final 
section describes the implications of this study for practice and future research. 
Adaptability in Evidential Planning 
Figure 1 presents a simplified model of adaptability in evidential planning, which 
serves to set the stage for the research questions. In this model evidential planning is 
depicted as a function of the auditor's risk assessments and knowledge base. The risks 
noted (inherent and control risks) are those suggested by the Audit Risk Model 
advanced in auditing standards. However, there is little knowledge concerning the 
extent to which program planning decisions in practice are tailored to risk assess-
ments. Two archival studies have examined this issue. Bedard (1989) found that audit 
programs varied little over time. Rationale statements suggested that extent seemed to 
be the primary mechanism for adapting to changes in risks. However, data regarding 
actual risk assessments were not gathered. 
Figure 1 
Adaptability In Evidential Planning 
(Audit Risk Model Perspective) 
Note: Variables In Bold Face Are Examined In This Paper 
CLIENT & 
INDUSTRY FACTORS 
AUDIT AREA/ACCOUNT 
(MATERIALITY) 
RISK ASSESSMENT 
INHERENT RISK 
CONTROL RISK 
PROGRAM PLANNING 
(DETECTION RISK) 
AUDIT TEAM 
KNOWLEDGEBASE 
STANDARD PROGRAM 
REQUIRED PROCEDURES 
PROCEDURAL FACTORS: 
COST 
EFFECTIVENESS 
(DIAGNOSTICITY) 
NATURE 
EXTENT 
TIMING 
AUDIT RESULTS 
IDENTIFIED ERRORS 
FREQUENCY 
MAGNITUDE 
Mock and Wright (1993) examine the relationship between program planning deci-
sions and risk assessments over a two year period from data abstracted from the 
working papers. Table 1 provides an overview of the results of that study. Three of the 
findings are particularly noteworthy, First, audit programs were found to be quite 
stable over time, corroborating the findings of Bedard (1989). Second, extent was 
related to the level of a number of risk factors, especially the existence of prior errors. 
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This finding suggests the intertemporal link in program planning decisions. That is, an 
audit appears to be a sequential learning process, since the audit results from a prior 
year indicate areas of risks. Finally, changes in risks over time were not found to be 
significantly associated with revisions to extent. In sum, these findings raise questions 
of whether evidential planning decisions in practice are sufficiently adaptive to the 
level of and changes in risk. 
Table 1 
Summary of the Research Findings of Mock & Wright (1983) 
RESEARCH 
QUESTIONS 
RESULTS 
ACROSS CLIENTS OVERTIME 
DO AUDIT PROGRAM DECI-
SIONS (NATURE AND 
EXTENT) VARY? 
NATURE WAS SIMILAR (70%-
75% COMMON TESTS) BUT 
EXTENT VARIED. 
THERE WAS LITTLE 
CHANGE IN TYPES OF 
TESTS (95% COMMON 
TESTS) FROM YEAR TO 
YEAR. EXTENT DID VARY 
TO A LIMITED DEGREE. 
DO RISK ASSESSMENTS 
VARY? 
THERE WAS A WIDE RANGE 
AND VARIANCE IN RISK 
ASSESSMENTS. 
LIMITED CHANGE WAS 
PRESENT IN RISK ASSESS-
MENTS; i.e. NO CHANGE IN 
90% OF MICRO IR; 76% OF 
MACRO IR; AND 94% OF IC 
RELIANCE JUDGMENTS. 
WHAT IS THE RELATION-
SHIP BETWEEN AUDIT 
PROGRAM DECISIONS AND 
RISK ASSESSMENTS? 
SOME SIGNIFICANT ASSOCI-
ATIONS WERE FOUND FOR 
A/R EXTENT DECISIONS BUT 
NONE FOR A/P. 
EXTENT WAS LARGELY 
DEPENDENT ON THE PRIOR 
YEAR'S PLAN/ACTUAL. 
MIXED/LIMITED FINDINGS 
REGARDING THE ASSOCIA-
TION BETWEEN PLANNED 
EXTENT AND RISK 
CHANGES. 
NOTES: 1. Common tests are those that are done across clients or across time (this year & last year) 
2. Micro IR: inherent risks for an account/cycle 
3. Macro IR: inherent risks at the engagement level (e.g. going concern problems) 
4. A/R = Accounts Receivable; A/P = Accounts Payable 
Figure 1 also identifies elements of the auditor's knowledge base that are likely to 
influence program planning decisions. Standard audit programs and required proce-
dures (e.g. confirmations of accounts receivable) are decision tools that suggest 
evidence to be gathered. Additionally, through experience the auditor is expected to 
gain knowledge of the costs and relative effectiveness of various procedures. 
The Bedard (1989) and Mock and Wright (1993) studies provide important insights 
concerning program planning decisions. However, they do not explicitly consider the 
impact of industry and required procedures on evidential planning, the focus here. 
The pattern of errors (Hylas and Ashton 1982; Ham et al 1985; Kreutzfeldt and 
Wallace 1986) and their magnitude and cause (Maletta and Wright 1993) significantly 
differ across industries, suggesting areas of audit exposure vary cross-sectionally. 
Further, the level of inherent risks associated with different assertions may differ 
across industries. For instance, the collectibility of accounts receivable (valuation) 
may be more problematic for a merchandiser than a manufacturer due to the larger 
number and greater diversity of customers. Finally, the availability, reliability and cost 
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of gathering evidence can differ across industries. For example, Caster (1990) 
suggests that confirmations sent to vendors in a manufacturing environment are more 
diagnostic than those received from consumers for a retailer. Thus, one would expect 
auditors of manufacturing clients to devote a larger percentage of audit time to confir-
mations than auditors of merchandisers, ceteris paribus. 
Given the importance of industry factors, as described, the following exploratory 
research questions are examined. 
Q1: Does evidential planning (nature and extent of procedures) vary across 
industries? 
Q2: Are there industry differences in the relationship between evidential planning 
and the level of risks? 
Q3: Are there industry differences in the adaptability of evidential planning to 
changes in the risk over time? 
The second variable examined here is the impact of account differences on 
program planning. The reliability and cost of gathering evidence may vary across 
accounts. Additionally, key assertions and inherent risks may differ. The findings of 
Mock and Wright (1993) suggest that adaptability to risk at the account level may be 
limited. The present study examines a potential explanation for this finding, the effect 
of procedures required by professional standards. Wright and Mock (1985) argue that 
given a competitive environment, the time consuming nature of required procedures 
such as accounts receivable confirmation may limit the auditor's ability to adapt to the 
unique risks and evidence of a client. That is, required procedures reduce planning 
flexibility in that auditors have limited resources available to deal with specific risks, 
and required procedures absorb some of these resources irrespective of the level of 
risk present. The diagnosticity of such required procedures as inventory observation 
and accounts receivable confirmations has been found to be quite low (Hylas and 
Ashton 1982; Sorkin 1977; Warren 1973). Required procedures may, thus, provide a 
false sense of confidence in that auditors perceive such evidence to be of greater diag-
nostic value than is actually provided. L in et al (1991) provide evidence supporting 
this. The final research question examines the effect of required procedures on adapt-
ability of program planning, an issue not explored in prior research. 
Q4: Do required procedures inhibit adaptability in program planning? 
Method 
This study is based upon actual evidential planning judgments abstracted from 
audit working papers. The study focuses on planning decisions in two accounts (and 
related cycles): accounts receivables (revenue and receipts cycle) and accounts 
payable (purchasing and disbursement cycle). These accounts were selected for 
several reasons. First, these accounts are material on most audit engagements. 
Auditors, therefore, can be expected to have had frequent experience in planning these 
areas. Second, prior research suggests these areas contain a relatively high incidence 
of errors (Maletta and Wright 1993; Wright and Ashton 1989; Kreutzfeldt and Wallace 
1986). A final rationale is the need to compare the planning judgments for an account 
that has a required procedure to one that does not (Ques. 4). The confirmation of 
accounts receivable is required by professional standards while no such requirement 
exists in the accounts payable area. 
This research examines engagements in two industries: manufacturing and 
merchandising. Maletta and Wright (1993) report that of the industries studied, the 
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mean number of errors was highest for the manufacturing and merchandising compa-
nies, with the manufacturers having the largest errors. Additionally, error causes 
varied across the manufacturing and merchandising companies. Importantly, accounts 
receivable and accounts payable are normally material accounts for companies in both 
of these industries. 
A random selection was made from one Big 6 firm's client list, with an equal 
number of manufacturing and merchandising companies. Two sample criteria were 
employed. The company had to (1) be an audit client and (2) have been audited for at 
least one prior year. The second criterion was to address the responsiveness of eviden-
tial planning to changes in risks (Ques. 3). This selection criterion limited the sample 
to 345 engagements, of which 46 percent responded. Given the extensive information 
sought on each engagement, this response rate was considered satisfactory. The final 
sample comprised 155 audits: 84 manufacturing and 71 merchandising. 
Table 2 presents financial data on the sample, indicating a wide range of companies 
in terms of size. Audit "gauge" is reported, which is the participating firm's opera-
tional determination of planning materiality. Gauge equals the greater of revenues or 
assets to the 2/3 power. On average, both the accounts receivable and accounts 
payable areas were quite material. 
Test Instrument 
A test instrument3 was developed to obtain information on the nature and extent of 
audit procedures (planned and actual) for the two most recent years in the accounts 
receivable and accounts payable areas. Risk data were also obtained for this period. 
The test instrument was pilot tested by six audit managers and minor modifications 
were made. 
The instrument was completed by the auditor in charge of the engagement and was 
reviewed by the manager and partner on the engagement for thoroughness and accu-
racy. Participants had an average of 4.1 years of experience, with 85 percent at senior 
level or higher. Respondents, therefore, are expected to have a good level of under-
standing and experience in evidential planning. The instrument was administered as 
close to the completion of the current year's field work as possible, minimizing 
completion time and also enhancing the accuracy of responses. 
The nature of planned evidence was determined by requiring the auditors to submit 
a copy of the current and prior year audit program. The firm's standard audit program 
had been used on 95 percent of the selected engagements. Coding of audit evidence 
was, thus, objective and efficient, as the auditors indicated by their initials those stan-
dard procedures planned for the audit. Additional procedures were also noted. The 
coding for these procedures was independently completed by 2 individuals. The level 
of agreement was 78 percent, with all discrepancies jointly discussed, resolved and 
coded accordingly. 
The extent of evidential planning was measured based upon total audit hours. 
Sample size was not used as many evidential sources (e.g. client inquiry) do not 
involve the selection of a sample. The audit effort and cost of equally sized samples 
are also not necessarily equivalent. 
Total audit hours (planned and actual) for accounts receivable and accounts 
payable were taken directly from the working papers. A measure of extent by broad 
procedural area4 was also needed. Auditors were asked to consult the working papers 
3 A copy of the instrument is available upon request. 
4 Disaggregation of audit time by individual audit test was determined, from consultation with firm 
personnel and pilot testing, to be extremely time consuming and not likely very accurate. 
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Table 2 
Financial Data 
(in thousands of dollars) 
Manufacturers  (n=84) Merchandisers (n=71) 
Current Year Prior Year Current Year Prior Year 
Total Assets Mean $70,642 $66,470 $183,577 $140,473 
Range $419-2,664,879 $300-2,452,968 $404-7,443,877 $404-4,840,311 
Total Revenues Mean $62,442 $71,616 $252,461 $245,726 
Range $300-1,277,790 $294-2,041,745 $587-8,225,326 $562-7,774,480 
Audit Gauge Mean $426 $427 $551 $491 
Range $9-5,300 $7-5,839 $12-12,000 $4-11,000 
Net Income (Loss) Mean $4,978 $4,975 $4,028 $8,002 
Range $(23,889)-206,583 $(35,583)-226,599 $(15,012)-109,302 $(5,185)-231,300 
Accounts Receivable Mean $11,645 $12,144 $16,039 $15,557 
Range $77-352,344 $102-459,980 $17-426,927 $5-478,701 
Accounts Payable Mean $7,266 $8,352 $24,625 $27,082 
Range $5-276,128 $25-397,267 $4-1,023,905 $9-1,151,426 
Accounts Receivable/Gauge Mean 25 25 21 21 
Range 2-134 2-162 0.15-151 0.26-116 
Accounts Payable/Gauge Mean 16 17 24 21 
Range 0.28-203 0.62-249 0.01-461 0.14-12 
Note: No significant differences (p ≤ 0.10) across industries. 
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and use their professional judgment in allocating the total audit hours in each account 
to broad procedural areas. These areas are presented in Exhibit 1 and were determined 
from discussions with executive office personnel and review of the firm's audit 
manual. A pilot test revealed that the broad procedural areas were familiar to and un-
derstood by the participants. 
Exhibit 1 
Broad Procedural Areas by Account 
Account Procedural Area 
Accounts Receivable - Analytical procedures 
- Confirmations 
- Collectibility procedures 
- Detailed procedures 
Cutoff 
- Financial statement disclosures/methods 
- Tests of controls 
Accounts Payable - Analytical procedures 
- Confirmation (vendors' statements) 
Cutoff 
- Review accruals 
- Detailed procedures 
- Financial statement disclosures/methods 
- Test of controls 
Risk data were also obtained. Several inherent risk factors were identified from the 
literature (Kreutzfeldt and Wallace 1986; Willingham and Wright 1985) which appear 
to be significant. Table 3 presents these "macro" and "micro" level risk factors. 
"Macro" level risk factors relate to the engagement overall, whereas the "micro" level 
risks are account specific. A l l risk factors, with the exception of the number of audit 
differences, were measured on a 7 point scale. 
Assessments of risk were derived from the audit working papers. Planned reliance 
on accounting controls for each account was also determined directly from the 
working papers. A four point scale was used reflecting the procedure employed by the 
participating firm in practice. Controls were assessed as strong, moderate, weak, or 
not relied upon. 
Findings 
Prior to examining the research questions an analysis was performed to ascertain 
whether the industry groups were on average of comparable financial size and risk. 
This analysis was necessary so that any differences in evidential planning across indus-
tries could be attributable to industry classification and not to initial variations in size 
and or risk. The industry data were compared through t tests. No significant differences 
(p ≤ .10) were noted for the financial variables and only one significant difference was 
noted for a risk variable in Table 3 (change in management's level of aggressiveness).5 
5 Engagement or macro level risks individually or inaggregate did not significantly vary across industries 
(p ≤ .10) forboth years. A significant difference was noted concerning the change over the two year period 
in management's level of aggressiveness in committing the entity to high risk ventures or projects. The 
mean  level of change in management's aggressiveness wa  1.88 for manufacturers and .00 (nochange) for 
merchandisers. This difference was significant at p = .04. 
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Table 3 
Inherent and Control Risk Factors 
Engagement (Macro) Risk Factors Scale End Points Manufacturer's Mean 
(St. Dev.) 
Merchandiser's Mean 
(St. Dev.) 
Level of knowledge of the entity's accounting personnel (i.e., controller and staff) in 
terms of awareness and understanding of accounting principles a d practices and how to 
apply them. 
Extremely high knowledge-
Extremely low knowledge 
2.93 
(1.08) 
3.06 
(1.29) 
Accounting personnel's general attitude in accomplishing their responsibilities. Extremely conscientious-
Unconscientious 
2.27 
(0.94) 
2.37 
(0.94) 
Degree the entity's financial information system(s) changed in the fiscal year interms of 
input, output, or thedegree of computerization. 
Significant change-
No Change 
2.36 
(1.44) 
2.25 
(1.30) 
Degree the entity's financial information system(s) are computerized. Completely computerized-
Completely manual 
2.41 
(1.20) 
2.69 
(1.35) 
Overall level of general controls, including potential for management override. 
Consider factors such as organizational structure, documentation policies, existence 
of budgets and comparisons of budgets to actual results, and existence of an internal 
audit department. 
Extr mely strong general controls-
Extremely weak general controls 
3.00 
(1.07) 
3.32 
(1.25) 
Management's  (i.e., CEO, CFO, and other operating officers) agg essiveness in 
committing the entity to high risk ventures or projects.* 
Extremely aggressive-
Extremely conservative 
3.44 
(1.27) 
3.08 
(1.33) 
Extent of high level management turnover (i.e., CEO  and other key operating officers). Extremely high turnover-
No turnover 
2.08 
(1.45) 
1.97 
(1.45) 
* Significant at p≤0.10. 
Note: With the exception of the last risk variable (number of differences) all risk ssessments were on a seven point scale with verbal end - points as noted above. 
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Table 3 (cont'd) 
Inherent and Control Risk Factors 
Manufacturer's Merchandiser's 
Mean Mean 
(AR = Accounts Receivable, AP = Accounts Payable) 
Account (micro) risk factors Scale End Points 
(St. Dev.) 
AR  AP 
(St. Dev.) 
AR  AP 
Degree to which judgment (including estimates) was required in arriving at the Extreme judgment required- 3.38 2.06 3.35 2.07 
entries to the accounts receivable (account payable)and re ated allowance for Little or no judgment required (1.25) (0.87) (1.41) (1.07) 
uncollectible accounts. 
Degree of complexity underlying entries made to accounts receivable (accounts An  extremely high level of complexity- 2.42 2.34 2.46 2.32 
payable) and related allowance for uncollectibles. Little or no complexity (0.96) (1.04) (1.25) (1.15) 
Relative number of unusual transactions (including related pa ty transactions) A  significant number of unusual 
included in accounts receivable (accounts payable) and related allowance for transactions- 2.31 1.80 2.25 1.93 
uncollectibles, as compared to similar clients in the industry. Very few or no unusual transactions (1.36) (0.89) (1.31) (1.10) 
The  total number of prior audit differences found affecting the accounts (1) Number of differences: P&L effect 2.36 1.81 2.22 1.92 
receivable (accounts payable) and related allowance for uncollectible accounts (4.55) (2.47) (2.58) (2.41) 
(include all differences whether waived ornot). 
Reclassification 0.87 0.73* 1.19 1.60* 
(1.19) (0.98) (2.41) (2.06) 
(2) Number of differences: P&L effect 0.16 0.16 0.19 0.10 
(0.55) (0.51) (0.64) (0.45) 
Reclassification 0.20 0.11 0.14 0.24 
(0.48) (0.35) (0.39) (0.57) 
* Significant at p≤0.10. 
Note: With the exception f the last risk variable (number of differences) all risk assessments were on a seven point scale with verbal end - points as noted above. 
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Nature and Extent of Evidential Planning Across Industries (Q1) 
To  examine variations in the nature of planned tests, chi-square tests were don  for 
each audit procedure, comparing the frequency with which it was performed in one 
industry versus another. There were significant differences (p ≤ .05) for 12 out of 24 
common  tests in accounts receivable and only one out of 20tests in accounts payable. 
These findings suggest that the nature of planned t sts does differ by industry for 
accounts receivable. 
In the accounts receivable area, fiv out of the 12 different procedures were related 
to confirmations, an additional five related toc llectibility, with the remaining differ-
ences attributable to analytical procedures. In all cases, the frequency with which 
these procedures were performed was greater for manufacturing clients than merchan-
disers. Based on the number and diverse nature of the customers in a merchandising 
environment, one might expect greater frequency in performing a portfolio of 
collectibility procedures for merchandising clients as compared to manufacturers. 
Additional research is needed to further explain this finding. In the accounts payable 
area, analytical review procedures were performed more often for merchandisers than 
manufacturers. 
The percentage of engagement hours devoted to each account was compared for 
the manufacturing and merchandising companies as a test of the differences in the 
extent of planned procedures across industries.6 Total planned hours for accounts 
receivable as a percentage of engagement hours did not significantly differ across 
industries (p = .36). The mean percentage of engagement hours devoted to accounts 
receivable for manufacturers and merchandisers was 11.7 percent and 14.0 percent, 
respectively. Total planned hours for accounts payable as a percentage of engagement 
hours did significantly differ at p = .02. For manufacturers, the mean (standard devia-
tion) percentage of total engagement hours devoted to accounts payable is 7.4 percent 
(5.2 percent). This percentage for merchandisers is 9.7 percent (6.9 percent). 
To further investigate differences in the extent of planned procedures, tests were 
performed comparing planned hours by broad substantive auditing area as a 
percentage of total engagement hours. In the accounts receivable area, significant 
differences (p = .03) across industries were noted in the confirmation area. The mean 
(standard deviation) percentage of engagement hours planned for the confirmation of 
accounts receivable was 5.1 percent (6.3 percent) for merchandisers and 3.3 percent 
(2.5 percent) for manufacturers. This finding is interesting, considering that confirma-
tion procedures for a merchandiser is likely to provide less diagnostic evidence than 
that obtained through confirmations for a manufacturing firm. Additionally, from the 
risk data obtained, perceived risk did not significantly differ between the industry 
groups. The additional hours spent by auditors in the confirmation area for merchan-
disers may be due to the number of confirmations requested and/or, for example, the 
need to reconcile differences between the clients' records and the confirmation 
responses. No significant differences in the percentage of engagement hours across 
other substantive areas in accounts receivable were noted. 
In comparing the percentage of engagement hours devoted to substantive audit 
areas for accounts payable, two significant differences were found. The mean (stan-
dard deviation) percentage of engagement hours planned for the confirmation of 
6 Since the focus of this study is on evidential PLANNING judgments, extent measures reflect planned or 
budgeted hours rather than actual hours. However, planned and actual extent were very highly correlated 
(average correlation r = .90). The primary findings were the same when either planned or actual extent 
measures were employed in the analyses. 
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accounts payable was 2.5 percent (2.3 percent) for merchandisers and 1.6 percent (1.6 
percent) for manufacturers. This difference is significant at p = .05. A significant 
difference (p = .02) was also noted in the area of accounts payable cutoff; 1.3 percent 
of planned engagement hours were devoted to cutoff procedures (1.1 percent) for 
merchandisers versus 1.0 percent for manufacturers (0.6 percent). 
Industry Differences in Responsiveness of Evidential Planning 
Decisions to the Level of Risk (Q2) 
Table 3 provides descriptive data by industry on the assessment of macro and 
micro level risks. Risk measures were compared between manufacturing and 
merchandising firms through t-tests and except for one variable (number of prior 
errors) were not significantly different. Importantly, the relatively high standard devia-
tions present suggest variation in risk across clients. Generally one would expect that 
as risk differs across clients, the appropriate number of tests and/or the variety of tests 
needed to detect potential errors also would differ. 
Nature of Procedures 
A regression analysis7 was performed (See Table 4) to examine differences in the 
nature of audit procedures selected for accounts receivable and accounts payable as a 
function of the client's industry and risk characteristics. The nature of tests was repre-
sented by the number of procedures selected. 
In the accounts receivable area, the model was significant at p = .001, R 2 = .32. 
Industry and five account specific inherent risk factors were significant p ≤.10. These 
factors were level of knowledge of accounting personnel, management's aggressive-
ness, degree of judgment, number of unusual transactions, and prior errors. 
In the accounts payable area, the model resulted in little explanatory power (R2 = 
.05) with no significant industry effect noted. The one significant account specific 
inherent risk factor was management turnover. 
The results presented above suggest that industry and level of risk offer little 
explanatory power with respect to the selection of accounts payable procedures. 
Auditor's evidential planning decisions in the accounts receivable area appear some-
what adaptive to the client's industry and selected risk factors.8 
Audit Extent Decisions 
To examine the responsiveness of evidential extent decisions to industry and level 
of risk, a regression analysis was performed in which the percentage of engagement 
hours devoted to accounts receivable and accounts payable was examined as a func-
tion of the client's industry and risk characteristics. 
7 The model tested was as follows: 
Nature and extent of evidential planning = f(Industry, engagement inherent and control risks, account-
specific inherent control risks, internal control reliance, and 
materiality of account) 
Based upon the current level of knowledge concerning the relationship between specific macro and micro 
level risks to audit planning and the possibility that risk factors could be offset, an additional model was 
also tested. This model may be represented as: 
Nature and extent of evidential planning = f(Industry, total macro risks, total micro risks, and materiality of 
account) 
The findings of the regression analysis for this model did not significantly vary from the results reported 
and indicate the robustness of the research findings. 
8 Logit analysis were also performed on an individual audit procedure basis. Industry and the various risk 
factors served as the independent variables. The results are consistent with those described. 
83 
As presented in Table 4 in the r ceivable area, the model was significant a  p = 
.001, R2 = .61. However, industry was not a significant predictor. Significant (p ≤ .10) 
engagement level risk factors included: th market in which shares are traded, the 
degree to which the entity's financial information system changed, and manageme t's 
aggressiveness. The only significant account-specific inherent risk factor was the 
number of prior errors affecting accounts receivable. Materiality of he account was 
highly significant at p = .001.9 
Table 4 
Regression Results For Responsiveness of Evidential Planning Decisions 
Accounts Receivable Accounts Payable 
No. of Audit Percentage of No. of Audit Percentage of 
Independent Procedures Engagement Procedures Engagement 
Variables Planned Hrs in Account Planned Hrs in Account 
Intercept 16.58 -5.01 12.88 2.09 
Industry -2.72* .61 .10 1.03 
Trading Market (Private or Public) -.72 3.23* -.19 2.68* 
Engagement  Inherent and Control Risks 
Knowledge  of Personnel .52* -.21 .15 -.37 
Attitude .07 .58 .10 .26 
Change  in System .02 .83* .02 .18 
Computerization .21 -.36 -.33 .05 
General Controls .01 -.37 .07 .10 
Management's  Agressiveness -.48* -.81* .04 .03 
Turnover -.30 .39 -.39* -.16 
Account Specific Inherent and Control Risks 
Judgment 1.40* .39 .26 .03 
Complexity .01 .24 .11 .29 
No. of Unusual Transactions .56* .34 .09 -.41 
Prior Errors—No. of -.01 1.04* -.01 .21* 
Prior Errors—No. Exceeding Materiality -.79* -.24 -.00 .27 
Internal Control Reliance -.10 -.09 .21 -.98* 
Materiality of Account .02 .14* .00 .04* 
MODEL  R2 (p) .32(.00) .61 (.00) .05(.97) .27(.00) 
ADJUSTED  R2 .24 .57 -.07 .18 
N 146 148 144 147 
*Significant at p < 0.10 
In the accounts payable area, the model was significant at p =.001, R2 = .27. 
Industry was not a significant predictor. The only significant e gagement level risk 
factor was the market in which the client's hares are traded (p =.002). Significant 
account-specific inherent risk factors included the numb r of prior errors and internal 
control reliance. As in the accounts receivable area, materiality of the account was 
significant at p = .02. 
The findings suggest some adaptability inthe extent of evidential planning to the 
level of selected risk factors. Significant risk factors varied by account area and 
included both macro and micro level risks. The extent of evidential planning did not 
9 To investigate the xtent of multicollinearity among the risk factors, the variance inflationary factor (VIF) 
was computed. VIF values were generally in the 1 to 2range and, in all instances, did not exceed 4. 
Marquandt  (1980) states that only if VIF values exceed 10 is there likely to be a multicollinearity p oblem. 
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vary by industry and suggests that the extent of audit testing is dependent upon the 
level of risk associated with an engagement, rather than the client's industry classifi-
cation. 
Industry Differences in Responsiveness of Evidential Planning 
Decisions to Changes in Risk (Q3) 
Evidential planning decisions are also expected to be responsive to changes in risk. 
In examining the responsiveness of planning decisions to changes in risk, no direc-
tional expectations are posed. In the regression analyses the dependent variables were: 
number of new procedures, number of deleted procedures, and mix of planned proce-
dures (referred to as "common tests" and calculated as the percentage of procedures 
included in both the current and prior year audit program). 
As presented in Table 5, in the accounts receivable area, all three regression 
analyses revealed no significant industry effect (p ≤ .10). Significant (p ≤ .10) risk 
factors in the regression analyses, with number of new tests (R2 = .24) and percentage 
of common  tests (R2 = .23) as the dependent variables, were changes in the ov rall 
level of general controls and an increase in total revenues. An increase in totalassets 
was also a significant predictor for the number of new tests. Significant predictors for 
the number of deleted tests (R2 = .34) was an increase in accounts receivable and a 
change in management's aggressiveness and turnover. 
In the accounts payable area, industry was a significant predictor of the number of 
new  tests and the percentage of common  tests. The following macro level inherent and 
financial risk factors were found to be significant (p ≤ .10) for the regression analyses 
in which the number of new tests (R2 =.35) and percentage of common  tests (R2 = .40) 
were the dependent variables: change in the financial information system, increases in 
total revenues and an increase in the number of accounts payable accounts. Also 
significant for the number of newtests in the accounts payable areas was the change 
in level of knowledge of accounting personnel. Changes in the overall attitude of ac-
counting personnel and general controls were significant predictors of the percentage 
of common tests. A significant predictor for the number of deleted tests (R2 = .18) and 
percentage of common tests was an increase in the accounts receivable balance. 
To examine the response in extent judgments to changes in risk, a regression 
analysis was performed. The percentage of engagement hours in the account served as 
the dependent variable. In the accounts receivable area, this model was marginally 
significant at p = .10, R 2 = .36 for the merchandising industry. The only significant 
micro level risk factor was the change in the number of audit adjustments resulting 
from reclassification. In the accounts payable area, no significant results (p ≤ .10) 
were obtained for either industry. 
Overall, the responsiveness of evidential planning across industries to changes in 
risk appears to be extremely limited10 and was noted only in the accounts payable area 
in terms of the nature of tests performed. However, in interpreting these findings, one 
must consider that the participating engagements exhibited limited variation inrisk 
across the two year time period examined. 
1 0 However, on average, the percentages of participants who assessed no change in risk over the two year 
period examined were: 
Macro  - Engagement level risks - 78.3% 
Micro - Account specific r sks - 90.4% 
Internal control reliance - 94.3% 
These assessments appear to reflect he belief that audit clients are quite stable over the two year time 
period examined. 
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Table 5 
Regression Results For Responsiveness of Evidential Planning Decisions to Changes in Risk 
Accounts Receivable Accounts Payable 
Independent No. of No. of Percentage of No. of No. of Percentage of 
Variables New Test Deleted Tests Common Tests New Test Deleted Tests Common Tests 
Intercept .94 1.20 .96 -.13 .95 1.00 
Industry .07 .02 -.01 -.73* .39 -.04* 
Trading Market (Private or Public) -.86 -1.27 .06 .38 -.89 -.01 
Engagement Inherent and Control Risks 
Knowledge of Personnel .47 .04 -.03 .66* .18 -.04 
Attitude -.09 -.12 .01 -.18 -.07 .01* 
Change in System .23 .15 -.02 .39* -.07 -.02* 
Computerization .65 .74 -.04 .57 .46 -.03 
General Controls -.76* -.14 • .05* -.45 -.53 .02* 
Management's Aggressiveness .07 -1.12* -.00 .21 -.33 -.02 
Turnover .01 .38* -.00 -.11 -.02 .01 
Account Specific Inherent and Control Risks 
Judgment -.11 -.24 .01 .58 .46 -.04 
Complexity -.18 .49 .01 -.18 -.38 -.00 
No. of Unusual Transactions .40 -.16 -.03 -.53 .49 .05 
Prior Errors—No .of .04 .05 -.00 -.05 .04 .00 
Prior Errors—No. Exceeding Materiality .03 .03 -.00 .10 .05 -.00 
Internal Control Reliance -.24 .07 .01 .58 -.16 -.03 
Materiality of Account .02 .03 -.00 .01 .05 -.00 
Financial Measures 
Increase in Total Assets 1.24* 
Increase in Accounts Receivable -.22* -1.20* .13* 
Increase in Total Revenues -.33* .02* .61* -.04* 
Increase in Accounts Payable Accounts -41.13* 2.81* 
MODEL R2 (p) .24(.28) .34(.01) .23(.33) .35(.01) .18(.70) .40(.00) 
ADJUSTED R2 .04 .17 .30 .17 -.04 .24 
N 116 116 116 113 113 113 
Significant at p < .10 
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Effect of Required Audit Procedures on the Adaptability of 
Evidential Planning (Q4) 
As described earlier, the requirement to perform confirmation procedures in the 
accounts receivable area may limit auditor's adaptability. Analyses were performed to 
compare the nature and extent judgments of accounts receivable (containing the 
required confirmation procedure) versus accounts payable (no required procedure). 
The regression results presented earlier in Tables 4 and 5 do not reflect a clear 
pattern of greater responsiveness to risks for accounts payable than accounts receiv-
able. Additional measures of adaptability are the variability in the nature and extent of 
selected procedures at a point in time as well as over time, ceteris paribus, lower 
adaptability would suggest less variation. 
The results presented in Table 6 do not suggest significantly greater variability in 
the nature of selected procedures in the accounts payable area than in accounts receiv-
able. In addition, this table reports descriptive statistics on the extent judgments in 
each of these areas and changes in extent. F tests for equality of variance were not 
significant (p ≤ .10), indicating the relative level of variation in extent judgments 
across accounts was similar. Additionally, the high standard deviations for accounts 
receivable confirmations relative to the means suggests auditors adapt the extent of 
this procedure to reflect the engag ment needs. Therefore, the findings do not support 
the notion that required procedures, per se, inhibit adaptability in evidential planning. 
Table 6 
Extent Judgments Across Audit Areas 
Accounts Receivable Accounts Payable 
Extent Judgments Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. 
Planned Hours/ 
Engagement Hours 
12.7% 14.7% 8.3% 6.1% 
Current Year Planned Hours/ 
Prior Year Actual Hours 
93.0% 30.0% 93.0% 30.8% 
Change in Planned Hours/ 
Engagement Hours 
-0.03% 3.6% -0.4% 2.2% 
Planned Confirmation Hours/ 
Engagement Hours 
4.1% 4.6% 2.0% 2.0% 
Change in Planned Confirmation 
Hours/Engagement Hours 
-0.1% 1.3% -0.1% 0.7% 
Differences in planned audit hours by broad substantive audit area for accounts 
receivable and accounts payable were also compared across industriesutilizing a 
multivariate analysis of variance. To control for client size, audit hours by substantive 
area were examined as a percentage of total accounts receivable (or accounts payable) 
hours and as apercentage of total planned engagement hours. The level of risk was 
also statistically controlled. In the accounts receivable area, no significant differences 
were found in planned audit hours by area as a function of industry. The only margin-
ally significant industry difference (p = .10) was found in the accounts payable area in 
87 
comparing planned hours for tests of controls as a percentage of total planned hours 
for this area. 
As described, prior research studies (Caster 1990; Sorkin 1977; Warren 1973) 
suggest confirmations are unreliable in identifying misstatements. Recent field studies 
(Hylas and Ashton 1982; Ham, Losell and Smieliauskas 1985; Wright and Ashton 
1989) have found similar results. 
Table 7 provides comparative data of the extent judgments in this sample and the 
empirical findings. Four broad types of evidence are evaluated here because of data 
limitations. The field studies cited above provide a further disaggregation of evidence. 
However, a breakdown of audit hours into such detail is not performed in practice. 
Thus, based on the pilot test, audit extent was requested for broad procedural areas, 
which generally fall into the four evidence categories in Table 7. 
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Table 7 
Evidential Extent and Diagnosticity 
Accounts Receivable 
Planned Hours/Account Hours 
Actual Hours/Account Hours 
Accounts Payable 
Planned Hours/Account Hours 
Actual Hours/Account Hours 
Diagnosticity 
(Wright & Ashton, 1989)* 
Tests of 
Details 
Confirma-
tion 
Analytical 
Procedures 
Other 
Procedures 
23.1% 
22.9% 
59.5% 
56.9% 
47.5% 
32.4% 
32.8% 
23.2% 
23.1% 
0.0% 
10.5% 
10.1% 
14.9% 
14.3% 
15.5% 
34.0% 
34.2% 
2.4% 
5.7% 
37.0% 
Notes: 
(1) Data above represents the aggregate mean for all engagements in the sample. 
(2) Hours/account hours reflect the relative time spent within the particular area of 
the audit. 
* Percent of errors detected by type of evidence as reported in this study. 
The findings in Table 7 indicate that, although confirmations detected virtually no 
errors in the field studies noted, a substantial proportion of audit time is devoted to 
performing this procedure. This finding is especially pronounced in accounts receiv-
able, where almost 1/3 of the audit time in the account is spent performing this test. 
Discussion and Implications 
This research examined the adaptability of evidential decisions to industry differ-
ences and the level and changes in risk associated with the engagement. A summary 
of the results is presented in Table 8 and suggests that auditors adapt the nature of 
procedures to be performed to the client's industry. However, the level of adaptability 
varied by audit area with greater variability in the planning of accounts receivable 
procedures than accounts payable. This finding appears to suggest that the reliability, 
availability and cost of gathering evidence may be differentially affected by industry 
classifications across audit areas. One might expect the make up and risk characteris-
tics of accounts receivable to vary more by industry than accounts payable. Therefore, 
more "standard" procedures may be employed in the audit of accounts payable. 
Table 8 
Summary of Research Findings 
RESEARCH 
QUESTIONS 
RESULTS 
ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE ACCOUNTS PAYABLE 
Q1: DOES EVIDENTIAL 
PLANNING VARY ACROSS 
INDUSTRIES? 
[Disscussion pages 10-13] 
SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES 
WERE PRESENT FOR 12 OUT 
OF 24 COMMON PROCE-
DURES AND IN PLANNED 
EXTENT IN THE CONFIRMA-
TION AREA. 
ONLY ONE SIGNIFICANT 
DIFFERENCE FOUND OUT 
OF 20 TESTS. PLANNED EX-
TENT VARIED FOR CON-
FIRMATION AND CUT-OFF 
TESTS. 
Q2: ARE THERE INDUSTRY 
DIFFERENCES IN THE 
RESPONSIVENESS OF EVI-
DENTIAL PLANNING 
DECISIONS TO THE LEVEL 
OF RISK ACROSS CLIENTS? 
[Table 4] 
NATURE OF TESTS WAS SIG-
NIFICANTLY IMPACTED BY 
INDUSTRY AND SEVERAL 
RISK FACTORS. EXTENT WAS 
AFFECTED BY SEVERAL RISK 
FACTORS BUT NO SIGNIFI-
CANT INDUSTRY EFFECT. 
NATURE OF TESTS IMPACT-
ED BY MANAGEMENT 
TURNOVER BUT NOT IN-
DUSTRY. EXTENT WAS AF-
FECTED BY RISK FACTORS 
BUT NOT INDUSTRY 
Q3: ARE THERE INDUSTRY 
DIFFERENCES IN THE RE-
SPONSIVENESS OF EVI-
DENTIAL PLANNING 
DECISIONS AND CHANGES 
IN RISK OVER TIME? 
[Table 5] 
NATURE WAS SIGNIFICANTLY 
AFFECTED BY SEVERAL RISK 
FACTORS BUT NO INDUSTRY 
EFFECT WAS PRESENT. 
EXTENT WAS MARGINALLY 
IMPACTED BY INDUSTRY. 
NATURE FOUND TO BE 
SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECTED 
BY SEVERAL RISK 
FACTORS AS WELL AS 
INDUSTRY. THERE WERE 
NO SIGNIFICANT ASSOCIA-
TIONS FOUND BETWEEN 
EXTENT AND INDUSTRY 
OR CHANGES IN RISK. 
Q4: WHAT EFFECT DO RE-
QUIRED PROCEDURES 
HAVE ON ADAPTABILITY 
IN EVIDENTIAL PLANS? 
[Table 6 & 7] 
RESPONSIVENESS TO RISKS SIMILAR FOR A/R AND A/P. THE 
VARIABILITY IN EXTENT WAS SIMILAR ACROSS ACCOUNTS, 
SUGGESTING REQUIRED PROCEDURES DID NOT RESTRICT 
ADABILITY. 
The extent of procedures to be performed in the accounts receivable areas was 
responsive to the level of risk associated with several risk factors. Responsiveness to 
changes in risk was, however, not dependent on industry classification in the accounts 
receivable area. Several "macro" level risks were important predictors of the nature of 
procedures to be performed. Of interest for future research would be an examination 
of the evidential planning decisions of engagements which have experienced signifi-
cant changes in risk. In addition, a longitudinal study that traces such decisions over 
an extended period of time would aid our understanding of how and when auditors 
adapt to changes in risk. 
The pattern of results, thus, suggest that the nature of planned procedures is some-
what adaptive to the client's industry. Variations in the extent of testing does not 
appear to change as a result of a client's industry but is reflective of the level of risk 
associated with the engagement. 
This pattern is intuitively appealing and logical. Evidence (nature) first must be 
determined to be sufficiently relevant and credible to address the assertion being 
examined. This determination is likely to differ by industry, since the availability, cost, 
and diagnosticity of evidence varies not only across industries, but across account 
areas within the industry classification. Once this determination is made, the extent of 
work to be performed is tied to the risk associated with the engagement. Therefore, 
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the selection of "what" procedures to perform appears to be adaptive to the client's 
industry but how "much" is done is driven by the level of risk associated with the 
client. 
Overall, the results suggest adaptability in the nature of procedures to be performed 
to industry classification. However, as discussed, such adaptability is dependent upon 
the audit area being examined. This finding is intuitively appealing and suggests that 
the differential reliability, availability, and cost of gathering evidence does not 
uniformly vary by industry across all accounts. The limited response in evidential 
planning to the level and changes in risk, although consistent with prior research, 
deserves further study. Such future research might consider the audit implications of 
combining macro and micro risks to arrive at an overall pattern of risk. This tendency 
in practice to combine risks was noted in Waller (1993), Janell and Wright (1991) and 
Graham (1985). As discussed in Note 7, the results of this study did not significantly 
vary when the regression models were based upon total macro and micro risks. 
The findings regarding limited adaptability in evidential planning also has implica-
tions for practice and suggests that auditors might benefit from additional training or 
the use of decision tools in assessing risk and linking such assessments to audit plan-
ning decisions. If auditors are not responsive to such factors, the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the audit is likely to diminish. 
Several limitations of this and prior research in the area need to be acknowledged. 
As noted, evidential planning decisions are examined over a short term. Auditors may 
not respond to changes in risk over such a brief period. In addition, auditors may intu-
itively require that changes in risk exceed a certain threshold before the audit plan is 
substantially revised. This belief may stem from the use of a fairly "standard" set of 
procedures that are considered robust in detecting errors for most client situations. 
Participation in this study was also limited to one firm. The effect of firm structure on 
adaptability is a fruitful avenue for future research. This research also did not examine 
the relationship between risk assessment and evidential planning at the assertion level, 
an important area for future research. 
Adaptability in evidential planning was also examined on an account basis in 
response to the requirement by professional standards to perform certain procedures, 
namely in this study, the confirmation of accounts receivable. This required procedure 
did not appear to inhibit adaptability. Nonetheless, a considerable amount of audit 
effort is devoted to these procedures which are of limited diagnostic value. It is 
unclear whether this is because auditors outweigh the value of such evidence due to its 
sanctioning by the standards, due to defensive measures in the event of litigation, 
and/or because confirmations are disproportionately time consuming to perform. 
Future research is needed to identify the cause. 
However, the results here suggest a reappraisal of evidential planning for this form 
of evidence may be needed. The relative diagnosticity of confirmations does not 
appear sufficient to warrant the audit intensity devoted to it in the accounts receivable 
area. In addition, 23.2 percent of the audit time in accounts payable is also devoted to 
confirmation procedures. This procedure was included in the planning of all but two 
of the sample engagements. 
These findings suggest that confirmation of accounts payable, although not 
required by auditing standards, has become, perhaps, a "de facto" standard in prac-
tice. This finding is interesting and worthy of further study since little is presently 
known about the diagnosticity of confirmation procedures in this area. In addition, a 
useful insight for standard setters would also be to understand how and why such 
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practices develop and what the impact of requiring the confirmation of accounts 
receivable has had in the accounts payable area. 
Required procedures and those included by firms in standard audit programs may 
serve to inhibit the level of adaptability of evidential plans. These tests potentially 
induce framing effects, a phenomenon that has been widely documented in behavioral 
research (Kida 1984; Aston and Ashton 1988; Asare 1992). That is the presence of 
required or standard tests serve to frame evidential planning in a different manner than 
if planning is viewed as an open process. A n important avenue for future research 
would be to examine the extent to which potential framing effects of such tests impact 
program planning decisions. 
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Discussant's Response to "An Investigation of 
Adaptability in Evidential Planning" 
Norman R. Walker 
Price Waterhouse L L P 
Whether audit plans reflect differences in risk characteristics between industries as 
well as changes in risk over time for specific enterprises is a subject of interest to 
practitioners in the accounting and auditing profession. If audit plans do not reflect 
such differences in risk, serious questions arise as to both the effectiveness and effi-
ciency of the audits performed pursuant to the plans. 
While the research questions addressed by the authors of the paper are of interest, 
several factors diminish the usefulness of the results of the research and the paper 
generally from a practitioner's perspective. 
First, the industry selections of merchandising and manufacturing are awfully 
broad. The former, which presumably is synonymous with retailing, would include 
everything from food to appliances to clothes to drugs to autos to recorded entertain-
ment to building products to toys to jewelry to P C ' s and so on. Similarly, 
manufacturing could include production of many of the products referred to above 
(drugs, autos, toys, clothes) as well as steel, airplanes, mainframe computers, pulp and 
paper and so on. The risk characteristics for the more narrowly defined industries may 
differ substantially. However, when aggregated under the general headings of 
merchandising and manufacturing, such differences may be blurred and insight for the 
practitioner lost. Frankly, a more direct approach to the research might have been to 
select individual audits in more narrowly defined industries which are known to have 
distinctive risks for comparison of the audit plans. While the approach taken has 
statistical validity, the potential for more enlightening results may have been sacri-
ficed. 
Similarly, the research approach to the question of whether audit plans for specific 
enterprises reflect changes in risk over time is not the most direct, i.e., what is the 
likelihood that dramatic changes in risk wil l have occurred in the sample of enter-
prises during the two years for which an audit plan is being evaluated? 
It would seem more appropriate to identify enterprises where inherent risk has 
obviously changed over some appropriate period and then evaluate the audit plans for 
the same period to determine whether and how responsive they were to the changes in 
risk. This is acknowledged on page 21. 
With respect to both the question of industry definition and changes in risk over 
time, the research approach employed may have been driven by the relative avail-
ability of and access to audit plans and personnel and the need or requirement for a 
sufficient sample size to meet academic publication expectations. Either way, the 
practitioner's interest in the issues is not well served. 
A second area where the research could be crisper is with respect to the use of 
operating cycles for the comparisons. Risk factors typically impact financial statement 
components and the individual financial statement assertions within those components 
but rarely do they impact all the assertions and financial statement components 
involved in the broad concept of an operating cycle (e.g., purchasing, accounts 
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payable, payments). Whether an assertion specific approach to the research would 
have produced significantly different results is not known. However, practitioners are 
increasingly relating risks to specific assertions to determine the most efficient and 
effective audit procedures to reduce those risks to acceptable levels. 
A third area where the research approach limits the usefulness of the results is the 
use of audit plans from a single audit firm. Evidence that the results may not be repre-
sentative of audits generally can be found in the extensive use of accounts payable 
confirmations. Such a procedure is not routine in my firm nor is it in certain other 
firms. 
Further, the fact that the audit plans were from a firm that makes extensive use of 
"standard" programs may have had significant "firm effects" on the results. 
Finally, from an editorial perspective, the language used in the paper could have 
been more practitioner friendly. The meaning of a phrase such as "adaptability of 
evidential planning" is at best unclear and sounds at least slightly antithetical to an 
audit. That is, an auditor doesn't plan evidence. Rather, an auditor plans to perform 
procedures and obtain evidence. 
The concepts of inherent risk and control risk are confused in the paper. For 
example, Table 3 (and page 79) refer to inherent risk but Table 3 clearly lists control 
risk factors in the detail; page 84 identifies internal control reliance as a specific 
inherent risk factor; and page 82 refers to inherent and financial risk factors, the latter 
not defined. 
Further, in Table 3, "reclassifications" are referred to in the context of account 
payable and accounts receivable. In practice, the definition and significance of reclas-
sifications can vary significantly and further explanation of the use of that terminology 
would be useful. Similarly, on pages 87 and 88, "tests of controls" are referred to as a 
"substantive audit area" which is confusing. 
Many of the points noted above are acknowledged in the paper. If they are 
addressed in future research the results wi l l be more useful to practitioners in 
assessing the efficiency and effectiveness of audits in varying risk environments. 
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The Acme Financial Statement Insurance Company Inc.: 
A Case Study 
Stephen J. Aldersley 
Ernst & Young (Canada) 
Prologue 
At the 1992 Kansas Symposium I made some serious judgmental errors, particu-
larly during the discussion of Jerry Sullivan's article on Litigation Risk Broadly 
Considered. I made the silly observation that in this quagmire of auditor litigation, 
there was a business opportunity. It seemed to me that the auditing profession was 
running an insurance business while not really having any idea as to what the loss 
ratio was. Why not form an insurance company to offer financial statement insurance 
rather than audit opinions? After all, the market seemed to want someone to pay for 
their losses and the auditor was apparently the only party left with any money in a 
financial failure. 
It seems when I open my mouth I often get something caught in it. Almost a year 
ago, Raj Srivastava asked me to develop the idea more formally and present it at the 
1994 Symposium. I accepted the invitation. So much for common sense. Well, here is 
the result of that analysis, a case study built around a business plan for a financial 
statement insurance company. 
If one considers the number of audits performed on an annual basis, one can only 
conclude that auditors actually make very few mistakes. In fact, as reported by 
Palmrose (1988) in her studies of auditor litigation the actual rate at which auditors 
fail in such way as to cause financial loss is extremely low, much less than one percent 
of the time. Notwithstanding this remarkable performance, the costs of auditor litiga-
tion, including direct payments, legal costs, and liability insurance premiums (when 
available), have risen to amounts that are now very significant costs for public 
accounting firms. As reported by Mednick in a speech at the American Accounting 
Association's 1993 Annual Meeting, the litigation costs of major U.S. auditing firms 
have risen to 11 percent of revenues in 1992 and continues to trend upward. This cost 
does not include the costs that are being added to each and every audit as audit firms 
react to the increasing exposure by seeking increasingly burdensome auditing stan-
dards and by following defensive auditing strategies. 
Should auditor legal costs continue to grow, it will probably not be long before 
auditing becomes uneconomic. What will evolve to replace the existing framework? 
Before attempting to answer that question, it is important to recognize that the current 
litigation environment and the public's expectation of auditors do not exist in a 
vacuum but as part of society's evolution. In the past, auditor litigation often led the 
evolution of the audit both in technical terms but more importantly in terms of what 
should be expected of an audit. While the auditing profession's attempts at bridging 
the expectation gap are highly worthwhile, they may reveal a more fundamental issue, 
and that may be a need that the existing framework cannot satisfy. 
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The objective of this paper is to explore the possibility that society's evolving 
needs with respect to the reliability of financial statement information may require 
extending the audit framework and possibly abolishing the existing model and turning 
to something quite different. The idea of an insurance model for auditing is not new. 
For example, auditing firms have always considered their business risk in an audit 
engagement and many business processes and audit procedures are designed specifi-
cally to address those risks. However, these approaches do not go as far as viewing the 
audit as a form of insurance. Interestingly enough, Gunz and McCutcheon (1990) 
present an approach to the audit service that takes an insurance perspective but within 
the framework of the existing auditing firm model. Not surprisingly, many of the 
features of their proposal are quite similar to the insurance model that is developed in 
the case study below. But there are also some important distinctions in moving to a 
full insurance model. 
The case study is organized in the form of a business plan for a financial statement 
insurance company, and therefore, includes discussion of the market for the service, 
how it could be sold, the product itself, how such a company might be expected to 
operate and what the financial consequences might be. The paper concludes with a 
brief review of some of the characteristic features of an insurance approach to 
enhancing financial statement credibility. 
Acme Financial Statement Insurance Company Inc.: 
Business Plan 2001 
The Company 
The Acme Financial Statement Insurance Company, which was founded in 1999, 
has its head office in Litigant City, Somestate, U S A and is the first insurance company 
of its kind in the world. 
Acme's Business 
Acme specializes in providing financial statement insurance. Companies that 
distribute their financial statements to the public or to specified third parties purchase 
a financial statement insurance policy in order to compensate users of the financial 
statements who suffer economic losses as a result of errors or misstatements in the 
distributed financial statements. 
Acme's Distinctive Competencies 
Acme is the first organization to offer financial statement insurance and is the first 
organization to apply insurance principles to enhancing the reliability of financial 
statements. The company plans to develop extensive databases on individuals, busi-
nesses, industries and financial information systems that is used as a basis for 
underwriting companies' financial statement risks. The company has superior inves-
tigative, investment analysis, claims handling, and financial skills drawn from several 
disciplines that operate in a coordinated way to ensure that unacceptable risks are 
declined, acceptable risks are accurately priced, legitimate claims are handled quickly 
and as fairly as possible and unwarranted claims are vigorously contested. 
Market Analysis 
The Market for Financial Statement Insurance and Outlook 
Companies and other organizations that publicly distribute financial statements 
prepared in accordance with the requirements of the Financial Accounting Standards 
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Board often need to enhance the reliability of the information in those financial state-
ments. This is particularly valuable when the information is provided to the public or 
to third parties such as banks and key ownership interests. Such users of the financial 
information can be expected to make financial decisions based on the information and 
therefore run a risk of financial loss in the event the financial information is incorrect 
or misleading. In the case of SEC registrants, such reliability enhancement is a 
requirement of registration. 
Target Markets 
Although our target market is ultimately all users of financial statements and 
related information, our initial target market will be non-public entities where the 
financial statements are provided to specified third parties. We will expand our opera-
tions once we have a firmly established base in this market segment. We believe there 
is significant potential in the public marketplace but recognize there will be a need to 
establish the product in a situation where we have direct access to financial statement 
users. 
Competition 
The dominant providers of reliability enhancement today are the public accounting 
firms, professional partnerships of CPA's who issue audit opinions on company and 
organization financial statements. 
Audit opinions are professional opinions on the conformance of financial state-
ments with generally accepted accounting principles as promulgated by the FASB and 
its predecessors. These opinions are based on audit examinations which are performed 
in accordance with what the accounting profession calls generally accepted auditing 
standards. According to the profession, an auditor's responsibility is to perform the 
audit examination in accordance with these standards and if this is the case, the 
auditor has no further obligation with respect to the examination. 
Audited financial statements may contain errors or omissions that may be material 
and yet are not detected by the auditor. If the financial statement user incurs a loss as a 
result of relying on incorrect financial statements, there wil l be no recourse to the 
auditor if generally accepted auditing standards have been applied in the audit exami-
nation. The only hope for recovery from the auditor is through negligence actions 
which dispute the assertion that generally accepted auditing standards have been 
applied, except in certain cases where the auditor has statutory liabilities. 
From the user perspective, this situation appears to be somewhat unsatisfactory. 
Although in practical terms, the auditor faces a difficult and often expensive task in 
proving that generally accepted auditing standards were applied in a particular audit 
engagement, the user must commit substantial time and resources to force the situa-
tion and must accept a significant risk of failure. 
In the short run, the accounting profession will be a very strong competitor, partic-
ularly on price. However, in the longer term, price will not be successful. Accounting 
firms carry significant labor costs associated with the need to perform their examina-
tions in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards. 
Regulatory Restrictions 
Acme is an insurance company registered in Somestate and is therefore bound by 
the requirements of the Somestate Insurance Law. These requirements limit the nature 
of operations and force the company to maintain a strong capital position relative to 
its insurance liabilities. 
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Marketing and Sales Activities 
Overall Marketing Strategy 
Acme's overall marketing strategy is a direct approach to the market. Existing 
insurance brokerage operations do not yet have experience with financial statement 
insurance, and therefore, it wi l l be necessary for Acme to market directly using 
personal and non-personal methods. Our marketing focus will be on third party users 
of financial statements in our primary target market. These users will include bankers, 
pension funds, investment dealers and other investment operations. This strategy 
recognizes that such users are generally more accessible and likely to be more recep-
tive to our sales approach than the companies whose financial statements we will be 
insuring. 
We will also develop direct mail and a targeted advertising campaign, also focusing 
on third party users of financial information. 
Sales Strategies 
We will develop a full and part-time sales force who will call on potential third 
parties. The benefits of financial statement insurance, particularly the direct compen-
sation for financial loss and the no hassle approach to claims handling are compelling 
reasons for these users to demand insurance over audit opinions. 
Calls and inquiries arising from our direct mail and advertising campaigns wil l 
receive calls from our sales force to determine if personal follow up is worthwhile. 
Although our primary focus will be on third party users, we fully intend to follow up 
with companies and organizations that prepare financial statements i f they respond to 
inquiries. 
Product/Service 
Financial statement insurance is a unique product. It is fundamentally an insurance 
product in that it is a contractual promise to pay a certain amount to a specified party 
in the event that party suffers a loss as a result of the occurrence of certain specified 
events. 
The Financial Statement Insurance Policy 
The key components of the financial statement insurance policy are the following: 
Insured 
The policy will clearly identify those parties, either corporate or individual, who 
are entitled to receive benefits in the event of a financial loss caused as a result 
of a financial statement error. Insureds may include, company management, 
company directors, common and preferred stockholders, holders of funded debt 
obligations, specified bankers and other lenders, and specified third parties such 
as purchasers and suppliers. In the latter cases, the policy should name the 
lender or third party explicitly. 
Occurrences 
A financial statement insurance policy will pay a claim when the following two 
conditions have been satisfied: 
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1. The financial statements contain one or more errors or departures from gen-
erally accepted accounting principles that, in aggregate, are greater than a 
specified monetary amount (i.e., materiality), and 
2. The insured can demonstrate that a loss has been suffered as a result of rely-
ing on the inaccurate financial statements. 
There will be several important exclusions in the standard policy. For exam-
ple, management fraud that results in a deliberate misstatement in the 
financial statements will not be covered under the standard policy. Nor will 
the insurance cover financial statement errors arising from business or finan-
cial failure. Financial statements will normally be prepared on the going 
concern basis except in unusual situations. Policy extensions will be avail-
able to cover both of these exclusions from the standard policy, but at an 
additional premium. 
Claims benefits 
Insureds will be entitled to financial payments in the event of an "occurrence." 
The amount of the payment will be limited to the lesser of the insured's actual 
loss and the pro-rata share of the overall policy limit. In some cases, particular 
insureds may be entitled to unique policy limits which would be specified in a 
policy extension and therefore would not be subject to the pro-rata limitation. 
Payments under the policy will not be made until 60 days after the end of the 
policy term. This is necessary to ensure that all possible claims have been con-
sidered. 
Policies will be issued with an explicit monetary overall policy limit that repre-
sents the maximum aggregate amount of claims benefits that would be paid 
under the policy. Aggregate losses in excess of this limit will not be covered. 
The policy contains benefit sharing percentages that are used to allocate benefit 
payments in the event the aggregate losses exceed the overall policy limit. In 
such a situation, an insured would receive at most the overall policy limit multi-
plied by that insured's benefit sharing percentage as defined in the insurance 
policy. 
Policies can be written with a benefits redistribution clause that permits pay-
ments in excess of the insured's pro-rata share of the overall policy limit in 
cases where losses incurred by some groups of insureds are below their pro-rata 
limit. The excess limit would be shared pro-rata amongst the other insureds. 
This clause addresses the situation where one class of insureds, say lenders, do 
not suffer any loss whereas common stockholders do. Since it increases the 
insurer's exposure, there is obviously an incremental premium for this clause. 
Premiums 
The policy premium must be paid to activate the policy. Premiums will be based 
on underwriting criteria and will depend upon the risk rating of the particular 
entity financial statements, the materiality level chosen, the overall policy limits, 
the policy term and any other policy extensions or clauses that affect the insur-
ance risk. 
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Policy Term 
Policies issued on a set of financial statements will have a specific inforce term 
of up to three years from the date of the financial statements. Claims for losses 
suffered during this period are insurable provided the claims are submitted prior 
to the end of the policy term. Longer terms are expected to require significantly 
higher premiums than shorter terms and as a result, the normal situation will be 
a one-year term. 
When an entity's financial statements are insured, there will be a Certificate of 
Insurance attached to the financial statements which alerts the users of the financial 
statements to the existence of the insurance policy. A n illustrative Certificate is shown 
below: 
Acme Financial Statement Insurance Company Inc. 
Certificate of Insurance 
X Co. Financial Statements 
December 31, xxxx 
The Acme Financial Statement Insurance Company Inc. has written financial 
statement insurance policy number 12345678 on the accompanying xxxx finan-
cial statements of X Co. This policy provides certain benefits to specified 
insured parties in the event these financial statements contain errors or depar-
tures from generally accepted accounting principles which in aggregate misstate 
the net income of X Co. for the year ended December 31, xxxx by more than 
$1,000,000 and the specified insured parties have suffered financial losses as a 
result. Claims for benefits under this policy must be submitted no later than 
December 31, xxxx+1. 
This policy contains exclusions for deliberate misstatements by management 
and for subsequent financial failure of X Co. 
The policy has an overall limit of $5,000,000 which applies pro-rata to the spec-
ified insured parties as outlined in the Schedule A of the policy documents. 
This certificate does not constitute an insurance policy. Inquiries concerning the 
provisions of Policy Number 12345678 should be directed to Public Affairs 
Dept, X Co. Address and Telephone number. 
Policy Development 
We expect our initial policy offerings will undergo development as we gain experi-
ence with the needs of policyholders and insureds as well as the nature and magnitude 
of claims that arise. 
Operations 
Acme's operating structure will be similar to that of a specialty insurance company 
and will differ significantly from the operating structure typically found in public 
accounting firms. 
Sales and Marketing 
The sales force will consist of commissioned salespersons with specialized finan-
cial and insurance training. Sales force compensation will be based on commissions 
with adjustments for experience on the block of business handled by the salesperson. 
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For example, salespersons with blocks of business with excessive loss ratios will be 
paid reduced commissions whereas those with better than average loss ratios will 
receive bonuses. The salesperson benefits considerably from retaining clients that are 
good insurance risks. 
The salesperson is the key customer contact and will be responsible for sourcing 
new business, negotiating insurance contracts, and day-to-day customer relations. The 
ideal salesperson will be a business generalist with a strong background in investment 
and financial analysis. 
The marketing operation wil l use the sales force as a source of information on 
customer needs in order to develop new insurance and other products. Marketing will 
also take the leadership role in product innovation and development and manage 
multi-disciplinary teams with representation from sales, underwriting, claims and 
statistical and actuarial in order to develop new financial statement insurance 
products. 
Underwriting 
The objective of underwriting financial statement insurance is to first, distinguish 
those risks that are insurable from those that are not, and secondly, to properly rate the 
insurable risks so that an appropriate premium is charged. 
We will use empirical methods to identify uninsurable situations and to develop 
rate tables for insurable situations. Existing market data will be used initially and this 
will be modified through experience. 
The underwriting department w i l l be multi-disciplinary with specialists in 
conducting private investigations, forensic accounting experts, systems experts, invest-
ment analysts, business operations specialists, and accounting experts. There will also 
be a group of technicians available for data collection. Where appropriate, industry 
specific experience and expertise will be used in the underwriting process. 
The underwriting process begins with an initial screening of the potential customer 
by the salesperson. This includes inquiries regarding the customer's reputation and the 
integrity of key individuals in the customer organization. An initial assessment is 
made of the company's operations and degree of business success, as well as the 
management systems employed. 
This initial underwriting phase is intended to identify clearly uninsurable 
customers such as those where the principals have questionable integrity, are incom-
petent, have hopelessly inadequate management systems, or are nearly bankrupt. 
The initial screening is followed by a formal underwriting process that involves the 
following: 
• A formal private investigation of key individuals including a credit check and a 
lifestyle analysis. This would be performed on all new customers and on a three 
year cycle for existing customers. Insurability is again assessed at this stage and 
a decision to proceed with further underwriting is made. 
• An onsite investigation focusing on the business operations and management 
systems. This investigation is multi-disciplined and would normally include 
industry-specific experience. The objective is to identify risk areas in the opera-
tion that may lead to financial statement errors or misstatements. One result of 
this investigation will be the development of a specific investigation program to 
be conducted by underwriting technicians. 
• Another assessment of insurability is made at this point in the process. At this 
time, a fixed non-refundable underwriting fee is agreed with the customer which 
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wil l be credited against the insurance premium should the customer buy a 
policy. The amount of this fee is set to cover the direct underwriting costs and is 
substantially lower than a typical audit fee. 
• A detailed review of the accounting principles followed by the customer in 
preparing the financial statements is performed. Any and all errors and de-
partures from generally accepted accounting principles identified would be 
considered in the underwriting decision. Inappropriate accounting principles 
would require adjustment. 
• Conduct the specific investigation program. This may include typical audit 
procedures such as inventory count observation, tests of transactions, confirma-
tion of certain items, etc. or possibly forensic investigation. 
• Determine risk classification and rating. 
Once the risk classification is determined, the salesperson negotiates the insurance 
contract details, including materiality, overall policy limit, policy term, policy 
insureds, and the premium. The premium is then collected and the insurance policy 
and certificate is issued. 
Investments 
Premiums received, after commissions and other acquisition costs, are invested to 
earn interest, dividends and capital gains. In view of the volatile nature of the insur-
ance business, it would not be sensible to incur additional risks on the investment side 
of the business. Accordingly, a conservative investment strategy is planned with a 
focus on government bonds, high quality corporate bonds and preferred shares and 
blue chip common stocks. Our investment manager will adhere to a comprehensive set 
of investment guidelines so that risks in this area are minimized. 
Claims 
The objective of our claims operation is to ensure that all legitimate claims are 
handled fairly and promptly. To file a claim, the insured must describe the financial 
statement errors that misstate the financial statements and also provide proof of finan-
cial loss. When we are notified of a claim, the customer wi l l be contacted and 
inquiries will be made to determine if a financial statement error has occurred. If it is 
concluded that an error is likely, an analysis will be conducted to determine the extent 
of the error and whether or not there are additional errors that may affect the financial 
statements. 
If the net errors are material, then an evaluation of the proof of financial loss is 
conducted and the payment amount for the insured is determined. A l l payment 
amounts are accumulated and any policy limitations are applied before claims 
payments are made. The claims department uses forensic accounting specialists to 
perform the investigations and will also include lawyers on staff. 
Statistical and Actuarial 
As claims data accumulates, it will be analyzed to identify patterns and other char-
acteristics. The objective is to provide information that would assist the underwriting 
department in setting rates. In addition to the analytical responsibilities, the Statistical 
and Actuarial department is responsible for determining reserves for Incurred But Not 
Reported claims, claims development and the adequacy of statutory reserves for 
unpaid claims. The department wil l be staffed primarily by casualty actuaries and 
statisticians with financial experience and training. 
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Finance and Administration 
The administration of the company will follow the usual structure with a support 
staff to administer finance, personnel, information systems, and general corporate 
activities. 
Management and Ownership 
Organization Chart 
Board of 
Directors 
Chairman 
President and 
CEO 
VP Sales 
and 
Marketing 
VP Under-
Writing 
VP Manager Chief VP Finance 
and Adm. Claims Investments Actuary 
Acme's Legal Structure and Ownership 
Acme is a widely held public insurance company. It is registered with the 
Somestate Commissioner of Insurance and has a licence to operate in all fifty states 
and in Canada. 
Financial Projections and Capital Requirements 
Projected Financial Data 
The following table presents the projected financial results for Acme for the next 
five years. Key assumptions used in developing these projections are discussed below. 
Dollar amounts are in millions. 
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Jan 1 xxxx xxxx xxxx+1 xxxx+2 xxxx+3 xxxx+4 
Written Premiums 1000 1100 1250 1400 1600 
Earned Premiums 500 1050 1175 1325 1500 
Claims incurred 345 735 846 954 1050 
Claims expenses 15 32 35 40 45 
Underwriting 100 189 176 199 225 
Commissions 50 105 118 133 150 
Other expenses 60 84 82 80 90 
570 1145 1257 1405 1560 
Insurance income (70) (95) (82) (80) (60) 
Operating ratio 114.0% 109.0% 107.0% 106.0% 104.0% 
Investment income 79 147 184 210 238 
9 52 102 130 178 
Taxes 4 21 41 52 71 
Net income 6 31 61 78 107 
Return on average equity 0.7% 3.7% 6.5% 7.3% 8.5% 
Investments 360 1226 1714 1964 2230 2538 
Fixed assets 40 40 40 40 40 40 
Total assets 400 1266 1754 2004 2270 2578 
Unearned premium 500 550 625 700 800 
Unpaid claims 360 767 881 994 1095 
0 860 1317 1506 1694 1895 
Capital 400 406 437 498 576 683 
Risk ratio 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.3 
Total liability and capital 400 1266 1754 2004 2270 2578 
Assumptions 
Net loss ratio 69% 70% 72% 72% 70% 
Claims expense ratio 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 
Commissions rate 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 
Underwriting exp 20% 18% 15% 15% 15% 
Other expense 12% 8% 7% 6% 6% 
Investment return 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 
Tax rate 40% 40% 40% 40% 40% 
Projected Loss Ratio and other Significant Assumptions 
The most significant assumption in projecting financial results is the loss ratio. A 
long term loss ratio of 72 percent with small fluctuations has been used in the above 
projections. 
The loss ratio can be controlled through varying the premium level against the 
overall policy limits and the materiality level. The underwriting process itself can also 
affect the loss ratio in this case as it may identify financial statement errors prior to 
finalizing the financial statements. The underlying frequency of material error in 
financial statements is the key factor in setting loss ratios. 
Over time, experience wil l provide Acme with a fairly accurate estimate of the 
frequency of material error. Furthermore, that information will be in sufficient detail 
so that frequency levels can be classified by the different types of entities that will be 
insured. Initially, however, it wil l be necessary to make a blanket assumption. An 
analysis by Kinney and Martin (1993) of audit-related adjustments across a 15 year 
period and over 1,500 audits indicates that material errors are detected in from 20 
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percent to 60 percent of the audits. On this basis, we propose to use an underlying fre-
quency assumption of 60 percent. This means that we wil l assume that any set of 
financial statements of an insurable customer will have an inherent 60 percent proba-
bility of a material error before any formal underwriting is conducted. 
We anticipate that underwriting will identify the material errors in 90 percent of the 
situations where material errors exist and therefore our net frequency of material error 
should be no more than six percent. It is further expected that claims payments will be 
equal to roughly 12 times the premium which gives the 72 percent loss ratio. 
Although payments will only be made in the event of financial loss by insureds, we 
have used a conservative assumption that claims payments wi l l be made in 100 
percent of the cases where there is a material financial statement error. Emerging 
experience will be used to provide a more accurate estimate. 
Other assumptions used in the projections are set as follows: 
Claims expense ratio 
This has been set at three percent of earned premiums on the basis that there is 
considerable information available from the underwriting process. It relates 
entirely to the time spent by internal personnel on handling claims. 
Commissions rate 
Set at ten percent of premiums. 
Underwriting exp 
Initially set at 20 percent of premiums to reflect the learning curve and the 
development of a database of experience. It is expected to drop as this database 
develops. It is roughly equivalent to a large portion of the salary costs of a 
public accounting firm. 
Other expense 
A guess. Again, there should be some start-up costs that wil l eventually dis-
appear. 
Indicated Capital Requirements 
Initial capital has been set at $400 million which gives an underwriting capacity of 
roughly $1 billion if we allow a 2.5 to 1 underwriting ratio. The above projections 
indicate the capacity for ten percent growth in written premiums on an annual basis. 
There should also be some margin available for dividends. 
Epilogue 
It is instructive to compare the insurance model with the existing attestation frame-
work. The following table outlines some of the significant differences in the features 
between an attestation service and an insurance model. 
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Feature Attestation Framework Insurance Model 
Product or service 
Product features 
Nature of liability 
Who can seek compen-
sation 
Amount of compen-
sation 
Period of exposure 
Key success factor 
Relationship with 
customer 
Pricing 
Role of judgment 
Operating structure 
Audit opinion - a profes-
sional judgment 
Claims viewed as chal-
lenges to auditor 
reputation 
Based on negligence 
laws 
Duty of care doctrine -
determined by common 
law 
Essentially unlimited -
dependent on losses 
sustained 
Essentially unlimited, 
although limited by state-
ments of subsequent 
periods 
Adherence to professional 
standards 
Must be independent 
Based primarily on time 
spent which is related to 
the risk - often fixed in 
advance 
A n integral part of the 
audit process with perva-
sive effect 
Professional training envi-
ronment with focus on 
accounting and auditing 
Insurance policy - a 
contractual obligation 
Objective is to pay legiti-
mate claims -failure to 
pay affects reputation 
Based on insurance 
contract 
Specific insured parties as 
stated in the policy 
Contractually limited to a 
fixed amount 
Limited to policy term 
Effective underwriting and 
claims handling - auditing 
standards not relevant 
Independence unnecessary 
Based on insurance risk -
determined by under-
writing process 
A similar role to auditing -
important to underwriting 
Specialists in diverse fields 
with analytical approach to 
business 
While there are important structural differences between the two models, perhaps 
the single most significant difference is the attempt to replace tort law liability with a 
contractual form of liability. In many respects, this is essentially a return to the role of 
auditing at the turn of the century. Time is not reversible however, and the price that 
must be paid for this return to a contractual liability exposure is a willingness to pay 
claims when there are errors in financial statements, something auditors would have 
considerable difficulty with. 
Is financial statement insurance a viable product? There does not seem to be any 
reason why insurance companies could not provide a similar form of insurance today. 
For example, fidelity bonding companies provide a form of loss coverage in the event 
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of fraud and one could argue that insurers of auditor liability provide something 
similar at the present time. But there does not seem to be anything on the market that 
is in essence a financial statement insurance product, other than audits. There are 
several possible reasons for this: 
Legal 
Audits are often required by statutes such as corporations acts and securities 
laws and it would be difficult to alter this historical structure. For example, the 
benefits of financial statement insurance would have to be clearly demonstrated 
before the SEC would find such arrangements an alternative to audits. 
Economics 
Financial statement insurance may not be economically viable as it may be too 
expensive. If one factors in all of the costs including loss ratio, etc. and this 
leads to a premium that is higher than would be spent on a conventional audit, it 
wil l be difficult to economically justify an insurance operation. If this is the 
case, there are some serious implications for the existing auditing framework. 
Claims exposure 
While one might attempt to limit the exposure through carefully worded insur-
ance contracts, it is quite possible that almost every insurance policy will attract 
a claim on the basis there is nothing for the plaintiff to lose. This would add 
significantly to claims handling costs until the contractual provisions were 
enforced by the courts. 
While one could continue to explore the nuances of financial statement insurance, 
this would take us away from our objective. The issue is whether the existing auditing 
framework still meets society's needs for enhancing the credibility of financial 
reporting at an economically viable cost. The case study provides an interesting alter-
native which has the added benefit of exposing some of the serious difficulties with 
the audit model. There can be no doubt that i f litigation costs continue to escalate, this 
paper will become academic in a very real sense. Should the current growth rate in 
litigation costs continue for a five year period, litigation costs of the order of 30 
percent of revenues wil l be the norm for accounting firms. We wi l l then have a 
perverse form of financial statement insurance but have it provided by organizations 
that are not structured for that particular product. We may have the opportunity to 
witness a short term phenomenon. 
Before this apocalypse occurs the profession must revisit some fundamental issues. 
We cannot afford to misinterpret an expectation gap as a failure to communicate the 
auditor's role. Is the rise in litigation a message to the profession that its existing 
product is no longer suitable? We need to explore what society needs and obtain a 
clear understanding of what they are asking for. The concept of financial statement 
insurance is one example of an alternative product that can be used to more accurately 
frame society's expectations of our profession. We need to listen. But we must also 
educate and inform. 
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Discussant's Response to "The Acme Financial Statement 
Insurance Company Inc.: A Case Study" 
Dan A. Simunic 
The University of British Columbia 
Before commenting on the Acme Case, it is useful to summarize the basic argu-
ments Steve Aldersley makes in his paper, as I understand it. 
Summary of Main Arguments 
• The legal liability costs incurred by auditors are becoming so onerous - at least 11 
percent of revenues and growing - that the business may soon become uneco-
nomic. That is, the supply price wil l exceed the maximum amount buyers are 
willing to pay at all possible market quantities of the service. 
• While auditors are doing good work - Steve cites evidence on the relative 
frequency of litigation developed by Palmrose (1988) - they are constantly being 
harassed in court to demonstrate their due diligence (lack of ordinary negligence). 
Auditors find this annoying. 
• In addition, courts are seemingly holding auditors liable even in cases where 
residual audit risk has been reduced to an acceptably low level. That is, although 
reasonable assurance that the financial statements are free of material misstatement 
has been obtained, auditors are often held liable for losses suffered by investors, 
creditors, etc. In effect, courts are imposing de facto strict liability on auditors (i.e. 
demonstrating due diligence is no defense). 
• Given this state of affairs, it would be better for all concerned if the "rules of the 
game" were clarified by acknowledging that auditors are really selling an insurance 
policy indemnifying financial statement users against losses incurred on account of 
reliance on materially misleading financial information. 
• Therefore, let's set up a business form - an insurance company - which can: 
1. Contract with (somebody) to offer such insurance. 
2. Only insure against losses arising from unintentional financial statement errors 
as the base case, with policy riders available to cover misstatements arising 
from management fraud and/or business failure (inadequate disclosure, etc. of a 
business's going concern problems). 
3. Set specific policy limits (a liability cap). 
• Finally, the paper seems to suggest that this insurance company wil l probably 
undercut the prices charged by public accounting firms and drive them out of 
business. 
Overall Reaction 
M y initial reaction on reading Steve's paper was that the Acme Financial Statement 
Insurance Company was as much (perhaps more) a public accounting firm than an 
insurance company. That is, it could not set an appropriate insurance premium without 
performing an extensive investigation of the "client's" accounting system and finan-
cial statement assertions (more on this point later). The major difference, it seems to 
me, is that Acme is strictly liable for losses, while at the same time Acme can "pick 
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and choose" what it is liable for (source of material misstatement), how much it is 
liable for, and to whom it is liable. These are all luxuries not currently available to 
auditors! 
Also, I was surprised that Steve limits the insurance to losses suffered on account 
of reliance on materially misstated financial statements. This does not seem to get at a 
major problem facing auditors in court: plaintiffs are often just trying to recover their 
investment losses even when the financial statements were not materially misstated at 
the time they were prepared, but may look questionable in hindsight after a business 
failure, the collapse of real estate values, etc. Auditors currently face this litigation 
problem, and so would Acme! 
Turning to specifics, I have three major comments (with several related observa-
tions) on the paper, and a final personal observation on the auditor "litigation crisis" 
including the implausible economics which seems to characterize much of the discus-
sion of that issue. 
Comment 1: Acme is as much an auditing firm as an insurance company. It must 
perform the equivalent of an audit to set an appropriate premium. 
This comment simply reflects the fact that a strictly liable insurer (auditor) would 
be motivated to expend some effort (incurring the costs of resources utilized) to deter-
mine a probability that the financial statements were materially misstated. The basic 
trade-off is the familiar one: more audit effort reduces the expected insurance payout 
(liability losses). Assuming an upward sloping "total cost of effort" function, and a 
downward sloping "expected payout" function, it is likely that some non-zero effort 
level minimizes Acme's expected costs. This is the efficient (minimum) insurance 
premium, given the risks faced. It is in Acme's self-interest to do the work, or risk 
losing the business to a competitor insurance company (auditor). 
Note that i f generally accepted auditing standards (GAAS) are such that this 
expected cost minimizing effort level constitutes a G A A S audit, then an auditor oper-
ating in competition with Acme in the existing legal environment (and other things 
held constant) could probably undercut Acme's price. This is because such an auditor 
need not charge a risk premium to cover the possibility that even though reasonable 
assurance has been obtained, the financial statements are actually materially misstated 
(audit risk). Thus, taken alone, the move to strict liability is cost-increasing, unless the 
courts are very inefficient in allowing auditors to establish a due diligence defense. 
But with strict liability, there is also the added cost of estimating an appropriate 
premium to cover the residual risk. 
However, I don't think it is really possible to compare Acme's fees with today's 
audit fees. There is a major "apples vs. oranges" problem since real-world auditors are 
not able to pick and choose the nature of misstatements they are expected to uncover, 
they largely do not determine the specific parties to whom they are liable, and they do 
not operate with liability caps. Thus the products sold by today's auditors and Acme 
are not comparable. 
Finally, while the importance of G A A S is clearly reduced in an insurance (strict 
liability) regime - since compliance with G A A S does not constitute a legal defense -
there is still a role for technical professional standards in guiding the performance of 
an effective and efficient audit. Thus, I don't fully agree with Steve's claim on p. 106 
that "auditing standards are not relevant" to Acme. 
Comment 2: There are many important incentive effects if (certain) financial 
statement users are insured against losses from material financial statement mis-
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statements, and there is no other legal liability regime nor mandatory audit re-
quirement in place. (Steve's paper does not discuss these problems.) 
A major concern is that financial statement users who are insured against losses 
have no incentive to exercise reasonable care in relying on financial statements in 
making decisions. For example, a creditor may be motivated to place too much weight 
on financial statement information rather than other important characteristics of poten-
tial borrowers. Shavell (1980) showed that strict liability without a defense of 
contributory negligence is inefficient (wasteful of resources) because victims do not 
have an incentive to be careful in using a product or service. While a contributory neg-
ligence defense would presumably not be available to an insurance company, perhaps 
co-insurance provisions could be used to deal with the problem. 
Problems also arise with management's incentives in an insurance regime. Even 
with a basic policy (coverage for unintentional errors only) management's incentive to 
maintain a well functioning internal control system is reduced, since the company is 
indemnified against losses suffered by "outsiders" on account of such errors. This 
affects the probability of error, the extent of the necessary "underwriting investiga-
tion" (the audit), and the appropriate premium. 
Offering policy extensions to cover material misstatements arising from manage-
ment fraud and/or business failure would likely create serious adverse selection 
problems - the offer of insurance will tend to attract the worst risks. Moreover, there 
are potential moral hazard problems in that the insurance may encourage more 
management fraud, and/or encourage management to undertake more risky invest-
ments - increasing the risk of business failure. The equilibrium level of audit effort 
and the appropriate insurance premium would be very difficult to determine in these 
circumstances. 
Related to the previous point, changing from a mandatory audit regime to a volun-
tary contractual regime can be expected to change the nature of the "risk pool" facing 
insurers. Given the information asymmetry between insurers and management -
management knows a lot more than Acme about its accounting systems and internal 
controls, its incentive to commit fraud and prospects for business failure — it is not 
clear how, if at all, the market would function. For example, if ethical viable compa-
nies were unable to convince insurers of their true type, the premium could be too 
high to induce them to purchase insurance voluntarily and the market could unravel 
(Akerloff 1970). 
Finally, I assume Steve's insurance proposal entails a recision of the mandatory 
audit requirement. Presumably, this legal requirement arose because there are public 
good aspects of the audit service. That is, users of audited financial statements can 
benefit from the reduction in risk of material misstatement without affecting the use 
(consumption) of other financial statement users. Under a voluntary insurance 
scheme, there would presumably be a class of uninsured current or prospective share-
holders, creditors, etc. who potentially benefit from the risk reducing aspects of an 
underwriting investigation (audit). These benefits are ignored in setting the terms of 
Acme's insurance contracts, resulting in a potential undersupply of the service. 
Comment 3: There are a number of ambiguities in the Acme business plan. 
Some of the more serious issues are: 
• It is not entirely clear to me who would actually purchase the insurance and pay 
the premium - a company or specific financial statement users? If policies were 
sold to companies, how would the changing identities of stakeholders (share-
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holders, creditors, etc.) be dealt with? If policies were sold directly tofinancial 
statement users, what incentive do s a company have to submit to an "under-
writing investigation"? 
• When making a  claim, how can users establish that a material misstatement has 
occurred without detail investigation of company records? It seems hat the 
claims process could easily degenerate into extensive litigation. Moreover, the 
distinction between unintentional and intentional misstatements is not very clear 
when  the application of accounting principles and disclosure judgements are at 
issue. Again, there is scope for litigation. 
• With a prior probability of 60 percent that ma erial misstatements exist in finan-
cial statements and a likelihood of detection of 90 percent, the Bayesian 
posterior probability of undetected material misstatements in "audited" financial 
statements is about 13 percent (assuming α-risk is zero), not the six percent 
used by Steve. 
Concluding Comments 
Steve has chosen an unusual way to address a complex social policy question: 
What  is the welfare maximizing liability regime for auditors? Essentially he asks: 
Could a private company which provided insurance to certain parties in certain 
amounts in certain circumstances for losses suffered on account of what we now call 
"audit risk" (1- reasonable assurance) successfully compete against traditional public 
accounting firms? Unfortunately, I have no idea what the answer would be because 
there are just too many differences between the current regime and the proposed busi-
ness, and the institutional background within which Acme  would operate is unclear to 
me. 
A  more tractable question would be: Is strict liability preferable to a negligence 
regime? Shavell's analysis suggests the answer is generally, No. Moreover, using an 
experimental markets approach to compare strict auditor l ability vs. negligence, 
Dopuch  and King (1992) found that audit fees were so high under strict l ability that 
auditors were frequently not hired, with potential auditees finding it preferable to 
restrict their investment plans becau e they were unable to convince potential share-
holders of the value of those investments. 
This raises the interesting issue that perhaps the major problem is not litigation 
itself, but the difficulties auditors have in pricing their services given the uncertainties 
arising in a litigious world. I find the argument made by Steve in the introductory 
parts of his paper that we should expect liability losses as apercentage of CPA  firms' 
revenues to continue to grow until the firms are bankrupt, implausible. 
The mandatory audit requirement for SEC registrants tends to make aggregate 
demand highly price inelastic, facilitating the "pass through" of auditors' costs. 
Moreover, I know of no evidence that audit firm partners earn less than a normal 
return on their invested human and financial capital. They probably earn a lower 
return than they would like (who doesn't?) and some might have earned more in the 
less competitive and less litigious past. But none of this portends the bankruptcy of the 
industry. 
It seems to me that the problems of pricing audit services when catastrophic events 
can occur with very low probability is an interesting and important research issue. But 
the evidence from Dopuch and King's work seems to suggest that it is much more 
difficult o assess the expected cost of, hence properly price, a service under strict 
liability (a complex premium) than under a negligence regime (mostly labor costs). 
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Voluntarily assuming strict liability, even under the guise of insurance, does not seem 
to be the best cure for auditors' litigation and pricing problems! 
To conclude, I found Steve's paper both interesting and thought provoking, and 
appreciate the opportunity to discuss it both at the Symposium and in these written 
remarks. 
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6 
A Behavioral-Economics Approach to Auditors' 
Risk Assessments 
William S. Waller 
University of Arizona 
Strict Bayesians are legitimately challenged to tell us where they get their numbers. 
I. Levi 
To establish a sound basis for a decision about the audit report, auditors process a 
variety of information which, in light of prior knowledge, sufficiently limits their 
uncertainty about misstatements in auditee assertions. As a frame for research on the 
problem of limiting such uncertainty, three general aspects may be distinguished: 
normative, descriptive, and prescriptive (Ashton et al. 1988). The normative aspect 
concerns the manner in which auditors, as unboundedly rational economic agents, 
should structure and solve the problem. The descriptive aspect concerns the manner in 
which auditors, as boundedly rational economic agents with limited cognitive 
capacity, structure and solve the problem in actuality. The prescriptive aspect concerns 
the ways in which boundedly rational auditors might improve on their current solution 
to the problem. This distinction is both important and problematic. It is important, 
because it reflects the dual role of auditing research, which is to understand and 
improve behavior in practical settings. It is problematic, because it raises difficult 
issues about how the three aspects relate to each other. Central to this relationship, in 
auditing as well as other areas of judgment and decision making, is the rational choice 
model, i.e., expected utility maximization under the subjective or Bayesian interpreta-
tion of probability (Savage 1954). 
Applications of the rational choice model in specific economic domains tend to use 
one of four approaches: positivistic, decision-analytic, heuristic-and-bias, generalized. 
The positivistic approach adopts the view that understanding an economic agent's 
behavior requires the assumption that the individual is acting rationally with respect to 
his or her opportunities, beliefs, and desires (Schoemaker 1982). Economic agents by 
assumption are Bayesian expected-utility maximizers, and a goal of research is to 
explain behavior by inferring agents' utilities and subjective probabilities, without 
regard to the psychological reality of these constructs. Given this assumption, the 
positivistic approach effectively rules out the possibility of agent error (Einhorn and 
Hogarth 1981a). Apparent inconsistencies between agent behavior and the rational 
choice model are handled by re-specifying the model (e.g., adding arguments to the 
utility function) or the assumed conditions of the setting to which the model is applied 
(e.g., viewing the setting as strategic rather than parametric), not by relaxing the 
assumption of rationality. The decision-analytic approach uses the rational choice 
model prescriptively as a means for structuring a real agent's problem (Raiffa 1968). 
Unlike the positivistic approach's goal of inferring an agent's utilities and subjective 
probabilities, the decision-analytic approach seeks to construct these numbers so as to 
facilitate choice, with no attempt to describe or explain how the agent might otherwise 
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decide. The heuristic-and-bias approach uses the model as a normative benchmark for 
evaluating behavior (Kahneman et al. 1982). Inconsistencies are seen as errors or 
biases, which are caused by cognitive factors and dealt with by corrective devices that 
move behavior closer to the model. The generalized approach is an analytical hybrid 
that covers empirical regularities, including persistent inconsistencies, by relaxing one 
or more axioms of the rational choice model (Chew 1983; Machina 1982). Besides 
accounting for past observations, the generalized approach has produced new predic-
tions and related empirical testing (Camerer 1989; Chew and Waller 1986). 
To achieve both the descriptive goal of understanding behavior and the prescriptive 
goal of improving behavior, none of the above approaches is entirely satisfactory. At 
one extreme, so long as the positivistic approach assumes away the possibility of error, 
its prescriptive value is limited to changes in the environment to which rational agents 
adapt, with nothing to say about how real agents might better adapt to a given environ-
ment. At the other extreme, the decision-analytic approach is primarily prescriptive, 
despite an increased sensitivity to psychological research among decision analysts 
(Bell et al. 1988; von Winterfeldt and Edwards 1986). The heuristic-and-bias approach 
is limited by its implicit assumption that the evaluator and evaluatee share the same 
specification of the problem (Berkeley and Humphreys 1982; Cohen 1979). When this 
assumption is wrong, inconsistencies cannot be unambiguously classified as errors, and 
the approach loses its prescriptive value. Also, the heuristic-and-bias approach focuses 
on the adverse consequences of using heuristics, rather than taking a balanced view of 
the benefits and costs (Christensen-Szalanski and Beach 1984). Those who use the 
generalized approach typically do not tout their hybrid models as normatively correct. 
Axioms of the rational choice model are relaxed to account for empirical data, not to 
improve decisions (Edwards 1992). Finally, and especially important in auditing, none 
of the approaches systematically takes into account the effects of organizational poli-
cies and constraints on individual judgments and decisions. 
This paper adopts an alternative approach to applying the rational choice model. As 
in complete versus simplified analyses (Demski 1980), the alternative approach 
stresses Simon's (1982, 1987a) distinction between unbounded and bounded ratio-
nality. The unboundedly rational agent effortlessly expresses all elements and 
implications of a knowledge base in terms of expected utility, producing a complete 
decision model as i f analysis were a free good. For the boundedly rational agent, 
however, analysis is costly, leading to simplifications, e.g., partial mining of the 
knowledge base and heuristics for probability assessment. As a first approximation, 
persistent inconsistencies between agent behavior and models of unbounded ratio-
nality indicate not errors, but economizing on the cost of analysis (cf. Marschak 1968; 
Shugan 1980). Each simplification trades off saving analysis costs and incurring the 
opportunity cost of simplified analysis. The task for economic agents is to find the 
optimal simplification, despite the infeasibility of a higher-order, complete analysis. 
Facing the same constraint, the task for researchers is to explain, evaluate, and pre-
scribe improvements in the simplifications used by real economic agents. A starting 
point for such research is observation of the standard practices of agents in specific 
economic domains by way of contrast with the rational choice model, without 
presuming that the current state of affairs is necessarily optimal or that models of 
unbounded rationality are necessarily appropriate for evaluation and prescription. 
Such observation provides a basis for hypotheses regarding agents' trade-offs between 
the analysis and opportunity costs of simplification, and for prescriptions of new 
simplifications with improved trade-offs. In line with Simon (1982, 1987b), this 
paper's approach is referred to as the behavioral-economics (BE) approach. 
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Although related to other approaches, the BE approach differs in important ways. 
Unlike the positivistic approach, the BE approach admits the possibility of agent error 
and improvement. Positivistic extensions of the rational choice model that include opti-
mization given analysis costs lead to infinite regress, contribute minimally to the 
descriptive goal of understanding behavior, and implicitly endorse the status quo rather 
than contributing to the prescriptive goal of improving behavior. A complete analysis of 
alternative simplifications is infeasible, so there can be no guarantee that any particular 
simplification is optimal. Besides explaining standard practices, the BE approach 
intends to produce innovations with improved (not to say optimal) trade-offs, e.g., 
reducing analysis costs while holding opportunity costs constant. Unlike the general-
ized approach, the BE approach focuses on human information processing limitations 
as a causal determinant of behavior. Although the heuristic-and-bias approach has a 
similar focus, the BE approach differs by not presuming that inconsistencies vis-a-vis 
the rational choice model are errors, instead taking a balanced view of the benefits and 
costs of simplification. The BE approach differs from the decision-analytic approach by 
emphasizing that attempts to mimic the rational choice model may not be worth the 
costs, even for decisions in field settings where the stakes are high (March 1978). 
Because such attempts are a type of simplification, decision analysis may be subsumed 
under the BE approach. Finally, as demonstrated below, the BE approach easily covers 
cases in which simplifications are chosen by policy makers at the organizational or 
professional level. In such cases, individual judgments and decisions amount to policy 
execution, indicating a need for researchers to expand their attention to include expla-
nation and evaluation of the policy, not just individual behavior. 
In audit planning, auditors must assess the risk of material misstatement in the 
auditee financial statements, relative to generally accepted accounting principles. 
General policy and standard practices for auditors' risk assessments are stated in 
AICPA Professional Standards, Volume 1, U.S. Auditing Standards (referred to below 
as Standards). Contrasting such practices with the rational choice model is a starting 
point for descriptive and prescriptive research under the BE approach. The Standards 
contain various inconsistencies with Bayesian postulates (i.e., coherence, total evi-
dence, and conditionalization) of the rational choice model: (1) risk is decomposed in 
ways that are inconsistent with coherence and total evidence; (2) risk is revised in 
ways that are inconsistent with conditionalization; (3) second-order uncertainty about 
risk assessments is dealt with in ways that are inconsistent with coherence and that 
confound belief and value. Each inconsistency may be explained in terms of trade-offs 
between the analysis and opportunity costs of simplification. For example, auditors' 
simplifications for assessing risk allow for second-order uncertainty, because 
constructing precise subjective probabilities would entail excessive analysis costs, 
relative to the gain from precision. In other words, second-order uncertainty is a proxy 
for economizing on analysis costs. For each inconsistency, the paper identifies issues 
for descriptive and prescriptive research under the BE approach. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 briefly states the 
Bayesian postulates and their relevance to boundedly rational economic agents. 
Section 2 describes the audit risk model in the Standards and how it is implemented 
by a major public accounting firm.1 Section 3 employs the BE approach to examine 
the three inconsistencies stated above. Section 4 provides some concluding remarks. 
Readers who are familiar with the audit risk model may prefer to skim or skip the second section. 
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Three Bayesian Postulates 
A n unboundedly rational agent's belief about the state of the world, M, conforms to 
three postulates: coherence, total evidence, and conditionalization (Seidenfeld 1979). 
Coherence requires that the agent's belief is representable as a unique subjective prob-
ability, PK(M), where K indicates that the subjective probability is based on the 
agent's knowledge at the time of assessment. Total evidence requires that K is a 
consistent, deductively closed knowledge base, the import of which is fully captured 
by PK(M). Conditionalization requires that changes in the agent's belief follow Bayes' 
theorem. Let E designate new evidence and K' designate the agent's updated knowl-
edge base, i.e., the deductive consequences of K and E. Given PK(E) > 0, 
conditionalization requires that: 
PK(E\M) • PK(M) 
PK(M\E) = , (1) 
PK(E) 
and upon observing E, 
PK\M) = PK(M\E). (2) 
It is worth emphasizing that Eq. 1 (Bayes' theorem) provides a rule of internal 
consistency with respect to a fixed knowledge base, K, and Eq. 2 provides a rule of 
belief revision from K to K'. Further, Eq. 2 is tautological in that E must be the entire 
change in knowledge from K to K' (Weirich 1983). 
For boundedly rational agents, conformance to these postulates entails analysis 
costs. Although decision analysts offer simple techniques for producing precise proba-
bility assessments (Spetzler and Stael von Holstein 1975), agents may conclude that 
the precision is imposed by the techniques rather than being a reflection of belief 
(Brown 1990). This conclusion highlights a problem in simultaneously satisfying the 
coherence and total evidence postulates: agents know their beliefs are less precise than 
the techniques' coherent measurement of them. The limited precision of real agents' 
uncertain beliefs has led theorists employing the generalized approach to relax coher-
ence and use an interval of probability as a primitive in their axiomatizations 
(Fishburn 1986). Other problems with the total evidence and conditionalization postu-
lates arise when human information processing limitations are considered (Goldman 
1993). In this regard, Brown and Lindley (1982, 120) characterized the agent's knowl-
edge base as a psychological field: 
which comprises the totality of his cognitive processes, experience, memory, or indeed anything 
which may be actually or potentially in his mind.... Usually (the agent) will only consider part of 
his psychological field but may extend this part by including extra material. Such an extension will 
be referred to as "digging" in his psychological field. This "digging" process may be contrasted with 
the process of (the agent) collecting data from his external world. 
A problem for boundedly rational agents is that the "digging" tools (i.e., cognitive 
processes) from one part of the psychological field limit the material which can be 
dug from other parts. Information in their mind may not be on their mind when 
making probability assessments. Researchers employing the heuristic-and-bias 
approach emphasize such limitations (Kahneman et al. 1982). The computational 
burden of Eq. 1 may be severe, especially as the number of possible pieces of 
evidence increases (Harman 1986). Conditionalization requires agents to build a 
protocol representing not only the evidence actually observed, but also evidence that 
could have been observed (Shafer 1985), and to imagine for each possible piece of 
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evidence an ex post knowledge state which comprises all implications of the evidence 
conjoined with ex ante knowledge. Such requirements may be problematic even in 
stylized, textbook cases (Bar-Hillel and Falk 1982). In practical domains, the analysis 
cost of conformance to the Bayesian postulates raises doubt about the rational choice 
model's applicability for evaluation and prescription as well as description and expla-
nation. The use of simplifications should be expected for real economic agents. 
Audit Risk Model 
The Standards and audit policy manuals of public accounting firms provide consid-
erable guidance on risk analysis, including the conceptualization of risk and the 
factors to be considered when making risk assessments. Such guidance is based on the 
audit risk model, which represents the risk components that auditors assess or control 
through decisions about the nature, extent, and timing of test procedures. The key 
component is audit risk (AR), the risk that an auditee assertion contains a misstate-
ment which is not detected by the auditor. A goal in auditing is to limit AR to an 
adequately low level. To achieve this goal, the audit risk model uses a decomposition 
strategy. At one level, AR is decomposed into auditee risk (AER) and auditor risk 
(ARR). AER is the risk that an auditee financial statement assertion contains a 
misstatement before the audit, and ARR is the risk that the auditor fails to detect a 
misstatement which is present. AER is assessed by the auditor, whereas ARR is 
controlled through the choice of test procedures. At a second level, AER may be 
decomposed into inherent risk (IR) and control risk (CR).2 IR is the risk that a 
misstatement occurs, assuming the auditee has no related controls, and CR is the risk 
that a misstatement is not prevented or detected (and corrected) on a timely basis by 
auditee controls. The audit risk model relates these components as follows: 
AR = AER x ARR, (3a) 
AR = IR x CR x ARR. (3b) 
In audit planning, the auditor sets a target for AR, makes separate assessments of IR 
and CR, or a direct assessment of AER, and selects test procedures such that ARR = 
AR/(IR x CR). 
The Standards allow for a variety of specific applications of the audit risk model. 
For concreteness, it is useful to describe the risk assessment task as performed by a 
major public accounting firm.3 This firm operationalizes a material misstatement by 
computing a monetary amount at the financial statement level as a function of auditee 
size and allocating the amount to accounts and assertions (tolerable error). In audit 
planning, the auditor's task is to assess the risk that an assertion contains a misstate-
ment exceeding tolerable error. This task is decomposed into separate assessments of 
IR and CR. IR is assessed on a verbal scale: low (IR l), moderate (IRm), high (IRh). 
Auditors are told to consider many factors when assessing IR, such as misstatements 
detected by previous audits, the complexity and subjectivity of accounting procedures, 
the competence and integrity of auditee personnel, and other auditee characteristics 
(operations, industry, financing arrangements, profitability, and so on). The firm's 
audit policy manual indicates how each factor generally affects IR, but it also stresses 
the role of judgment by stating that no mathematical weighting of factors is appro-
priate, since each IR assessment depends on the circumstances. 
2 The Standards permit either separate assessments of IR and CR, or a combined assessment. 
3 The firm is KPMG Peat Marwick. 
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As a preliminary to assessing CR on a similar scale, the auditor evaluates and 
performs tests of auditee controls. As with IR, many factors are supposed to be consid-
ered when assessing CR, such as the auditee's segregation of duties, its protection of 
assets and records, and its management's operating style and philosophy toward 
controls. At this point, the auditor considers the decision of whether to rely on 
controls as a partial substitute for substantive tests, e.g., collecting for close scrutiny a 
sample of documents that underlie financial statement assertions. Such reliance in-
volves a CR assessment below the maximum, CRh, with a corresponding increase in 
ARR and reduction in substantive tests. Overall audit costs generally are lower when 
reliance on auditee controls is substituted for substantive tests. But, the reliance option 
requires additional, costly evaluation, documentation, and testing of controls to 
support the lower CR assessment. The nonreliance option requires no further analysis 
and implies a CRh assessment. The latter option is selected if (1) controls are initially 
perceived to be weak or (2) the extra cost of analysis with the reliance option exceeds 
the possible benefit, i.e., a reduction in substantive tests. 
Given assessments of IR and CR, the auditor consults a risk table mapping each 
combination of IR and CR on the verbal scale into ARR on a [0,1] scale, given a target 
AR. The ARR value affects the auditor's decision about test procedures, e.g., required 
sample sizes decrease as ARR increases, other things equal. The risk table implicitly 
relies on numerical point values of IR (IRl = .36, IRm = .67, IRh = 1.00) and CR (CRl 
= .18, CRm = .44, CRh = 1.00). To illustrate, when the auditor assesses IRm and CRm, 
ARR=AR/(IRm x CRm) = .04/(.67 x .44) = .14. Like many simplifications in auditing, 
the point values reflect a conservative bias. In an archival study of auditors' risk 
assessments in field settings, Waller (1993) reported that the rate of detected misstate-
ments was .03 when auditors assess IRl, .08 when IRm, and .14 when IRh, controlling 
for CR. Even i f adjusted for reasonable estimates of undetected misstatements, the 
rate of misstatements for each level of IR would be far below the corresponding 
implicit point values in the risk table. In addition, the firm's audit policy manual 
instructs each auditor to interpret the verbal scale in terms of intervals rather than 
point values (.00-.40 for IRl, .40-.60 for IRm, .60-1.00 for IRh, .00-.20 for CRl, .20-.40 
for CRm, .40-1.00 for CRh). The risk table's implicit point values are set near the 
upper limit of the corresponding interval. Audit policy makers incorporate such 
conservative biases to ensure effectiveness, i.e., reaching the proper conclusion about 
the presence or absence of misstatements, despite the possible inefficiency of exces-
sive testing. 
Auditors must assess IR and CR at the assertion level for each significant financial 
statement account or transaction cycle. In effect, risk is decomposed from the account 
to assertion level, such that a misstatement in any assertion implies a misstatement in 
the account. For example, regarding an asset account such as trade accounts receiv-
able, auditors assess IR and CR for the following assertions: completeness (all 
exchanges that should be recorded by the auditee are recorded), existence (all 
exchanges recorded by the auditee are valid), accuracy (all exchanges recorded by the 
auditee are recorded accurately), valuation (items in the auditee financial statements 
are valued in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles), and owner-
ship (the auditee has appropriate rights to items in its financial statements). For trade 
accounts receivable, auditors thus make ten separate risk assessments (two types of 
risk x five assertions). In principle, this decomposition strategy allows for fine-tuned 
decisions about test procedures on an assertion-by-assertion basis. 
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Inconsistencies Between Audit Risk Model and Bayesian Postulates 
The Standards do not clarify the relationship between the audit risk model and 
probability theory. Even so, it is straightforward (to a point) to restate the audit risk 
model probabilistically. Consider the event sequence in Figure 1, where M is the event 
of a misstatement, C is the event of detection (and correction) of a misstatement by 
auditee controls, and D is the event of detection of a misstatement by the auditor (cf. 
Graham 1985). Based on this sequence, the risk of M, the risk of -C given M , and the 
risk of -D given M and -C, are represented by IR, CR, and ARR, respectively (but see 
below). As suggested by Eq. 3b, a misstatement in an audited assertion involves the 
conjunction of M, -C, and -D, the risk of which is represented by AR.4 In Bayesian 
terms, an auditor's subjective probability of a component event, say M, may be repre-
sented as PK(M). For two component events, say C and M, PK(C\M) represents an 
auditor's subjective probability of C, given the assumption of M. Along these lines, 
Eq. 3a may be restated as: 
PK(M & -C & -D) = PK(M & -C) x PK(D\M & -C). (4) 
The first term on the right side of Eq. 4 is the auditor's prior belief about the presence 
or absence of a misstatement in an unaudited assertion, and the second term is the 
auditor's belief that planned test procedures will fail to detect a misstatement which is 
present. 
Figure 1. Event Sequence. 
M C D M & -C & -D 
Detection Misstatement 
and in 
Occurrence correction Detection audited 
of by by financial 
misstatement? controls? auditor? statements? 
yes no no yes 
• • • 
IR x CR x ARR AR 
Extending the Bayesian representation of audit risk beyond Eq. 4 reveals at least 
three inconsistencies in auditors' standard practices: the decomposition of AER as IR x 
CR is inconsistent with the postulates of coherence and total evidence; IR and CR 
assessments are revised in light of new evidence, but not via conditionalization; and, 
IR and CR assessments reflect second-order uncertainty, which is inconsistent with the 
coherence postulate, and often reflect analysis costs rather than beliefs, which is 
inconsistent with the distinction between value and belief in the rational choice model. 
Below, these inconsistencies are examined under the BE approach. 
Decomposition 
The rational choice model permits a decision problem to be structured in many 
equivalent ways, e.g., an agent's belief about a target event may be stated directly or in 
terms of component events. Under the positivistic approach, such flexibility has no 
relevance, since the behavior of unboundedly rational agents is invariant to the 
4 The Standards are equivocal regarding the concept of AR. Eq. 3b suggests the interpretation of AR as the 
risk of the conjunction of M, -C, and -D. Elsewhere, the Standards suggest the interpretation of AR as the 
posterior risk of M given -C and -D. 
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problem structure (Tversky and Kahneman 1986). In contrast, the decision-analytic 
approach exploits the rational choice model's flexibility: 
The spirit of decision analysis is divide and conquer: Decompose a complex problem into simpler 
problems, get one's thinking straight in these simpler problems, paste these analyses together with a 
logical glue, and come out with a program for action for the complex problem. Experts are not 
asked complicated, fuzzy questions, but crystal clear, unambiguous, elemental, hypothetical ques-
tions (Raiffa 1968, 271). 
Decomposition is guided by two principles. First, there must be a theory-based link 
between components to permit a proper integration of separate assessments. The rules 
of probability provide the logical glue for integrating an agent's assessments of 
component events. Second, there must be an overall gain in effectiveness or efficiency 
from performing two or more assessment tasks, each with a relatively narrow focus, 
versus a holistic assessment. 
Under the BE approach, decomposition is seen as a method for producing alterna-
tive simplifications which may affect an agent's analysis cost and degree of 
conformance to the Bayesian postulates. Decomposition of a target event into compo-
nent events may allow a boundedly rational agent to partition elements of the 
psychological field by their relevance to each component event. Performing two or 
more assessments, each relating a component event with relevant knowledge, may 
increase conformance to the total evidence postulate, without increasing the cost of 
analysis (Armstrong et al. 1975). Also, by dividing a target event for which belief is 
imprecise into simpler events that can be reasonably assessed with greater precision, 
decomposition may increase conformance to the coherence postulate (Phillips 1973). 
Finally, the mechanical integration of assessments of each term on the right side of 
Eq. 1, in place of a holistic assessment of the left side, may aid conformance to 
conditionalization (Edwards and Phillips 1964). 
The audit risk model includes the decomposition of AER into IR x CR (Eq. 3b). 
Curiously, this decomposition emerged gradually over time and is not based on formal 
theory (Colbert 1987). Conventional wisdom in auditing has long recognized the need 
to consider the inherent riskiness of accounts or transactions, e.g., such risk is higher 
for an inventory of gold than pyrite. Early policy statements on audit risk (AICPA 
1972, 1981) nevertheless suggested that auditors suppress the effect of IR on ARR: 
The risk that monetary errors equal to tolerable error would have occurred in the absence of internal 
accounting controls related to the account balance or class of transactions under audit (IR) is diffi-
cult and potentially costly to quantify. For this reason in this model it is implicitly set conservatively 
at one, although audit experience indicates clearly that it is substantially lower (AICPA 1981,17). 
Subsequent policy statements (AICPA 1983, 1988) contrarily emphasized that AER 
includes IR as well as CR. Both risks must be assessed, separately or jointly, and an 
amendment to AICPA (1981) explicitly introduced Eq. 3b. Allowance for IR below the 
maximum has two positive effects. First, audit efficiency increases in that auditors 
may take credit for their knowledge about the inherent riskiness of misstatement in 
particular circumstances; Eq. 3b shows that ARR increases (and required testing 
decreases) as IR decreases. Second, performing the task of assessing IR causes 
auditors to consider risk factors that affect IR in addition to those that affect CR, 
increasing conformance to the total evidence postulate. Regarding analysis costs, early 
policy statements may have overstated the difficulty of assessing IR, e.g., mis-
statements detected by previous audits and unusual transactions for which auditee 
personnel lack familiarity are readily available, reliable cues of current misstatements 
(Houghton and Fogarty 1991). In sum, the decomposition of AER as IR x CR appears 
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to increase audit efficiency and conformance to total evidence, with little or no in-
crease in analysis costs. 
Unfortunately, not every division leads to a clear conquest (Burns and Pearl 1981; 
Chakravarti et al. 1979). Because the decomposition in Eq. 3b is not theory-based, it 
may lack the logical glue for integrating the components as intended. For comparison, 
consider a theory-based decomposition of PK(M & -C) from Eq. 4: 
PK(M & -C) = PK(M) X PK(C\M). (5) 
Although Eq. 5 is superficially similar to AER = IR x CR, it does not capture IR 
and CR as defined in the Standards. CR is the risk that controls fail to prevent or 
detect a misstatement that occurs. But, PK(C\M) reflects only the detective effect, and 
adding an event to Eq. 5 to represent the preventive effect does not achieve identity 
with Eq. 3b.5 Unlike theory-based decompositions, Eq. 3b lacks a clear event 
sequence, such as detection cannot precede a misstatement which in turn cannot 
precede prevention. By including both the preventive and detective aspects of 
controls, CR confuses the temporal order of prevention and detection vis-a-vis the 
occurrence of a misstatement. Also, IR is the risk of misstatement, assuming there are 
no related controls, which fails to recognize that the preventive effect may precede the 
(non)occurrence of a misstatement. In Eq. 5, PK(M) does not make this assumption. 
On the contrary, since auditors normally have at least some information about controls 
when they assess IR, PK(M) entails rejecting the assumption. On this point, the 
Standards in effect compel auditors to violate the total evidence postulate, and, 
because there is no logical basis that supports AER = IR x CR, auditors' conformance 
to the coherence postulate is open to question. The benefits of the decomposition in 
Eq. 3b are at least partially offset by its opportunity costs. 
In seeking alternative simplifications for assessing AER, an important issue concerns 
the knowledge-based dependence between variables such as IR and CR. This depen-
dence complicates a meaningful partition of elements in the auditors' psychological 
field by their relevance to the inherent riskiness of misstatement versus the perceived 
effectiveness of auditee controls. Kinney (1984,129) gave the following example: 
(W)e might ask a gun control worker (at an airport) to assess the joint probability that a plane 
departing the airport has one or more guns on board. Alternatively, we might ask the worker to esti-
mate the number that would, in the absence of all controls, carry a gun on board and the number that 
would be caught by the controls. The worker's response to the alternative question is likely to be 
"How should I know? I've never observed would-be passengers without the control." 
Just as passengers' gun toting depends on expectations about airport screening, 
employees' behavior (e.g., negligence or fraud) is influenced by the effectiveness of 
auditee controls (Cushing and Loebbecke 1983). Obversely, auditee management 
normally would effect tighter controls over significant assets that are vulnerable to 
loss (Graham 1985). A simplification that overcomes the dependence problem is to 
avoid decomposition and instead require a holistic AER assessment, perhaps with the 
aid of a checklist that brings to mind key risk factors, and some public accounting 
firms have adopted this policy. Another simplification is to re-define IR and CR along 
the lines of Eq. 5. Based on prior knowledge and auditee-specific information 
(including preventive controls), the auditor would assess PK(M), the risk of misstate-
ment prior to the application of detective controls, and PK(C\M), the risk that detective 
controls are ineffective assuming the occurrence of a misstatement. These assessments 
5 The Appendix shows a decomposition in which similar inconsistencies arise when the preventive and 
detective effects of controls are distinguished. See Leslie (1984) for a related discussion. 
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would be integrated via Eq. 5 and affect planning via Eq. 4. Conformance to 
coherence and total evidence similarly may be enhanced by decision-analytic simplifi-
cations that decompose AER or PK(M & -C) in terms of causal or diagnostic factors in 
K (Ravinder et al. 1988; Kleinmuntz 1990), but such decompositions may signifi-
cantly increase overall analysis costs. After identifying a set of alternative 
simplifications that by design ensure coherence, the general issue for prescriptive 
research under the BE approach is to evaluate the alternatives based on proxies for 
analysis costs (e.g., time taken), conformance to total evidence (e.g., number and type 
of risk factors taken into account), and effectiveness (e.g., calibration or accuracy). 
Such evidence would facilitate policy makers' choice of simplification. 
Belief Revision 
In the processing of observational events, conditionalization has static and dynamic 
aspects. Regarding the static aspect, an agent specifies the events and probabilities in 
Eq. 1, holding knowledge constant at K. The agent must not only assess each proba-
bility on the right side of Eq. 1, but also anticipate and incorporate into the event 
structure all possible observations on the basis of K . This analysis produces a set of 
preposterior conditional probabilities, e.g., PK(M\E) and PK(M\-E). Regarding the 
dynamic aspect, the agent specifies PK'(M) in Eq. 2 by selecting the conditional prob-
ability whose conditioning event has been observed.6 The static and dynamic aspects 
are bridged by the assumption that either E or -E, as specified on the basis of K, 
constitutes the entire change in knowledge from K to K ' . Without this assumption, the 
agent's belief revision may be affected by extraconditional information, i.e., differ-
ences between K and K' that go beyond E or -E (Waller and Mitchell 1991). It has 
long been recognized that conditionalization unravels when such information arises 
(Ramsey 1931). To rule out extraconditional information, unboundedly rational agents 
must not only exhaustively mine K when specifying Eq. 1, but also must know the 
external environment well enough to formulate an objectively correct model or 
protocol of what might be observed (Shafer 1985). In this regard, the Bayesian inter-
pretation of probability is not entirely subjective, since it requires veridical beliefs 
about information that the external environment might reveal. 
For boundedly rational agents, the bridging assumption is unlikely to hold. Costly 
analysis and limited knowledge prevent boundedly rational agents from formulating a 
subjectively complete, much less an objectively correct, model of what might be 
observed. Instead, these agents economize on analysis costs by employing condition-
ing events that are, and are perceived to be, abstractions of potentially observable 
information. Rather than specify all (known) possible observations in terms of Eq. 1 
and update via Eq. 2, boundedly rational agents employ "wait and see" simplifications 
that (1) anticipate observation of, but do not pre-specify, information beyond E or -E, 
and (2) accomodate information that happens to be observed. Anticipation of some 
extraconditional information, along with the intention to accomodate relevant infor-
mation as it is observed, sets the stage for inconsistencies with respect to Eq. 2. Such 
inconsistencies are not errors. Rather, conditionalization simply is not applicable for 
6 This interpretation differs from viewing belief revision as updating a prior, unconditional probability to a 
posterior, conditional probability in light of new information. Because PK(M\E) and PK(M\-E) are known or 
computable ex ante, the relation of PK(M) with either PK(M\E) or PK(M\-E) pertains to internal consistency 
with respect to K, not to belief revision from K to K'. Also, this interpretation does not suggest that the 
Bayesian apparatus cannot accomodate "surprises," i.e., unanticipated information. This can be done via 
retrospective conditioning (Diaconis and Zabell 1982). 
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evaluating the belief revision processes of boundedly rational agents. Consider an 
example based on Einhorn and Hogarth (1981b). A basketball coach is assessing her 
team's chances against an opponent to be played twice during the season. Knowing 
little about the opponent prior to game one (K), the coach assesses P K (G 1)  =  P K (-G 1) 
= .50 and P K ( G \ G 1 ) > .50 > P K (G 2 \-G 1), where G i is the event that the coach's team 
wins game i. Unfortunately, the coach's team loses the first game. Besides absorbing 
the outcome (-G 1), the coach intently watched the game itself, such that her updated 
knowledge base (K') contains considerable information about the opponent's style of 
play, and so on. The coach now assesses P K' (G2)  > .50. The inconsistency of P K' (G2) 
≠P K (G2\-G 1) is not an error, because the change in knowledge from K and K' includes 
extraconditional information. The bridging assumption does not hold, and conditional-
ization is not applicable. The coach should plan the rematch given her beliefs based on 
K'  rather than those based on K, consistent with he total evidence postulate. 
Performing an audit may be divided into a planning stage and an evidence evalua-
tion stage. In the planning stage, auditors rely heavily on the audit risk model: planned 
test procedures must have a sufficiently ow ARR to achieve the target AR, given an 
AER  assessment (where AER, ARR, and AR are exante with respect to observed 
evidence). In the evaluation stage, continued reliance on the audit risk mo el is prob-
lematic, because the event structure of Eq. 3a is underspecified relative to Eqs. 1 and 
2. Taking an example from Kinney (1989), suppose an auditor has a targetAR of .05, 
assesses AER at .40, and sets ARR at .125, using Eq. 3a. If test procedures do not 
detect a misstatement, then target AR presumably has been achieved. But, if achieved 
AR is defined as the posterior risk of misstatement (see note 4), then this presumption 
is true only under limited conditions. Although the audit risk model incorporates the 
risk of incorrect acceptance, i.e, ARR or P K (-D\M & -C), it ignores the risk of incor-
rect rejection, i.e., P K (D\-M  & -C). Suppose  P K (D\-M  & -C) is .10 for planned test 
procedures. Using Eq. 1, P K (M\-C  & -D) = .125 x .40 / (.125 x .40 + .90 x .60) = .085. 
Achieved AR exceeds target AR. This sort of specification problem has been empha-
sized in many critiques of the auditrisk model (Cushing and Loebbecke 1983; Kinney 
1983, 1984, 1989; Leslie 1984; Sennetti 1990). 
Beyond  these critiques, the crucial point under the BE approach is that analysis 
costs inevitably cause thebelief revision processes of boundedly rational auditors to 
be underspecified relative to Eqs. 1 and 2. A consequence is that, in contrast with 
conditionalization, auditors' belief revision is open to information that is anticipated 
but not pre-specified in terms of exclusive and exhaustive observational events. In the 
audit risk model, the pre-specified observational event is D or -D, i.e., the auditor's 
detection or nondetection of a misstatement that exceeds tolerable error. This event is, 
and is perceived to be, an abstraction of what might be observed during the audit. 
Designating K (K') as the auditor's knowledge in the planning (evaluation) stage, 
changes from K to K' go beyond the observation of either D or D. In particular, when 
the application of planned test procedures yields -D, auditors nevertheless consider the 
implications of other observed information for misstatements that may have escaped 
detection and, as deemed necessary, perform additional test procedures. To accomo-
date changes from K to K'  that go beyond -D, auditors' belief revision processes must 
be more comprehensive, and less formal, than either Eq. 3a or Eqs. 1 and 2. 
The Standards implicitly recognize this underspecification problem and require 
auditors to employ various "wait and see" implifications for belief revision during the 
evidence evaluation stage. Consider two variants. F rst, in audit applications of statis-
tical sampling, where the rules for accepting or rejecting auditee assertions are closely 
linked to the frequency or amounts of misstatements in the sample, auditors must 
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consider the qualitative aspects of detected misstatements such as their nature and 
cause. Instead of incurring analysis costs to pre-specify such qualitative features as part 
of the sampling plan, auditors employ a "wait and see" simplification in which they 
judgmentally evaluate misstatements observed in the sample. Such evaluation may lead 
to inferences that supplement the statistical inferences from sample results, e.g., auditee 
controls are weaker than expected. The analysis cost savings from this simplification 
may be partially offset, however, by an opportunity cost resulting from biased judg-
ments about the nature or causes of misstatements (Burgstahler and Jiambalvo 1986). 
Second, and more generally, the Standards require auditors to consider whether a re-
assessment of AER (or, IR and CR separately) is needed in light of any information 
observed in the evaluation stage. Recognizing that the audit is a cumulative process of 
evidence collection and evaluation, the Standards note the possibility that the auditor's 
updated knowledge, K', may include information that conflicts with K, the auditor's 
knowledge when assessing AER in the planning stage. In such cases, auditors must 
reconsider the adequacy of planned test procedures based on a re-assessment of AER 
given K', instead of K. Such re-assessments are curious from a Bayesian perspective, 
since they involve retrospectively constructing, rather than updating, a prior belief in 
light of new information (but see Diaconis and Zabell 1982). They also pose the cogni-
tively challenging task of renewed "digging" in an extended psychological field. In 
effect, the Standards establish an equivalence criterion: the adequacy of applied test 
procedures should be insensitive to whether risk-related information is processed 
during the planning or evaluation stage. Meeting this criterion may be complicated by 
human information processing limitations that cause differences in AER depending on 
the timing of assessment, e.g., a part of K that is easy to access during the planning 
stage may be relatively inaccessible, as part of K', during the evaluation stage (cf. 
Moeckel and Plumlee 1989). Assessing the opportunity costs of "wait and see" 
simplifications that economize on analysis costs, e.g., whether they satisfy the equiva-
lence criterion, is an important issue for empirical research under the BE approach. In 
any event, the conclusion remains that belief revision by boundedly rational economic 
agents cannot be reasonably evaluated against a model of unbounded rationality, such 
as Bayesian conditionalization, which suppresses analysis costs. 
Second-Order Uncertainty 
The coherence postulate requires that an agent's belief is representable as a unique 
subjective probability (Gardenfors and Sahlin 1982). To illustrate, suppose the goal is 
to measure an agent's uncertain belief about an event, M. A decision analyst might 
measure the agent's PK(M) with a probability wheel, i.e., a disk having two adjustable 
sectors (S and -S) with a spinner attached to its center. By adjusting the proportional 
area of the two sectors, the analyst can set the probability of the spinner stopping in S 
to any desired value, PK(S). With an initial setting of PK(S) = .50, the agent is offered 
two bets: a prize of $10 if M occurs, versus a prize of $10 if S occurs. A preference for 
the first bet implies PK(M) > .50; a preference for the second bet implies PK(M) < .50. 
By repeatedly adjusting the wheel until the agent is indifferent between the bets, i.e., 
PK(M) = PK(S), the analyst can measure the agent's belief to any desired precision. In 
effect, the coherence postulate requires that agents view uncertain events as compa-
rable to risky events with known probabilities. 
For boundedly rational agents, belief representation according to the coherence 
postulate has two problems. First, coherence overrepresents belief by imposing too 
much precision, as noted earlier. Under the probability wheel, an agent may be able to 
state a definite preference between the bets when PK(S) is .10 or .50, but not when 
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PK(S) is between .25 and .30. Stated differently, the agent may have second-order 
uncertainty about a precise measure of his or her degree of belief, which is costly i f not 
impossible to eliminate through analysis of a fixed knowledge base. Second, coherence 
underrepresents belief by failing to reflect the quality of agents' knowledge. For any 
two knowledge states, K and K " , so long as PK'(M) = PK"(M), the rational choice 
model requires agents to act as if K' and K" were equivalent. But, a voluminous 
psychological literature on ambiguity indicates that real agents are sensitive to K, 
controlling for PK(M) (for reviews see Camerer and Weber 1992; Einhorn and Hogarth 
1985; Frisch and Baron 1988). In particular, second-order uncertainty is inversely asso-
ciated with the quality of K, and actions are affected by second-order uncertainty. 
Among the many relevant studies in philosophy and psychology, two early contri-
butions are noteworthy here. Popper (1959) questioned the rational choice model's 
treatment of "ideal" evidence. Suppose M is the event that a coin lands "heads" on its 
next flip, where the coin may be fair or biased to any degree. A rational belief is 
PK(M) = .50. Suppose E is "ideal" evidence from a large number of flips of this coin 
with exactly 50% being "heads". On the evidence, a rational belief is PK'(M) = 
PK(M\E) = PK(M) = .50, where E is the entire change from K to K ' . This is the 
paradox of ideal evidence: strong empirical evidence is irrelevant, because it has no 
impact on rational belief (Bar-Hillel 1982). Ellsberg (1961) also questioned whether 
agents' uncertain beliefs are captured by a precise subjective probability. Suppose 
there are two urns, each containing 100 red or black balls. A ball will be drawn at 
random from one of the urns. Let R1 (B1) designate drawing a red (black) ball from 
Urn 1, and R2 (B2) designate drawing a red (black) ball from Urn 2. A n agent bets on 
a color and wins $10 if a ball with her color is drawn. Available information about the 
urns varies: the proportion of red balls in Urn 1 is 50%, but the proportion in Urn 2 is 
unknown. The agent is asked about her preferences between betting on R1 and R2, and 
between betting on B1 and B2. Because the proportions are known for Urn 1, but not 
for Urn 2, she prefers R1 and B1. Such preferences imply beliefs of PK(R1) > PK(R2) 
and PK(B1) > PK(B2). But, PK(R1) > PK(R2) implies PK(B1) < PK(B2); her beliefs are 
inconsistent. This is a version of the Ellsberg paradox. Both paradoxes are explained 
by agents' sensitivity to the quality of K and the analysis that K supports. In the 
paradox of ideal evidence, limited ex ante knowledge may lead an agent to assume 
that "heads" and "tails" are equiprobable, absent a reason to believe otherwise, by the 
principle of insufficient reason. This principle is a notoriously weak basis for proba-
bility assessment, referred to by Popper (1957) as "probability magic or knowledge 
out of ignorance." In the Ellsberg paradox, agents similarly may be led to assume that 
all proportions (0% to 100%) are equiprobable for Urn 2; the average proportion is 
50%. For Urn 1, however, agents can assess PK(R1) = PK(B1) = .50, by the stronger 
principle of direct inference, i.e., assign the probability for a general event class to a 
randomly drawn member of that class (Levi 1977). Agents conforming to these para-
doxes apparently consider a probability assessment based on the principle of 
insufficient reason to be epistemically weaker than one based on knowledge of rele-
vant frequencies or proportions, a difference in K that affects actions. 
The Standards implicitly recognize auditors' second-order uncertainty about risk 
assessments and provide a variety of coping mechanisms. The Standards state that IR 
and CR may be assessed in quantitative or nonquantitative terms, leaving the desired 
precision to be set by the individual auditor or public accounting firm. As described in 
Section 2, firms use risk scales such as low, moderate, and high. Crude risk scales are 
a simplification that reduces auditors' analysis costs, i.e., time and effort spent to dis-
criminate between possible risk values, and second-order uncertainty about risk 
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assessments. In an experimental study, Waller (1994) reported evidence confirming 
the straightforward prediction that second-order uncertainty is higher when auditors 
assess risk on a [0,1] scale versus a low-moderate-high scale. The analysis cost 
savings of crude risk scales presumably exceed the potential gain that precise risk 
assessments would provide via fine-tuned audit test decisions. The Standards state 
that auditors cannot rely completely on risk assessment. Regardless of the subjectively 
assessed values of IR and CR, auditors must perform at least minimal substantive tests 
that yield objective evidence for significant accounts and transaction cycles. Taking 
the extreme case, suppose an auditor assesses AER, or PK(M & -C), to be zero. From 
a Bayesian perspective, no test procedure is worthwhile, since no new evidence could 
change the auditor's prior belief. By requiring minimal substantive tests, the 
Standards acknowledge the subjectivity of risk assessment and concomitant second-
order uncertainty. The Standards emphasize that risk assessment entails analysis costs. 
In cases where analysis costs would outweigh the benefit of risk assessment, the 
Standards direct auditors to set risk at the maximum; i.e., when auditors are unwilling 
to incur the cost of analysis to reduce second-order uncertainty to an acceptable level, 
they must incorporate an extreme conservative bias. This confounding of analysis 
costs and risk assessments may be especially severe for CR assessments. In an 
archival study, Waller (1993) reported that over 80% of CR assessments were at the 
maximum. A n explanation is that auditors typically emphasized substantive testing 
instead of performing and documenting a thorough analysis of auditee controls. 
Finally, the Standards state a general requirement that auditors must have adequate 
technical training and proficiency. Public accounting firms economize on the costs of 
information search and analysis, and limit second-order uncertainty, by assigning the 
risk assessment task to auditors with experience-based knowledge about the auditee 
and its industry. Such knowledge substitutes for costly search and analysis, decreases 
second-order uncertainty, and sometimes signals a need for further search and analysis 
(Mills 1993; Taylor 1994; Waller 1994). Although inconsistent with the coherence 
postulate, simplifications that cope with, rather than eliminate, second-order uncer-
tainty should not be thereby considered errors. Under the BE approach, such 
simplifications may be reasonable means for boundedly rational auditors to econo-
mize on analysis costs when making risk assessments. Descriptive and prescriptive 
issues for empirical research under the BE approach include: How is auditors' second-
order uncertainty affected by factors such as task experience and the completeness of 
case-specific information? How does auditors' second-order uncertainty affect test 
decisions? Relative to current standard practices, how do alternative simplifications 
for assessing risk (e.g., judgment aids that use base rates) affect auditors' second-order 
uncertainty, analysis costs, and effectiveness? 
Concluding Remarks 
Behavioral economics generally is concerned with the empirical validity of 
assumptions underlying neoclassical economic theory and, when the assumptions are 
empirically invalid, with the implications for explaining human behavior and the oper-
ation of economic institutions (Simon 1987b). Much of the BE literature addresses 
firm or market phenomena. For example, behavioral economists have been critical of 
the neoclassical assumption that firm decision makers possess the knowledge and 
computational capacity necessary to maximize profit. Given bounded rationality, there 
is a firm cost of profit-maximizing behavior. Drawing out the implications of costly 
profit maximization, the BE approach seeks to explain empirical observations at the 
firm level of simplified practices, or routines, such as cost-plus pricing (Cyert and 
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March 1992). Under the BE approach, the persistence and predominance of certain 
routines are seen, not as the solution to an optimization problem that includes all kinds 
of costs, but as the product of an evolutionary process whereby routines that improve 
a firm's actual profit, relative to the competition, tend to be selected for survival by the 
economic system (Nelson and Winter 1982). Similarly, the BE approach is applicable 
at the individual level. Drawing out the implications of costly analysis, descriptive re-
search seeks to explain the simplifications of boundedly rational agents in specific 
economic domains in terms of trade-offs between analysis and opportunity costs. 
Also, because there can be no guarantee that the simplifications currently in use 
involve optimal trade-offs, innovation and improvement through prescriptive research 
are an open possibility. Finally, since individual judgments and decisions often are 
components of firm routines, e.g., auditors' risk assessments in producing a financial 
statement audit, applications of the BE approach at the individual level may inform, 
and be informed by, applications at the firm level. 
In this paper, the BE approach was applied to examine inconsistencies between 
auditors' standard practices for risk assessment and Bayesian postulates of the rational 
choice model. The inconsistencies pertained to event decomposition, belief revision, 
and second-order uncertainty. A general conclusion was auditors use simplifications 
that economize on analysis costs, e.g., "wait and see" simplifications for belief revi-
sion that are open to anticipated but not pre-specified events and simplifications that 
allow for and control second-order uncertainty. This conclusion is meant to be 
descriptive and not to imply that the simplifications involve optimal cost trade-offs. 
On the contrary, there are flaws in the audit risk model's decomposition of AER into 
IR x CR, "wait and see" simplifications may have opportunity costs resulting from 
judgmental biases when processing observed events, and coping with second-order 
uncertainty by incorporating an extreme conservative bias is inefficient. Each incon-
sistency suggests descriptive and prescriptive research issues, consistent with the dual 
goal of understanding and improving behavior. In pursuing these issues, it is important 
to consider three implications of the BE approach. First, descriptive research should 
not merely document auditors' patterns of judgment and decision making, but seek to 
understand the reasons for their use in terms of analysis and opportunity costs. 
Second, evaluative research using normative models, which suppress analysis costs, as 
benchmarks must justify the models' applicability to boundedly rational auditors who 
economize on such costs. Third, prescriptive research should take into account the 
effects of auditors' bounded rationality. Recommendations which cannot be used by 
boundedly rational auditors, because of analysis costs, have no prescriptive value. 
Appendix 
Figure 2 presents an event sequence that separates the preventive and detective 
aspects of controls. The sequence has four events: C' is the event of prevention by 
controls; M is the event of a misstatement; C" is the event of detection by controls; 
and D is the event of detection by the auditor. Thus, a misstatement in audited asser-
tions requires the conjunction of -C', M, -C", and -D. It is straightforward to restate 
AR = AER x ARR as: 
P K (-C' & M & -C" & -D) = P K ( -C' & M & -C") x P K (-D\-C' & M & -C"). (A1) 
It is not straightforward, however, to restate AER = IR x CR. Consider Eq. A2: 
P K (-C' & M & -C") = P K ( -C' & M) x P K (-C"\-C' & M), 
= PK(M\-C') x PK(-C') x PK(-C"\-C & M). (A2) 
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Eq. A2 is inconsistent with IR and CR as defined in the Standards. PK(M\-C) 
assumes the condition of a prevention failure, which is not equivalent to the assump-
tion of IR that there are no related controls. Also, unlike CR, Eq. A2 contains two 
measures regarding the effectiveness of controls: PK(-C') concerns prevention and 
P K ( - C " \ - C ' & M) concerns detection, and these do not generally combine into a single 
measure that corresponds to CR. The Standards define CR as the "risk that a material 
misstatement that could occur in an assertion will not be prevented or detected on a 
timely basis by an entity's internal control structure policies and procedures" (AICPA 
1993, A U 319, italics added). The italicized phrase may be represented by the 
conjunction of -C and - C " , so that PK(-C' & -C") would be a single measure corre-
sponding to CR: 
P K ( - C ' & -C") = PK(-C') x PK(-C"\-C'), 
= PK(-C') x {P K (M & -C"\-C') + PK(-M & -C"\-C')}, 
= PK(-C'){PK(-C"\-C & M) x PK(M\-C') + P K ( - C " \ - C ' & -M) x PK(-M\-C')}. (A3) 
Since P K ( - C " \ - C ' & -M)=1 and P(-M\-C') = 1 - P(M\-C'), 
PK(-C' & -C") = PK(-C'){[PK(-C"\-C' & M)- 1]PK(M\-C')+ 1}. (A4) 
To achieve identity between Eq. A4 and the last two terms of Eq. A2, the former must 
reduce to: 
P K ( - C ' & -C") = PK(-C) x P K ( - C " \ - C ' & M). (A5) 
Eq. A5 holds only in the special case where P k (M\-C ' ) = 1, i.e., a prevention failure 
necessitates the occurrence of a misstatement. However, a misstatement normally 
requires conditions beyond a prevention failure, e.g., employee action. 
Figure 2. Event Sequence with Prevention by Controls. 
C' M C" D -C & M & -C" & -D 
Detection Misstatement 
and in 
Prevention Occurrence correction Detected audited 
by of by by financial 
controls? misstatement? controls? auditor? statements? 
no yes no no yes 
• • • • • 
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Discussant's Response to "A Behavioral-Economics 
Approach to Auditors' Risk Assessments" 
Peter R. Gillett 
University of Kansas (former Partner, Grant Thornton, UK) 
Introduction 
Let me begin by thanking Raj Srivastava for inviting me to act as practitioner 
discussant for Professor Waller's paper. Many of you know already that I am in the 
course of making a transition from practitioner to academic. Let me express the hope, 
then, that Raj's asking me to act as practitioner discussant is a reflection of his appre-
ciation of my previous work, and not a comment on his perceptions of my progress in 
this transition. 
I propose to discuss this paper by regarding it as an onion. By this I do not mean, 
of course, that it has a strong smell, that it leaves a bad taste in the mouth, or that it 
will make our eyes water. Rather, I mean that I intend to examine it in a number of 
layers, beginning with the outside. 
The abstract tells us that real agents are rationally bounded, and that the audit risk 
model and auditors' risk assessments are inconsistent with a Bayesian rational choice 
model. I do not find the practitioner within me resisting these views at this level: I find 
this an acceptable onion. 
However, as we peel off this outer skin in order to examine the onion within, we 
might note that it is a somewhat thin skin. I have not generally found that auditors as 
individuals are more rational than others, although they may be more analytical, and 
perhaps more professionally skeptical. Professional standards nowhere assert that the 
audit risk model is, or should be, consistent with a Bayesian rational choice model. 
The many potential causes of suicide, despair and divorce among audit partners do 
not, in my experience, include a deep-rooted concern that our risk assessments might 
fail to obey the normative canons of Bayesian thought. So it is fair (and may be 
reasonable) to ask whether these are important and interesting findings. Let us 
proceed to do so. 
Economizing with the truth? 
At the second layer of examination we find that Professor Waller is not content 
simply to identify the non-Bayesian nature of auditor decision-making regarding risk 
assessments, but is concerned to offer an alternative model: the behavioral-economic 
model. This model differs from strict rational choice models insofar as it recognizes 
that: 
• Agent errors are possible. 
• Choice processes can be improved. 
• Convergence with a strict rational choice model may not be worth the agent's 
incremental costs. 
• Divergence from a strict rational choice model need not be presumed to be 
error. 
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I like this inner onion too: indeed, I shall be happy to admit the possibility of 
auditor error, especially if Professor Waller can help us reduce our errors in the future. 
In this sense, I share with great enthusiasm his search for a model that is both descrip-
tive and prescriptive. In common with a number of other practitioners, however, I 
should be happy to forgo a great deal of descriptive power in return for a prescription 
for improvement. This is a particularly salient issue, of course, in the development by 
auditors of decision aids: the objective is not to build models that emulate current 
decision making skills, but to provide tools to improve them. 
Who among audit practitioners would argue with the view that neither audit deci-
sion making, nor the acquisition of information on which decisions might be based, 
are costless? Not I, certainly. What practitioners might hope is that effective decision 
aids can play a role in reducing the incremental costs of improved decision making 
(whether or not that turns out to be a closer approximation to the rational choice 
model). 
As we remove this second layer, and proceed to consider some of the more detailed 
aspects of this paper, we might note that it, too, wears a little thin in places. For 
example, why should anyone suppose that any kind of rational choice model is appro-
priate for the audit context that Professor Waller has chosen to study? Scriptures do 
not require human activities to be rational: as Professor Waller makes clear, profes-
sional standards do not explicitly (and apparently not even implicitly) require 
rationality. Moreover, rational choice models are models of choice, and the account 
given in this paper is based upon revision of beliefs. The auditor's task, on the other 
hand, is to render an opinion, and there are questions of an epistemological and meta-
physical nature that can be asked regarding the expression of an opinion: 
• Can opinion formation properly be equated with the formulation (and possible 
revision) of a belief? 
• Is opinion formation an act of choice? 
• Ought opinion formation be rational? 
I take an opinion, in the context of an audit, to be a professionally considered view, 
a professional judgment. If we find that certain models of belief revision do not corre-
spond to processes used in reaching audit opinions, is this evidence that the opinion 
formation process is in some sense deficient? Or is it, rather, evidence that opinions 
are not exactly like beliefs, and that the canons for the formation of professional opin-
ions are not necessarily those normatively prescribed by Bayesians? Auditors, clients, 
legislators and social scientists all recognize that audit information and audit decision 
making are not costless. Since society is not willing to wait an infinite time for an 
audit opinion, nor clients willing to pay infinite amounts, there is no reason to expect 
that audit decision making will be fully rational, in the sense of using all available 
information, in an optimal manner. Which of us can be surprised, then, at the idea that 
auditors might trade off the incremental value of additional information or analysis 
with their additional costs? Which of us thinks that auditors have infinite computa-
tional and processing abilities? Professional standards explicitly recognize the limited 
nature of the auditing process. 
Although I do not propose to develop the point in detail today, we should also note 
that many auditor assessments (e.g., the assessment of internal control risk as 
maximum) explicitly do not represent auditor beliefs. They represent economic deci-
sions not to incur the (audit) costs of developing a belief. See, for example, Waller 
(1993). 
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Auditors' Risk Assessments: Inconsistencies with Rational Choice 
M y argument is that auditors, clients, legislators and social scientists do not expect 
auditing to follow a strict rational choice model. When we examine the third level of 
our onion, to study the claimed inconsistencies between auditors' risk assessments and 
the rational choice model, we may do so with interest to see what inconsistencies are 
found. That there are such inconsistencies, of course, is not in the least remarkable. 
"The audit risk model...decomposes risk in a muddled way that is inconsistent 
with the Bayesian postulates of coherence and total evidence," Professor Waller 
writes. What shall we say to this? If you prick us do we not bleed? Three questions 
spring at once to my mind: 
• Is it muddled because it is inconsistent (with the Bayesian model), or is it 
muddled anyway and inconsistent? 
• What does "muddled" actually mean in this context? Confused? Or merely not 
unboundedly rational? 
• Can we not equally express this finding as: "The Bayesian rational choice 
model fails adequately to represent the decomposition of audit risk which 
professional standards urge upon auditors?" 
This is not the place, and these are not the times, for a rational defense of the audit 
risk model. It has been subject to much criticism for over a decade (see, for example, 
Kinney 1983; Cushing & Loebbecke 1983; Jiambalvo & Waller 1984; Kinney 1989), 
and yet is still used by practitioners as a guide for planning decisions regarding alter-
nate sources of audit reliance. 
Professional standards themselves do not prescribe the functional form of the 
model. For example, "The model is not intended to be a mathematical formula 
including all factors that may influence the determination of individual risk compo-
nents (AICPA 1981)." Similarly, "The way the auditor considers these component 
risks and combines them involves professional judgment and depends on his audit 
approach (AICPA 1983)." Nevertheless, the simple multiplicative approach described 
by Professor Waller has been widely used to operationalize the model, and appears 
prima facie to be vulnerable to the criticisms found in this paper. 
Decomposition 
Let us consider the criticism relating to decomposition. AICPA (1983) defines 
Inherent Risk in terms of the susceptibility to material misstatement, assuming there 
are no related controls. Control risk is defined in terms of whether material misstate-
ments would be prevented or detected by controls. Professor Waller's comments 
regarding the difference in timing of preventive and detective controls (vis-a-vis 
occurrence of a material misstatement) are well made and to the point. They are not, 
however, new (see, e.g., Leslie 1985). The professional waters were further muddied 
(or should we say, "muddled") by the issuance of SAS 55 (AICPA 1989), which intro-
duced the additional concept of the control environment. 
Taking at face value the invitation in SAS 47 cited earlier: "The way the auditor 
considers these component risks and combines them involves professional judgment 
and depends on his audit approach (AICPA 1983)", a number of firms have elected to 
combine their assessments of Inherent Risk (as defined), the implications of the 
control environment, and preventive controls, so that what they actually assess (in a 
process sometimes called Environmental Assessment) is the overall susceptibility to 
material misstatement (see, for example, Grant Thornton 1990). Continuing with 
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Professor Waller's notation, let us call this IR*. In like manner, the Control Risk 
assessment (often based on attribute sampling to test the effectiveness of detective 
controls) may be referred to as CR*. 
Now, while IR and CR do capture the concepts defined in professional standards, 
IR* and CR* capture the assessments operationalized by auditors; this recombination 
is intended to be legitimated by the flexibility incorporated in the standards. Of 
course, this is essentially what Professor Waller offers as an alternative simplification 
to reduce analysis costs. Contrary to his position in the present paper, however: 
• This is a current operationalization rather than an alternative. 
• IR* may be taken as a primitive, rather than as a simplification - indeed, a strict 
interpretation of the coherence postulate as set out in this paper requires suscep-
tibility to be assessed in the light of everything the auditor actually knows, and 
does not provide for counterfactual hypothetical assessments; however, if such 
hypotheticals were permitted, they could be constructed consistently with the 
three postulates. 
• This approach does not, therefore, readily demonstrate the value of a behav-
ioral-economics approach. 
Belief Revision 
Let us peel another layer off our onion. There still remains the question of how IR* 
and CR* might be assessed and combined, and here we can see behavioral-economics 
compromises at work in the use of a multiplicative model. The incremental cost of the 
Bayesian approach is relatively minor, and it is frustrating that, on the whole, auditors 
have not taken the next step to a discrete Bayesian model (see, for example, Leslie 
1985). A little algebra and a few minutes work with a spreadsheet show that we can 
easily adapt Professor Waller's example to a Bayesian revision model. What is the 
auditor interested in? Presumably, using Professor Waller's notation it is PK'((M) = 
PK(M\-D). In other words, audit risk is the risk that there is a material misstatement, 
given that we did not find one. (In common with Leslie and others, I presume that the 
auditor knows what to do if a material misstatement is discovered!) 
PK(M\-D) = PK(M & -D) / PK(-D) = PK(-D\M) x PK(M) / PK(-D) 
where PK(-D\M) = PK(-D\M & -C) x PK(-C\M) 
and PK(-D) = PK(-D\M) x PK(M) + PK(-D\-M) x PK(-M) = 
PK(-D\M) x PK(M) + (1 - PK(M)) 
Letting PK(M) = IR*, PK(-C\M) = CR*, and 
PK(-D\M &-C) = Detection Risk DR 
gives PK(M\-D) = (IR* x CR* x DR) / (1 - IR* + IR* x CR* x DR). 
Naturally, this gives different results from the usual multiplicative formula. 
However, assuming that given the changed semantics auditors would assign different 
values to the risks, it is easy to show that identical results for the required detection 
risk DR can be achieved by taking 
PK(M) = IR* / (IR* + 1 - PK(M\-D)). 
Figure 1 shows what values would need to be assigned to IR* in the case of 
Professor Waller's example (page 118), in order for the Bayesian model to require the 
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same detection risk for an audit risk of 5% as the multiplicative model in the example 
did. 
Figure 1 
Figure la: Multiplicative Model. Detection Risks to give an Audit Risk of: 5%. 
Internal Control Risk 
Low Moderate High 
Inherent Risk 0.18 0.44 1.00 
Low 0.36 0.77 0.32 0.14 
Moderate 0.67 0.41 0.17 0.07 
High 1.00 0.28 0.11 0.05 
Figure lb: Bayesian Revision Model. Detection Risks to give an Audit Risk of: 5%. 
Internal Control Risk  
Low Moderate High 
Inherent Risk 0.18 0.44 1.00 
Low 0.27 0.77 0.32 0.14 
Moderate 0.41 0.41 0.17 0.07 
High 0.51 0.28 0.11 0.05 
The data in the example, of course, is somewhat speculative, and Figure 2 shows a 
similar comparison for the published "definitions" of another firm (Grant Thornton 
1990). 
Figure 2 
Figure 2a: Multiplicative Model. Detection Risks to give an Audit Risk of: 5%. 
Internal Control Risk  
Limited Moderate Significant Maximum 
Inherent Risk 0.13 0.24 0.56 1.00 
Low 0.50 0.75 0.42 0.18 0.10 
Moderate 0.71 0.53 0.30 0.13 0.07 
High 1.00 0.38 0.21 0.09 0.05 
Figure 2b: Bayesian Revision Model. Detection Risks to give an Audit Risk of: 5%. 
Internal Control Risk 
Limited Moderate Significant Maximum 
Inherent Risk 0.13 0.24 0.56 1.00 
Low 0.34 0.75 0.42 0.18 0.10 
Moderate 0.43 0.53 0.30 0.13 0.07 
High 0.51 0.38 0.21 0.09 0.05 
I am not claiming that either firm would, in fact, select these values in a Bayesian 
model. We can note, however, that the results for the two firms are comparable, and 
we can ask. what meaning could be given to such values in the Bayesian interpretation. 
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It is interesting to note that even in this Bayesian model, behavioral-economics is still 
at work: 
• As Leslie (1985) notes, this approach uses discrete approximations to contin-
uous distributions. 
• The analysis assumes that misstatements detected and corrected by controls are 
known to the auditor (as part of K); i f it is assumed that controls detect and 
correct without auditor knowledge, the resulting formulae are more complex; if 
detected and corrected misstatements may or may not be known to the auditor, 
even more sophistication will be necessary. 
Professor Waller further argues that extra-conditional information introduces addi-
tional inconsistencies with the rational choice model, and I see no reason to disagree. 
Second-Order Uncertainty 
We are now ready to peel away the last layer of our onion, and study the little piece 
in the middle. The coherence postulate of the rational choice model requires that 
beliefs be representable as unique subjective probabilities. You may think, as many do, 
that this is a limitation in the model itself, but that is a story for another day. Ignorance 
is a feature of the auditor's environment, and other formulations seek to address this 
directly (see, for example, Shafer & Srivastava 1990). 
It is true that professional standards implicitly recognize second-order uncertainty. 
In practice, it may be the case that second-order uncertainty is a consequence of 
behavioral-economics, rather than an argument for this approach. In my experience, 
few auditors actually believe that client environments can be partitioned into just three 
isomorphism classes, or that the values for inherent risk used in their firms' 
approaches are representative of long-run frequencies. Behavioral-economics has 
caused auditors to develop methods that incorporate second-order uncertainties. It 
may well be, of course, that such uncertainties would have existed without current 
approaches to risk assessment - but Professor Waller does not show evidence for this, 
and nor shall I. The question remains, however: i f my beliefs about client circum-
stances cannot be represented by unique subjective probabilities, does that fact exhibit 
shortcomings in me, in my beliefs, or in the applicability of the rational choice model 
that requires this representation? 
Conclusions 
Now that we have reduced this paper to a pile of onion rings, it may be time to take 
stock of what we have achieved via this tangential approach, before we break out the 
condiments of congratulations. Let me begin by noting that the paper presumes 
throughout that risk assessments are individual choices - and this is by no means the 
whole story. Professor Waller argues that auditors are (at best) boundedly rational. I 
believed this before I read this paper, and I believe it still. 
He argues that professional standards and practices are inconsistent with Bayesian 
postulates for a rational choice model. It is not clear that professional standards are 
inconsistent with such postulates, although they neither mandate nor even encourage a 
Bayesian approach. However, I find my profession guilty as charged regarding 
common practices. 
He argues that a behavioral-economics approach will help us to better describe and 
prescribe auditor performance and divergence from a rational choice model. As to 
description, I accept his point. As to prescription, I believe that in many places the 
profession is already making use of such an approach - although there are no doubt 
138 
further opportunities to be seized. Perhaps it would be equally valid to say that such 
an approach wil l assist researchers to better describe and prescribe the work of 
auditors. 
It would be presumptuous indeed to suggest that the work of researchers is inher-
ently more noble or important than that of auditors, and this is not my intention. I see 
the laying down of normative approaches without regard for practical feasibilities as 
somewhat sterile, and the documentary description of auditor shortcomings as a sorry 
and sordid affair. Researchers have the opportunity, through carefully considered 
prescription, to add value to the auditing profession and to society. In this sense, at 
least, Professor Waller clearly knows his onions! I congratulate him on an interesting 
and thought-provoking paper. 
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Auditing for Fraud: Perception vs. Reality 
Alan J. Winters 
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John  B. Sullivan 
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When  you come to a fork in the road, take it. 
Yogi Berra 
Many  people, both in and out of the accounting profession, would say that Mr. 
Berra's aphorism has guided the evolution of the auditor's responsibility to detect 
fraud. Throughout its history, the profession has taken various positions on this 
responsibility; sometimes adopting a position, abandoning it, and then returning to it. 
This erratic evolution has been propelled largely by two factors. One factor is the 
vagaries of auditors' beliefs about (1) what degree of fraud detection responsibility s 
commensurate with an auditor's professional obligation and (2) what technical 
prowess auditors command to detect fraud. The other factor is what responsibility the 
public, in the form of users of the auditor's product; regulators and legislators; courts; 
and  financial press writers, expect auditors to assume. 
This paper begins with a summarized history of the volution of the auditor's 
responsibility o detect fraud in financial statement audits, including both nonauthori-
tative and authoritative guidance and major influences outside the profession. We then 
provide a critique of the ffectiveness of audit approaches for detecting fraud. Finally, 
we offer some suggestions for modifying those approaches and improving their effec-
tiveness. 
Progression of Professional Guidance－ 
Nonauthoritative and Authoritative 
From  ancient times until around the turn of the twentieth century, auditing's 
primary objective was to detect fraud and the technique used was  detailed examina-
tion rather than selective testing (Brown 1962). For example, the prevention and 
detection of fraud underlay the "hearing" of accounts during the Roman Empire  as 
well as audits of companies during the Industrial Revolution (Brown 1962). 
During the five years that preceded and followed the turn of the twentieth century, 
the primary objective of auditing beganto shift. Contrasting passages from two promi-
nent auditing texts issued seven years apart illustrate this shift. 
"The object of an audit may be said to be three-fold: 
1. The detection of fraud. 
2. The detection oftechnical errors. 
3. The detection of errors of principle." (Dicksee 1905) 
* The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the AICPA  or 
Deloitte & Touche. 
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"In what might be called the formative days of auditing, students were taught that 
the chief objects of an audit were: 
1. Detection and prevention of fraud. 
2. Detection and prevention of errors, but in recent years there has been a decided 
change in demand and service. 
Present-day purposes are: 
1. To ascertain actual financial condition and earning of an enterprise. 
2. Detection of fraud and errors, but this is a minor objective." (Montgomery 
1912) 
In addition to the shift in audit objective, there was a move away from detailed 
examination of virtually every transaction toward selective testing. This change 
occurred because of the growing size of audited entities and the accompanying 
impracticability of detailed verification. Also, auditors began to recognize internal 
control and its relationship to testing and also to develop audit sampling techniques. 
Thus, both the objective of audits and the techniques used to perform them trans-
formed. 
The transition in the practicing profession's stance on the auditor's responsibility 
for detecting fraud continued until the first authoritative recognition of this responsi-
bility in 1951 in Codification of Statements on Auditing Procedure (AICPA 1951). 
Codification of Statements on Auditing Procedure: The Codification stated that 
an audit is not designed and cannot be relied on to disclose fraud. It emphasized that 
primary responsibility for detecting fraud lies with adequate systems of accounting 
and internal control. It also indicated that if the auditor becomes suspicious of the 
client's integrity, he or she must extend audit procedures to determine whether those 
suspicions are justified. 
In 1961, SAP No. 30, Responsibilities and Functions of the Independent Auditor in 
the Examination of Financial Statements (AICPA 1961), set forth the auditor's respon-
sibilities for fraud detection in substantial detail. That SAP, as codified in SAP No. 33, 
contained the following guidance: 
• In an audit, the auditor is aware that fraud may exist. 
• The auditor recognizes that, if a fraud is sufficiently material, it may affect the 
opinion and considers this possibility. 
• A n audit is not designed and cannot be relied on to disclose defalcations or 
misrepresentations by management; failure to detect fraud is only a problem 
insofar as it results from the failure to comply with G A A S . 
• Detecting fraud is the responsibility of the accounting system and system of 
internal accounting control; the auditor evaluates the system of internal 
accounting control to determine the selection and timing of other auditing 
procedures. 
• The cost of searching for fraud would be prohibitive and the exercise would, in 
some cases, be futile. 
• If the auditor suspects fraud, he or she needs to determine the possible magni-
tude. 
• If the magnitude is likely to be material, the auditor should reach an under-
standing with the client as to who wi l l investigate it and determine its 
magnitude. 
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• If the magnitude is notlikely to be material, the auditor should refer it to the 
proper representatives of the clientwith the suggestion that they follow up. 
• Subsequent discovery of fraud does not necessarily indicate substandard audit 
work; the auditor has fulfilled his or her responsibility if the audit was 
performed with due care and skill in accordance with G AA S. 
This discussion was carried forward to SAS  No. 1, section 110.05-.08. 
Statement on Auditing Standards No. 16: In the early to mid 1970's, the 
Auditing Standards Executive Committee (AudSEC) reconsidered the auditor's 
responsibility o detect fraud. This reconsideration was spurred by, among other 
things, the report of the AICPA's Special Committee on Equity Funding and the 
growing recognition that the public considered fraud detection an important objective 
of an audit. As a result, AudSEC, in 1977, issued SAS No. 16, The Independent 
Auditor's Responsibility for the Detection of Errors or Irregularities (AICPA 1977). 
SAS  No. 16 made the following changes to authoritative literature: 
• Expanded guidance to address errors in addition to irregularities. 
• Added the concept hat financial statement users look to internal control 
together with audits to provide assurance about the financial statements. 
• Restated the auditor's responsibility affirmatively; tha s, rather than state what 
the auditor is not responsible for, state what the auditor is responsible for－to 
plan the audit to search for material errors and irregularities. 
• Added the concept of professional skepticism 
• Added a discussion of the interrelationship of controls and errors and irregulari-
ties, compliance testing (reliance) and substantive testing (from SAS No. 1, 
section 320). 
• Included warning signals-circumstances suggesting the potential for errors or 
irregularities. 
• Added discussions of the importance of management integrity and warning 
signals suggesting potential for management misrepresentation, but not that, 
absent information to the contrary, the auditor may assu e no misrepresenta-
tions (or verriding of controls) has occurred. 
• Strengthened the discussion of the inherent limitations of an audit andstated 
that, no matter how much work the auditor does, he or she will fail to detect 
some types of irregularities or misrepresentations. 
• Made more specific the auditor's obligations and procedures when the auditor 
suspects material errors or irregularities. Whereas SAP No. 30 only required 
that the auditor reach an understanding with the client as to whoill investigate 
them, SAS No. 16 specified the level of management to be contacted, require-
ments to obtain evidential m tter, implications for the auditor's report, and 
further actions. 
• Specified to whom the auditor should report immaterial errors or irregularities 
and  stated that the auditor should consider their effect on other facets of the 
audit. 
SEC  Reaction to SAS No. 16: A l l of the SEC's comments on the exposure draft of 
SAS  No. 16 were incorporated in the final standard except one. TheSEC  believed "it 
would  be useful to include a comment to the effect that many errors and irregularities 
will be discovered by an auditor standing back from the detail and considering an 
enterprise, its environment, and its financial statements in the overall." Although that 
guidance was not specifically incorporated in SAS No. 16, SAS No. 23, Analytical 
Review Procedures, noted that analytical procedures may be performed at or near the 
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conclusion of the engagement as an overall review of financial information. 
Subsequently, SAS No. 56, Analytical Procedures, removed the option and required 
that analytical procedures be used in the overall review of the financial statements in 
the final review stage of the audit. 
Cohen Commission: In 1978, theCommission on Auditors' Responsibilities: 
Report, Conclusions, and Recommendations, (Cohen Commission 1978) was 
published－about a year after SAS  No. 16. The report made a number of recommenda-
tions regarding the auditor's responsibilities to detect fraud: 
• Provide explicit guidance on the appropriate exercise of professional skill a d 
care concerning fraud detection. For example, if an audit is conducted with due 
care, the auditor will discover certain types of irregularities, should they exist. A 
reasonable search for irregularities is necessary to provide an important service. 
A  standard of professional skill and care is needed to evaluate the performance 
of auditors. 
• Require periodic review of existing clients for determination as to continuance. 
If there is any doubt about management integrity, the auditor should take all 
reasonable actions to resolve the doubt because, if management is not trust-
worthy, there is a significant likelihood that an audit cannot be performed. (SAS 
No. 7 requires investigation when taking on a new client. There are no G A A S 
requirements concerning existing clients. Quality Control Standard No. 1 
requires consideration of policies regarding continuance of clients.) 
• Require auditors to study and evaluate internal controlsthat have a significant 
bearing on the prevention and detection of fraud. 
• Form a special AICPA  to analyze fraud cases and advice on their effect on 
auditing standards. 
Subcommittee  on Fraud: The Standing Subcommittee on Methods of 
Perpetration and Detection of Fraud was charged to study and publish analyses of 
fraud cases to consider how such cases affect the need for revised or new auditing 
standards. The subcommittee was created as a result of the Cohen Commission 
recommendation discussed in the previous section. Although the subcommittee accu-
mulated a large data base of reported cases, its only tangible product was a list of 16 
warning  signals of fraud, which was published in the May 12, 1979 CPA Letter. In 
addition, the subcommittee advised other AICPA  components, for example the CPE 
division, on projects involving fraud and it reviewed the research that was eventually 
published as the Report of the Study of EDP-Related Fraud in the Banking and 
Insurance Industries. 
The  subcommittee disbanded in 1981 due, in large part, to its inabilityto obtain 
specific information from CPA  firms regarding frauds detected. When the AICPA's 
Special Investigations Committee was established, it had theability to obtain that 
information more effectively than the subcommittee and the latter was deemed un-
necessary. 
SAS  No. 53, The Auditor's Responsibility to Detect and Report Errors and 
Irregularities: During the early 1980's, several events occurredthat prompted the 
Auditing Standards Board (ASB) to reconsider its authoritative position on the 
auditor's responsibility to detect fraud and on related technical guidance. The two 
predominant events were a number of well-publicized business failures and the 
Dingell hearings, which were kindled by those failures as well. These events caused 
the profession to question whether it had accepted sufficient responsibility to find 
fraud and whether it had been effective enough in uncovering it. 
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The ASB's response to these questions was SAS No. 53 (AICPA 1988). That SAS 
expanded the auditor's responsibility to detect fraud. In simple terms, the SAS 
elevated this responsibility by changing it from one of looking for fraud to one of 
detecting it. In the more precise language of the standards, SAS No. 16 required the 
auditor to plan the audit to search for fraud, while SAS No. 53 requires the auditor to 
provide reasonable assurance of detecting it. 
The overall tone of the two standards also differs. SAS No. 53 couches the 
auditor's responsibility in a much more affirmative manner than SAS No. 16 by deem-
phasizing the inherent limitations of an audit. It also discarded the SAS No. 16 notion 
that auditors could assume management was honest unless there was information to 
the contrary. It replaced this notion with a requirement that the auditor make a 
specific assessment of the risk of management misrepresentations-assuming neither 
management's honesty nor dishonesty. 
SAS No. 53 also provided much more specific guidance about the effect of fraud 
on auditors' reports and on their communications both within and outside the entity. In 
addition, SAS No. 53 strengthened the guidance about planning and performing the 
audit and evaluating audit results. Because these latter requirements are discussed 
extensively in the another section of this paper, they are not detailed here. 
National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting: The National 
Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting (National 1987) was a private sector 
initiative jointly sponsored by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 
American Accounting Association, Financial Executives Institute, Institute of Internal 
Auditors, and Institute of Management Accountants. Its objective was to identify the 
incidence, causes, and potential remedies relative to fraudulent financial reporting and 
consider the roles of relevant bodies, including independent auditors, entity manage-
ment and employees, educators, and regulatory and enforcement agencies. 
The Treadway Commission was formed in large part as a response to public 
concerns, including those of legislators, about business failures in which fraudulent 
financial reporting was believed to be involved. The Commission performed a large 
part of its work concurrently with the development of SAS No. 53, and, as a result, the 
SAS incorporated to some extent most of the Commission's recommendations as they 
related to the independent auditors' detection of fraud. These recommendations were: 
• Restate the auditor's responsibility for detecting fraud to require reasonable 
assurance that it is detected. 
• Provide guidance to improve the auditor's ability to detect fraud. 
• Strengthen the quality of audit management. 
• Improve communications with users about the nature, scope, and limitations of 
an audit. 
Public Oversight Board: The Public Oversight Board (POB) is the most recent of 
the profession's bodies to issue recommendations concerning the auditor's responsi-
bility to detect fraud. In a 1993 report (POB 1993), the POB said "...to a greater 
extent than it now does, the profession must accept responsibility for the detection of 
fraud by management." To that end, the POB made the following specific recom-
mendations: 
• The profession should develop a process to analyze alleged audit failures to 
determine their causes and to develop enhanced risk assessment and procedural 
guidance. 
• The profession should strengthen its emphasis on professional skepticism. 
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Other Recent Initiatives: Recent actions concerning the auditor's responsibility to 
detect fraud confirms that its evolution is continuing－that concern and confusion 
about the nature and adequacy of the guidance inSAS  No. 53 remains. In May 1992, 
the AICPA  held an Expectations Gap Conference to assess the progress of the nine 
expectation gap standards issued in 1988. The discussion of SAS  No. 53 during that 
roundtable (Albrecht andWillingham 1992) indicated that SAS No. 53 may not be 
adequately addressing fraud detection. 
The AICPA's Board of Directors issued a report in 1993 (AICPA 1993) stating that 
"The public looks to the independent auditor to detect fraud, and it is the auditor's 
responsibility o do so." This statement was intended not only as a response to 
lingering public concerns about auditors' detection responsibility, but also as a 
reminder to the profession about what its responsibility is. That report also supported 
the POB's recommendations pertaining to fraud detection, cited above, and pledged 
action to implement them. 
In a related step, the January, 1994 CPA  Letter, contained a discussion of fraud be-
cause "it is clear that some members are still confused about their responsibility－and 
some commentators have objected to the position of the AICPA  Board of Directors on 
the matter." 
As a culmination to continuing skepticism about SAS No. 53, the ASB  rec ntly 
appointed a fraud task force to reexamine that SAS  and determine whether it should 
be revised or supplemented. 
Influences Outside the Accounting Profession 
A  number of groups outside the accounting profession have influenced profes-
sional guidance pertaining to the auditor's responsibility to detect fraud. They include 
audit report users, legislators and regulators, the courts, and the financial press. These 
groups have often interacted with each other, one group f eling the concerns of others. 
Almost without exception, the concerns and actions of the egroups were triggered by 
financial losses suffered by investors and creditors that, at least in part, were blamed 
on fraudulent financial reporting and failed audits. 
Initiatives from these groups have taken a wide variety of forms including investi-
gations by three Congressional subcommittees, proposed legislation, legal decisions, 
and op ed pieces in prominent financial and business publications. Although a review 
of these initiatives is far beyond the scope of this paper, their collective ffect demon-
strates the public perception that auditors should detect fraud. 
Actions by these groups have, indeed, influenced the profession's consideration of 
its fraud detection responsibility. The timing of the Moss  (1976) and Metcalf (1977) 
hearings and the issuance of SAS  No. 16 in 1977 was not coincidental. Neither were 
the Dingell hearings in the mid 1980's, the Treadway Commission deliberations of 
that same period, and the issuance of SAS  No. 53 in 1988 random events. The public 
has influenced the evolution of the auditor's responsibility to detect fraud, and it 
continues to. 
The Risk Model and Fraud Detection 
SAS  No. 53, The Auditor's Responsibility to Detect and Report Errors and 
Irregularities, employs the audit risk model to frame the auditor's responsibility to 
detect fraud. The auditor is required to ass ss he risk that errors and irregularities may 
cause the financial statements to contain a material misstatement. The SAS requires 
the auditor to consider factors that influence this risk (hereafter referred to as fraud 
risk factors). It provides examples of these factors that the auditor may consider that 
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pertain to both the financial statement level (all or several financial statement compo-
nents) and the account balance or transaction class level (individual financial 
statement components). 
The  Theory of Fraud Risk Factors 
The  fundamental theory underlying fraud isk factors (also referred to as red flags, 
indicators, characteristics) is that their presence may portend an increased likelihood 
of fraud induced misstatements in the financial statements. This theory underlies the 
risk model approach set forth in SAS  53. 
A  respectable amount of research, both in academia and professional practice, has 
been devoted to the theory and application of fraud risk factors (for example, 
Albrecht, et al 1980; Albrecht and Romney 1986; Albrecht and Willingham 1992; 
Campbell and Parker 1992; Loebbecke et. al. 1989; National Commission on 
Fraudulent Financial Reporting 1987; Pincus 1989). Research efforts directed toward 
this theory have addressed various aspects of fraud risk factors including identifying 
them, classifying them, weighting them, combining them, and testing their predictive 
effectiveness. 
The  bulk of research, practice experience, and anecdotal history indicates that fraud 
risk factors－those in SAS  No. 53, as well as other combinations－are undependable as 
cues for fraud induced misstatements. This body of evidence challenges the adequacy 
of the guidance in SAS  No. 53 and strongly suggests that additional or, perhaps, alter-
native guidance should be developed. 
Limitations of Fraud Risk Factors 
A  number of attributes limit the reliability of fraud risk factors, and therefore the 
audit risk model, in predicting fraud induced misstatements. The following discussion 
briefly describes what we believe to be the most significant limiting attributes. 
Recognition and consideration ofthese attributes potentially can aid in improving 
audit guidance for fraud detection. 
Inappropriate Risk Factors: Several research studies have addressed the question 
of which fraud risk factors are most effective in predicting fraud induced misstate-
ments (for example, Albrecht and Willingham 1992; Loebbecke et al 1989; and Pincus 
1989). Most of these studies have concluded that SAS No. 53 contains some risk 
factors that are not effective predictors and excludes some factors that are. Research, 
however, has not yet constructed a set ofriskfactors with sufficient predictive ab lity 
to correctly categorize frauds and nonfrauds in an audit. Therefore, auditors applying 
No. SAS No. 53 are faced with a relatively long list of risk factors with varying 
degrees of predictive success, many of which are always present in an audit client. As 
a  result, we believe, many auditors doubt the credibility of fraud risk factors in 
detecting fraud. 
Further, some auditors have expressed concern that a requirement to consider 
imprecise fraud risk factors raises their exposure to litigation substantially more than 
it increases their likelihood of detecting fraud. In their view, this added legal risk 
arises when they have dutifully considered risk factors, responded with appropriate 
audit modifications, not detected fraud induced misstatements, and, after issuing an 
unqualified opinion, fraud is discovered. 
Combining and Weighting Risk Factors: In addition to the issue of which risk 
factors are accurate indicators of fraud, the question also exists as to how to combine 
or categorize these factors and what relative weights to assign them. SAS No. 53 
states that the factors should be combined, but provides no related guidance. Some 
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research has delved into the combination issue by creating classes or categories of 
factors, such as situational, opportunity, and personal honesty (Albrecht et al 1980) 
and conditions, motivation, and attitude (Loebbecke et al 1989). However, these 
research results have not been refined and tested sufficiently to demonstrate their 
effectiveness as fraud predictors. 
Even if relevant fraud risk factors can be identified, their application is limited by 
the auditor's lack of knowledge about their relative significance in diagnosing fraud 
induced misstatements. The only study we are aware of that addressed "weighting" 
risk factors is Albrecht and Willingham, 1992, which used statistical models to eval-
uate weightings. That study concluded that "The weight that should be assigned to 
each relevant fraud indicator in combining them is a very complex problem. Based on 
research results, guidance about combination of fraud indicators is beyond the ca-
pability of an SAS.... [W]hile the models are somewhat accurate at both the very low 
and very high risk levels, they are significantly less accurate when the risk is deter-
mined to be low, moderate, andhigh. In every risk case, misinterpretations about 
whether fraud existed were present." 
Some  public accounting firms avoid the issue ofcombining risk factors by requiring 
a  response to any risk factor present. In essence, this approach requires the auditor to 
consider whether "other conditions" might offset or augment the likelihood of fraud. 
We  believe the practical problems of combining and weighting fraud risk factors is 
a  significant limitation of the utility of the risk model approach in SAS 53. We hope 
that future research will address these problems and help alleviate them. 
Inability to Target Specific Misstatements: Fraud risk factors, those in SAS  No. 
53 and others, are intended to predict the presence of fraud. If and when a set of rele-
vant, properly combined and weighted risk factors is developed, it can, atbest, only 
accurately predict that fraud has occurred. These factors cannot direct the auditor to 
financial statement components where fraud induced misstatements exist. SAS  No. 53 
implicitly recognizes this limitation by the guidance it provides concerning the 
auditor's response to a significant r sk of misstatement. That guidance instructs the 
auditor to exercise a heightened degree of professional skepticism by considering the 
appropriateness of the experience and expertise of audit staff assigned to the audit; the 
extensiveness of audit supervision that may be necessary; and the modification of the 
nature, timing, and extent of auditing procedures to provide more persuasive evidence. 
The  auditor, however, still faces the perplexing problem of where to aim this added 
audit intensity. Often the spectrum of financial statement components susceptible to 
fraud induced misstatements is so broad th t a massive portion of thefinancial state-
ments must be subjected to utmost scrutiny. We believe that th  additional time, cost, 
and  risk related to detecting specific misstatements when risk factors point to fraud 
has caused an increased tendency for auditors to withdraw from audit engagements or 
decline to accept clients where th se factors are present. In these circumstances, audi-
tors' concerns about management integrity and the need to rely on management 
representations, particularly concerning the completeness assertion, requires switching 
to a "fraud audit" audit strategy. Because such a strategy is extremely costly, the 
auditor usually cannot contract to do the necessary work. Thus, the auditor withdraws 
from the engagement. While these actions are not necessarily inappropriate, they do 
emphasize the need for risk factors that are better able to target specific financial state-
ment components. 
Management  Manipulation of Risk Factors: Fraud risk factors are subject to 
management manipulation. Management is aware of the factors auditors consider in 
assessing the risk of fraud－in many cases CFOs  or other top executives have been 
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auditors with CPA  firms－and is able to distort or play down risk factors to mislead 
auditors. A recent example of risk factor manipulation occurred in the ZZZZ  Best Co. 
where the CEO led auditors to address ri k areas that really were not risky. This 
directed auditors away from legitimate risk areas and helped perpetuate the conceal-
ment of fraudulent financial reporting. 
SAS  No. 53 "Misstatement" Risk Factors: In addition to the limitations of fraud 
risk factors discussed above, the manner in which SAS  No. 53 guides the auditor's use 
of risk factors creates other limitations. SAS No. 53 discusses risk factors as indica-
tors of potential misstatements. Misstatements defined in the SAS  include both errors 
and irregularities, the latter being subdivided into management fraud and defalcations. 
Because SAS No. 53 presents risk factors as signals of potential misstatements, the 
auditor must decide whether a particular combination of riskfactors indicates errors 
(unintentional misstatements) or irregularities (intentional misstatements). If the 
auditor concludes that irregularities are likely, then he or she must make an additional 
judgment about whether they take theform of management fraud or defalcations. 
The  condition－error, management fraud, or defalcation－causing the misstatement 
is significant. It affects how the auditor should respond to achieve reasonable assur-
ance of detecting the misstatement. When the underlying cause of the misstatement is 
intentional, as with management fraud and defalcations, the auditor's response should 
consider that accounting principles and audit evidence may have been manipulated to 
conceal or support the misstatement. When, on the other hand, the underlying cause is 
unintentional, as with errors, the auditor generally has less concern about the credi-
bility of audit evidence. In addition, the audit approach to respond to expected 
management fraud is likely to differ from the approach to respond to expected defal-
cations. Neither SAS  No. 53 nor research on risk factors provides adequate guidance 
about how such factors might indicate the underlying cause of misstatements. 
SAS  No. 53 does contain a brief discussion of management fraud. It requires a 
specific assessment of the risk of management misrepresentation. This assessment is 
in addition to and secondary to the requirement that the auditor assess the risk of 
material misstatement. The SAS provides additional factors that an auditor may 
consider that pertain specifically to this risk. Presumably, the auditor should incorpo-
rate this secondary risk assessment-risk of management misrepresentation－into the 
formation of the primary risk assessment-risk of material misstatements. However, 
the SAS does not mention the interrelationship of the two risks, much less provide 
guidance about integrating them. 
The  Risk Model, Reasonable Assurance, and Nature of Misstatements 
SAS  No. 53 requires the auditor to understand the characteristics of errors and 
irregularities and their interaction when assessing the risk of misstatement. Those 
characteristics-materiality, level of involvement, concealment, internal control struc-
ture, and financial statement effect－(discussed in the App ndix to the SAS) are 
discussed in the context of how they influence the auditor'sability to detect misstate-
ments. The discussion states that the existence of some of these characteristics may 
make some misstatements extremely difficult, if not impossible, to detect. 
By  introducing these characteristics into the auditor's risk as essment, SAS  No. 53 
raises the question as to whether the auditor is able to detect all misstatements, what-
ever their characteristics, w th the same level of assurance. We believe that the SAS 
and a substantial majority of auditors take the position that all misstatements, what-
ever their nature or characteristics, cannot be detected with the same level of 
assurance. 
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On the other hand, the auditor's standard report, prescribed in SAS No. 58, Reports 
on Audited Financial Statements, requires a statement that the audit provides reason-
able assurance about whether the financial statements are free of material 
misstatements. Neither SAS No. 58 nor the standard report, differentiate among levels 
of assurance for misstatements by nature or characteristics. 
These two standards send different messages. We think that report readers believe 
that the auditor is responsible for and can detect all misstatements, irrespective of 
whether they are errors, management fraud, or defalcations, with the same level of 
assurance, while auditors do not. In other words, auditors believe that what is a 
"reasonable" level of assurance for detecting a misstatement varies with the nature of 
the misstatement while report readers believe that this "reasonable" level of assurance 
is the same for all misstatements. This certainly widens the expectation gap and, we 
believe, should be specifically addressed in auditing standards. 
Improving the Auditor's Fraud Detection Capability 
In this section we present some suggestions for strengthening the auditor's ability 
to detect fraud. These suggestions concern both changes in auditing standards and 
changes in practice and, in varying degrees, involve practitioners, standard setters, and 
academics in their implementation. Some of these suggestions are being considered 
by the ASB's newly formed fraud task force. 
Unambiguous Statement of Responsibility to Detect Fraud 
We believe many auditors are still unsure or unaccepting of the responsibility for 
detecting fraud that is set forth in SAS No. 53. On the historical timeline, as noted 
earlier, the responsibility to detect fraud is new. Changing the old, entrenched belief 
among auditors that they are not responsible for detecting fraud will require additional 
effort. We believe one effective method would be to specifically use the term "fraud" 
in auditing standards. Using the term irregularities and lumping it into misstatements 
has obscured the auditor's understanding of the responsibility SAS No. 53 imposes. 
We also believe that a restated responsibility should help the public to better under-
stand the auditor's responsibility to detect fraud. The public needs to understand that 
detecting all material fraud induced misstatements is beyond auditors' capability. 
Auditors should have an affirmative responsibility to detect fraud, but it should be 
articulated in a manner that clearly explains the concept of reasonable assurance and, 
to the extent possible, sets forth that concept in an operational manner. We believe the 
responsibility to detect fraud is analogous to the responsibility of police officers to 
find criminals. It would be absurd for police officers to deny such a responsibility, but 
it would be unreasonable to expect them to always find criminals. We believe that the 
public understands and accepts this for police officers but not for auditors. Restating 
the auditor's responsibility for fraud more precisely and coherently in professional 
standards could help achieve this understanding and acceptance. 
Refining the Audit Risk Model 
Despite the limitations of the audit risk model discussed in the preceding section, 
we do not advocate its abandonment. We believe that continued research and distilla-
tion of practice experience to attenuate the limitations are critical to enhancing the 
auditor's ability to detect fraud. 
The highest priority should be given to identifying factors that are relevant and reli-
able predictors of fraud. We hope that factors could be identified that correlate 
specifically with fraud instead of fraud and error combined. In addition, we believe 
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that fraud risk factors capable of reliably predicting the risk of fraud in specific finan-
cial statement components can and should be developed. Knowledge about such 
factors would significantly improve the effectiveness of the risk model approach in 
detecting fraud. 
In addition to considering fraud risk factors for specific financial statement compo-
nents, we believe that auditors should simply ask themselves which financial 
statement component(s) would be a desirable area for executing fraud. This differs 
from merely considering specific risk factors in that the auditor attempts to identify 
the area where he or she would conceal a fraud if one were to be perpetrated. It has 
the added benefit of not being directly related to risk factors and, therefore, not as 
susceptible to the client's anticipation of where the auditor might focus additional 
audit effort. In addition, it would help compensate for the client's knowledge of the 
audit approach gained when firm staff accept positions with client entities. 
Evidence About Fraud 
In a number of circumstances involving fraudulent financial reporting, auditors had 
ample evidence of fraud but failed to adequately recognize its implications or 
follow-up on the questions that evidence raised. We believe that additional profes-
sional guidance is needed about audit evidence implications and evaluation. 
One important area this guidance should address is evidence manipulation in fraud 
schemes. Knowledge of the characteristics, indicators, and methods of distorting 
manipulated evidence would sharpen the auditors' evaluation of audit evidence and 
help to concentrate their attention on specific financial statement components where 
fraud induced misstatements may exist. In addition, this knowledge would help in 
developing audit procedures directed specifically toward determining whether 
evidence has been manipulated. 
We believe that two fruitful sources of information about manipulated evidence are 
the SEC's Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases and litigated fraud cases. 
Both of these sources have been used in identifying fraud risk indicators. They could 
be used in a similar fashion to glean knowledge about evidence manipulation. In addi-
tion, the process recommended by the POB involving analyzing information in CPA 
firm workpapers about alleged audit failures is another important source of informa-
tion. Both practitioners and academics could contribute significantly to developing 
this knowledge. 
We also recommend that the profession create a formal process for collecting and 
disseminating information from individual CPA firms about the audit techniques that 
have been successful in detecting fraud. We believe that much useful information could 
be captured by studying the profession's success stories in detecting fraud in the thou-
sands of audits that do not end up on the front pages of the business and financial press. 
Identifying and publishing how these frauds were devised, the techniques employed to 
perpetrate them, and the evidence and auditing procedures that led to their detection 
during the audit would enable the profession as a whole to gain from these experiences. 
In addition, this process would better position the profession to answer its critics who 
focus on the shortcomings of the audits that were not successful. 
The recent K P M G Peat Marwick fraud survey ( K P M G Peat Marwick 1993), using 
companies rather than CPA firms, is an example of how such a process might be 
established. That survey provided information from companies about the frequency of 
fraud, types of frauds, how they occurred, and how they were discovered, among 
many other fraud attributes. Similar information from CPA firms would be a fertile 
source of knowledge for the profession. 
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Auditor Response to Risk Factors 
When  risk factors indicate a risk of fraud induced misstatements, auditors often 
respond by strengthening the nature, timing, or extent of audit procedures. One 
response is to apply analytical procedures to help arget potential financial statement 
components. Experience suggests that such procedures often are not effective because 
management is able to respond with explanations that can be corroborated and yet 
misleading. 
Another common response to the risk of fraud is to strengthen ests of details. This 
approach, however, has also been ineffective. Often, these tests fail because the 
transactions or events used to perpetrate fraud occur late in the fiscal year. Auditors 
have examined many such items already and found no problems. Thus, they are lulled 
into complacency by past positive experience and fail to recognize the very items they 
are looking for. 
We  believe SAS No. 53 should be revised or supplemented to provide more 
specific guidance about appropriate audit testing responses and their application. 
Audit Staffing 
We  also believe that changes in approaches to audit staffing might be beneficial in 
improving the auditor's ability to detect fraud. The profession has developed and used 
specialists for quite some time in individual industries. Today, there is increased 
emphasis on training and using such specialists. We believe the notion of specializa-
tion should be expanded. Public accounting firms should consider creating staff 
specialization in certain financial statement areas. This specialization would pertain 
not just to specific industries, but also to specific financial statement components, 
such as valuation of certain ssets or liabilities. Such specialities would provide exper-
tise that would enhance the auditor's ability to detect fraud. 
We  believe such specialization would be helpful because today's audits are analo-
gous to an assembly process where junior staff get experience in a particular audit 
area, such as receivables and inventory, by participating in audits of those areas or 
two  or three clients. They then are assigned to other financial statement components in 
other audits to gain experience in those areas. It is not uncommon for a staff person to 
become a senior and have been exposed to a particular financial statement area only 
once. 
This process often does not provide sufficient exposure to audit areas to adequately 
prepare junior staff to recognize circumstances th t may  involve fraud. Yet frequently 
the work that is critical to detecting fraud is the basic auditing performed by these
staff members. A lack of depth of experience in specific audit areas may cause them to 
overlook important matters relevant to fraud that, therefore, will not be brought to the 
attention of more senior staff who could bring their greater expertise to bear on these 
matters. 
We  recognize that this training approach may be impracticable to change, but we 
believe that specialization in financial statement areas could help overcome some of 
the disadvantages associated with this approach. 
Summary 
There is an old a age that a primary reason for studying history is to avoid repeating 
it. The profession's history of defining the auditor's responsibility for detecting fraud 
already contains too much repetition. A trend, however, is developing and there does 
not seem to be room for a U turn－auditors are responsible for detecting fraud. 
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This is a hefty responsibility and it must be defined in the context of the auditor's 
capability to detect fraud. The profession has had mixed success in achieving a 
reasonable blend of responsibility and capability. We believe that continued research 
and practice experience to refine the audit risk model, better analysis of audits 
involving fraud (successful as well as unsuccessful), a clearer definition and descrip-
tion of the auditor's responsibility to detect fraud, and changes in staff training and 
specialization can help make responsibility commensurate with capability. 
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What We Can Learn From Yogi Berra 
Discussant's Response to "Auditing for Fraud: 
Perception vs. Reality" 
Karen V. Pincus* 
University of Southern California 
As a baseball fan, I appreciated that Alan Winters and John Sullivan began their 
paper, Auditing for Fraud-Perception vs. Reality, with a quote from Yogi Berra. They 
ended their paper with a comment that the profession's history of efforts to grapple 
with fraud detection already contains too much repetition, calling to mind another 
famous phrase often attributed to Yogi: It was déjà vu all over again. So, in my turn at 
bat, I plan to follow Alan and John's lead and consider what audit practitioners, educa-
tors and researchers can learn from Yogi Berra. 
My comments address four questions that Alan and John's paper made me think 
about, the first two dealing primarily with audit practice, and the other two related 
more to audit education and research: (1) Why do auditors miss fraud clues or fraud 
itself? (2) How much assurance is reasonable assurance? (3) Does audit education 
begin too late? and (4) Do auditor characteristics matter? 
Why Do Auditors Miss Fraud Clues or Fraud Itself? 
In the body of their paper, Alan and John present a large number of thoughtful 
observations and interesting suggestions about auditing for fraud. Many of their obser-
vations address the implicit question: Why do auditors miss fraud clues or fraud itself? 
Consider, in response to this question, George Bush's favorite Berra quote concerning 
Yogi's reason why the Yankees lost the 1960 World Series to the Pirates: "We made 
too many wrong mistakes." 
Let me briefly review four "wrong mistakes" I think auditors make that lead them 
to miss fraud clues or fraud itself and compare and contrast my views to those 
expressed in Alan and John's paper. 
The first wrong mistake: expecting too much of the fraud risk model 
First, auditors make the wrong mistake of looking too hopefully at the fraud risk 
model for strong predictive relationships. Alan and John focus most of their criticisms 
on the fraud risk model and I find most of their criticisms well taken, as well as their 
conclusion that the risk model, as currently expressed in the literature, can and should 
be significantly improved based on what we've learned since SAS #53. But, I also 
think we must recognize that even if we improve the fraud risk model in every 
feasible way, there will still be a limit to the predictive ability it can provide us. 
Let me put on my hat as an educator for a moment to explain why this is so. One of 
the challenges that faces us as teachers of auditing is to explain to our students, who 
have never been on an audit, what we mean when auditors talk about becoming "satis-
fied" about an audit objective, or feeling "comfort" about an audit conclusion. What 
* As of August 1995, University of Arkansas. 
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we're trying to communicate, of course, is the notion of second order uncertainty that 
we were discussing earlier today in conjunction wi h Bill Waller's paper. So, I create a 
very simplified explanation for my students. I tell them that audits involve a multitude 
of decisions and that the decision tasks fall roughly into three groups. 
The first and largest group－knowledge tasks－contains hose tasks where there's an 
almost deterministic relationship between the available evidence and the decision at 
hand. Examples of knowledge tasks include deciding whether depreciation expense 
was calculated correctly and deciding whether the inventory count was accurate. 
When  you make these decisions as an auditor, you can never be 100% guaranteed you 
are right, but you're close enough to certainty for all practical purposes. 
The second group̶which is smaller than the first, but which has more value-
added and thus is what we get paid more for̶contains judgment tasks. For judgment 
tasks, there's a more probabilistic relationship between the available evidence and the 
decision at hand, as, for example, when an auditor decides whether the net book value 
of accounts receivable is collectible. The relationship is predictable over many clients, 
or for a single client over the long run, but for any individual client in an i dividual 
year, the auditor must live with more than a minimal level of uncertainty. 
In terms of a more formal model, what we're talking abouthere is second order 
uncertainty: the auditor will always experience greater second order uncertainty for 
judgment tasks than for knowledge tasks. And here's where the rub is: many error 
detection tasks are knowledge tasks, but fraud detection is now－and will always be, no 
matter how close to optimal we make the fraud riskmodel－a judgment task. There is a 
limit to the degree of satisfaction auditors can feel about fraud detection that will 
always  be lower than the degree of satisfaction we can feel about error detection. So, 
my  warning is that we shouldn't oversell improvement of the fraud risk model. We 
can take a step forward, but not the entire journey. 
By  the way, in case you're curious, the third group of decision tasks－which, fortu-
nately, I believe is rare (though not non-existent) on an audit-is guessing tasks, tasks 
where there is little or no relationship between the available evidence and the decision 
at hand. M y usual example for students of a guessing task is the decision about 
whether tax law changes in the next five or ten years will affect the amount hat 
should be recognized today in the long-term deferred taxes accounts. 
The  second wrong mistake: failing to remember "too" normal may be a red flag 
The second wrong mistake auditors make is being too focused on looki g for abnor-
malities. Focusing on deviations from expectations worksbetter for error detection than 
for fraud detection. For instance, abnormal results from analytical procedures can help 
the auditor find the dumb frauds, but they're not much help finding the smart ones－the 
ones where the fraud perpetrators are at least as smart as (or, in some cases, smarter 
than) the auditors and deliberately set out to deceive the auditors. 
Auditors too often forget the simplest rule ofmanipulation: Make  it look normal. 
As Barry Minkow, architect of theZZZZ  Best fraud, says in a videotaped interview 
produced by the Institute of Certified Fraud Examiners, "The number one thing we 
had to do as a fraud team was CONSISTENCY." Thus, auditors shouldn't focus only 
on abnormalities, but should also look for results that are too consistent, too normal, 
or too good to be true. That doesn't mean that auditors should be skeptical of every-
thing－but it does mean they should recognize that deviation from expectations isn't 
the only warning signal to watch for on an audit. 
Consider another teaching example. If astudent hands in a homework problem that 
comes pretty close to the solution manual, as a teacher, I'm happy. But if that student 
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keeps on handing in homework that always tracks the solution manual, pretty soon I 
begin to suspect that maybe the student has the solution manual. To ignore that possi-
bility would be naive.... and that's true even though no one's likely to sue me if I miss 
a manipulation. 
The famous ZZZZ Best fraud, which Alan and John refer to in their paper, provides 
an illustration of how auditors can miss a manipulation by failing to notice the too 
good to be true. For example, the auditors examined one-page building restoration 
contracts worth millions of dollars. While one might fervently wish to encourage 
simplification of legal jargon, the one-page contract seems too good to be true. How 
many multi-million dollar legal contracts have you seen without pages and pages of 
specifics? Or, consider that when the auditors went to observe the work at a building 
being restored after fire damage, they found the building in almost pristine condition, 
with no real evidence of remaining damage and little evidence of continuing work. 
Even for an almost completed project, this would be too good to be true. Real life is 
rarely seamless; seamless evidence may not be real. 
The fraud risk model, as currently expressed in the practice and research literature 
that Alan and John discuss, reinforces the auditors' tendency to focus on deviations 
from expectations. Consider that even the term "red flags," the popular name for fraud 
risk indicators, refers to something which jumps out at you as different than normal. If 
we want to improve fraud detection, we need to expand our notion of fraud clues to 
include the too good to be true, as well as the abnormal deviations. Moreover, even if 
we improve the risk model, we still need to consider improving education and firm 
training of auditors to improve auditors' ability to focus on the too good to be true, as 
well as observed abnormalities. One way to do this might be to build more observa-
tion exercises into the college classroom and firm training programs, with care taken 
to include cases with abnormalities, normal cases, and too good to be true cases. It is 
also important to consider the too good to be true problem when teaching about 
performing analytical procedures. Too often, the sole focus of analytical procedures is 
looking for material deviations from expectations, which is very helpful in locating 
errors. But if the books have been cooked, one sign may be ratios and trends with too 
little deviations, another case of too good to be true results. 
The third wrong mistake: insufficient industry/benchmarking knowledge 
Another wrong mistake auditors make may be found in the fraud cases where 
better industry knowledge and better benchmarking could have provided clear red 
flags that the books were being cooked. To use the Z Z Z Z Best case again as an 
example, remember that Z Z Z Z Best hid material losses from their legitimate carpet 
cleaning business in mounds of false profits from a phony fire restoration business. In 
this case, the auditors examined fictitious restoration contracts for $7 to $8 million 
apiece, but failed to see the red flag as they were unaware of industry data which 
reported that the largest restoration jobs on record were in the $2 to $3 million range. 
Mistakes related to insufficient industry/benchmarking knowledge are not just a 
recent phenomenon. When I was an undergraduate auditing student back in the 1960s, 
audit texts often used the example of the "Great Salad Oil Swindle," an inventory 
fraud case that could have been detected earlier by better use of industry knowledge 
and benchmarking. In this case, a subsidiary of American Express created fictitious 
inventory at a New Jersey storage tank farm by floating a layer of salad oil on top of 
tanks filled mostly with water. When the auditors observed and tested the tanks' 
content, they saw and smelled salad oil, and thought the tanks were full of oil. But, 
had the auditors been aware of published industry data, they would have known that 
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the amount of salad oil claimed to be stored in this one New Jersey location was a 
highly unreasonable amount in comparison to the previous year's world production. 
With the advent of advanced technology and the greatly increased access to 
industry information via electronic databases, more sophisticated industry knowledge 
and benchmarks should be much easier to create than in the past. Yet, as the Z Z Z Z 
Best case reveals, auditors keep repeating the same "wrong mistake" of not taking 
advantage of available information. In addition to improving the fraud risk model, we 
must also improve the use of industry knowledge and benchmarking when auditors 
conduct analytical procedures. 
The fourth wrong mistake: not leading with the strongest hitters 
In the game of baseball, it's generally considered good planning to lead off with 
some of your strongest hitters. Yet, on audit teams, we tend to bat our rookies at the 
top of the order when it comes to field work. Yogi would not approve. 
The traditionally-structured audit team made sense in the era when it was first 
created. At that time, the focus of an audit was more on error detection than on fraud 
detection and accounting systems (and audits) were largely manual. This environment 
required small armies of accounting clerks to create the books and small armies of 
audit laborers to perform the kind of tedious testing that went by such monikers as 
"tick and tie." But with advanced technology, accounting systems are now largely 
computerized from automated data entry via barcode scanners and electronic data 
interchange, through electronic processing, storage and reporting. Many of the 
computational tests in the audit process have likewise been computerized. 
In this electronic information environment, increased input accuracy and built-in 
error checking have become the norm for accounting systems. Consequently, errors 
are less frequent than they were in manual systems. On the other hand, electronic 
information systems create new opportunities for manipulation, broadening the range 
of potential frauds. Thus, as technology has changed, error detection has become rela-
tively less important and fraud detection has become relatively more important. 
Moreover, audit technology has removed most of the laborious tick and tie tasks from 
human hands to electronic testing, raising the level of sophistication of tasks now 
done by people at the lowest level of the audit team. 
How could we strengthen the batting average of an audit team when it comes to 
fraud detection? Let me offer two suggestions Yogi might give: (1) more coaching, 
and (2) more farm team experience before moving to the major leagues. 
More coaching could be provided by increased formal education, as the proponents 
of expanding entry-level education to 150-hours or graduate degrees in accounting 
advocate. More coaching could also be provided within the firms by having the experi-
enced "pros"-the managers and partners-mentor the inexperienced rookies on the audit 
staff. Traditionally, manager/partner contact with junior staff members has been limited, 
with several layers of the management hierarchy filtering communication between the 
top and bottom levels. Again, this made sense in the days when public accounting firms 
were structured as pyramids with very wide bases and narrow peaks, and with a great 
deal of turnover (both voluntary and involuntary) in between. Yet, in the current envi-
ronment, the traditional pyramid structure is being replaced by something that is begin-
ning to look more like a cylinder. With this structure, direct mentoring by partners and 
managers may be feasible and cost effective. It should at least be explored as a possible 
way to leverage the batting power of the rookies on the team. 
More farm team experience might also be in order. Traditionally, the best and 
brightest graduates of our accounting programs have often begun their careers in 
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public accounting. Then, after two to four years experience, many of these graduates 
have left public accounting for careers in industry or government. Public accounting, 
in effect, served as a training ground for auditors in other sectors of the profession. 
This made sense to public accounting firms because the nature of their industry 
required those armies of bodies at the entry level and high turnover. It made sense to 
young accountants because they got broad-based audit experience and great on-the job 
and continuing education training, which added up to a de facto graduate school. It 
made sense to industry and government, because they got experienced hires who were 
ready to hit the fast track when they came on board, particularly because experience 
transferred easily in an age of manual information systems. 
But again, changing technology and other changes in the environment—including 
the greater sophistication needed to audit a broad range of computerized global clients 
and increased competitiveness in public accounting—make the old system question-
able. Is it still economically efficient to use public accounting as the farm team for 
other sectors of the profession? Or, has the situation now reversed so that it may make 
more sense to have young accountants begin their careers in industry or government 
and then, after two to four years of experience, enter a public accounting firm if they 
wish to be financial auditors? 
How Much Assurance Is Reasonable Assurance? 
I take issue with Alan and John's paper (which I often agree with) most severely 
when it comes to the topic of reasonable assurance. None of us in practice, education 
or research like the question: How much assurance is reasonable assurance? As Yogi 
Berra once said when asked for the umpteenth time about the dismal record of his 
1984 Yankees: "I wish I had an answer to that question because I'm getting tired of 
answering that question." 
In their paper, Alan and John argue that auditors believe a reasonable level of 
assurance is lower for fraud than error, but users believe a reasonable level of assur-
ance is the same for both error and fraud: 
We think that report readers believe that the auditor is responsible for and can detect all misstate-
ments, irrespective of whether they are errors, management fraud, or defalcations, with the same 
level of assurance, while auditors do not. In other words, auditors believe what is a "reasonable" 
level of assurance for detecting a misstatement varies with the nature of the misstatement while 
report readers believe that this "reasonable" level of assurance is the same for all misstatements. 
I think this argument seriously understates the true magnitude of the expectation 
gap. There is ample evidence in the research literature to tell us that investors want 
more (not the same) assurance against fraud than error. For example, the January 1994 
Journal of Accountancy included an article on audit assurance by Epstein and Geiger 
reporting the results of a national survey of shareholders, one of the primary user 
groups for audit reports. Consider the following table which reveals the results of one 
of the survey's key questions: 
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Investor perceptions of audit assurance 
The auditor should do whatever investigation is necessary so he or she can 
provide assurance the audited financial statements are free from material 
misstatements. This assurance should be described as follows: 
Error Fraud 
No assurance necessary 1.67% 2.51% 
Reasonable assurance 51.05% 26.36% 
Absolute assurance 47.28% 71.13% 
From: Marc J. Epstein and Marshall A. Geiger, "Investor Views of Audit Assurance: Recent Evidence of 
The Expectation Gap," Journal of Accountancy, January 1994, p. 60. 
The expectation gap is not less assurance for fraud versus error on the auditor side 
versus the same assurance on the user side; it's less assurance on the auditor side 
versus more assurance on the user side. I think it's very important that practitioners, 
and especially standard-setters, acknowledge the true magnitude of the expectation 
gap. Acknowledging the true size of the expectation gap is important because the gap 
is not likely to be closed by one side or the other moving completely to the opposite 
side's position, but by both sides compromising. From the viewpoint of Alan and 
John's paper, reducing the expectation gap by moving to the same level of assurance 
for fraud and error would be regarded as a capitulation where auditors give in entirely 
to users. But, i f the real magnitude of the expectation gap is acknowledged, it 
becomes clear that moving to the same level of assurance for fraud and error would be 
a compromise for both sides, not merely a one-sided capitulation. Until auditors 
recognize the true magnitude of the expectation gap, it is unlikely that a mutually 
acceptable resolution of the gap can be achieved. 
Alan and John's paper contains another argument which shows, in my view, further 
evidence that auditors in practice often understate the reality of the expectation gap. In 
their call for an "unambiguous statement of responsibility to detect fraud," Alan and 
John make the dual points that auditors must detach from their old, entrenched belief 
that they can disavow responsibility for fraud detection and that the public must also 
detach from their old, entrenched belief that auditors can detect all frauds. So far, so 
good. But then, Alan and John go on to explain how the public should come to view 
missed cases of fraud by drawing an analogy to the responsibility of police officers to 
find criminals: 
We believe the responsibility to detect fraud is analogous to the responsibility of police officers to 
find criminals. It would be absurd for police officers to deny such a responsibility, but it would be 
unreasonable to expect them to always find criminals. We believe that the public understands and 
accepts this for police officers, but not for auditors. Restating the auditor's responsibility for fraud 
more precisely and coherently in professional standards could help achieve this understanding and 
acceptance. 
This is an interesting analogy, but it hasn't been thought through. Let's take a 
closer look for a moment at the notion that the public understands and accepts the 
failure of police officers to find criminals. Make the analogy a bit more specific by 
thinking about a particular crime analogous in severity to financial fraud. Since most 
companies don't die from fraud, we'll reject murder as the crime; but since they suffer 
greatly from the violation, rape would seem to be an appropriate analogy. 
Now, ask yourself the question: Does the public understand and accept that some 
rapes go unsolved? At best, I think you could argue that the public at large accepts the 
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abstract notion that some rapists are undiscovered, but itwould be unreasonable to 
argue that the victims of rape, or their families and close friends, feel the same way. 
Those affected by the crime do not accept or understand the failure to catch the rapist 
in the same way  those unaffected by the crime might. And those who are affected by 
crime can include a pretty broad circle beyond the victim and the victim's family and 
close friends. While you may, in general, be tolerant that some rapes go unsolved, you 
will less likely be tolerant if the unsolved rap  occurred in the parking garage of your 
building on the floor above where you park. 
Here's where Alan and John's police officers analogy leads us: the public in 
general may be tolerant, butvictims, both direct and indirect, care. The problem for 
auditors is immediately apparent. Financial frauds, particularly in public companies, 
have huge numbers of victims－and victims care. The analogy of "suite crime" 
(management fraud) to street crime, is a good one; but, when the analogy is carried 
through, it leads not to the logical conclusion that the public should be more forgiving 
of undetected crime, but to the conclusion that the pressure to keep the streets afe 
will continue. 
Does Audit Education Begin Too Late? 
Since I have been somewhat critical of practice so far, in the interest of fair play, let 
me also take a swing at academia. As academics, one Yogi-ism we should think about 
is Berra's explanation of why he missed a ball when playing left field in an afternoon 
game of the 1961 World Series: "It ge s late early out there." 
As educators, we need to recognize that time is not on our side when it comes to 
audit education: it ge s late early out there. Consequently, in myview, audit education 
should begin earlier than it does in the traditional undergraduate curriculum. In the 
traditional curriculum, audit education occurs at the end of an accounting majors' 
coursework. Presumably, this placement of audit education with n the curriculum 
arose from the notion that you can't learn how to audit un il you've already learned 
about the financial accounting, managerial accounting, systems and tax aspects of 
organizations. While there's definitely merit in this notion, it applies more to audit 
procedures than to basic audit concepts. Basic audit concepts-including basic 
coverage of fraudulent financial reporting－should betaught earlier in the curriculum, 
and they should be taught to non-majors as well as majors. 
By  confining audit education to upper division auditing courses, we are missing 
our best opportunity toeducate USERS  of audit reports. The introductory accounting 
sequence is the only exposure most non-accounting business students and non-busi-
ness majors ever have to accounting. It is ludicrous to constantly talk about the need to 
reduce the expectation gap, yet to ignore our only opportunity to talk to future users of 
audit reports about the role of auditing in society. Instead of talking about auditing 
only in a course for majors, we need to begin audit education at the introductory level. 
At the introductory level at the University of Southern California, for the past three 
years we have been introducing students to the meaning of the different types of audit 
reports, the nature of audits, the value of audits, and the types of testing and evidence 
auditors use. As a result, non-accounting stude ts have a much clearer understanding 
of what an audit is about and they are more likely to correctly interpret the meaning of 
an audit opinion. In addition, we cover basic aspects of fraudulent financial 
reporting－including a discussion of the impact of fraudulent fina cial reporting, and a 
discussion of the roles of various parties (management, the board of directors, internal 
and external auditors, and regulators) in preventing, detecting and disc plining fraud. 
This type of early education raises awareness of the importance of maintaining the 
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quality and credibility of financial reports and places a strong emphasis on the ethical 
responsibilities of managers in setting an appropriate control environment to help 
reduce the incidence of fraudulent financial reporting. 
Starting audit education early in the curriculum has added benefits for accounting 
majors. By confining audit education to a single course late in the traditional 
curriculum, we force some topics, including fraudulent financial reporting, to be 
treated too simplistically. We  only have enough time in a traditional auditing course to 
cover the most basic aspects of fraudulent financial reporting. But, if these basic 
aspects were covered in the introductory course, the later courses could mov  to more 
complex aspects of the topic. For instance, if students come to their upper division 
auditing course already aware of the auditor's use of analytical procedures to asses
risk, the auditing course can then focus on more complex as ects of risk assessment, 
such as the "too good to be true" problem mentioned earlier. 
Do  Auditor Characteristics Matter? 
Finally, while I realize that Alan and John's focus is on fraud detection in practice, 
I can't resist making one observation about research. Those of us who spend part of 
our lives doing academic audit research might want to consider a comment Yogi Berra 
once made about the game of baseball: "Ninety percent of this game is half mental." 
In pondering Yogi's unique phrasing, we might want to ask ourselves a question 
about research on auditors as fraud detectors: Do auditor characteristics ma ter? That 
is, if client characteristics help predict who is more likelyt  commit fraud, can auditor 
characteristics help predict who is more likely to detect it? 
Earlier, I criticized practitioners for focusing only on large numerical deviations 
observed in doing analytical procedures. But, we researchers are guilty of a similar 
narrow focus when it comes to research on fraud detection. We tend to focus our 
efforts too much onempirical research on fraud risk factors (which red flags are the 
best fraud predictors?) and too little on the human judgment side of fraud detection. 
This occurs despite intriguing evidence building up in the auditing literature that such 
variables as sensitivity to integrity (e.g., the body of research on moral development 
using the work of Kohlberg as a model) and tolerance for ambiguity vary greatly 
among auditors. The role of auditor characteristics in audit judgment－particularly, 
fraud detection judgments-is an under-researched area that holds potential as a second 
line of attack directed toward potential improvement of fraud detection. 
It's time to open the floor for discussion now, which reminds me of one last Yogi 
quote, Berra's description of his experience attending a 1985 White House dinner: "It 
was hard to have a conversation with anyone, there were so many people talking." 
So, in closing, I would like to express my thanks to Deloitte & Touche and the 
University of Kansas for making it possible for so many people to come together to 
talk about such interesting topics as auditing for fraud. 
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Abstract 
This paper presents the results of a study designed to understand how auditors 
make client acceptance and continuation decisions. Descriptive evidence was gleaned 
from the professional literature, audit firm materials, and interviews with seven audit 
partners. Based on the evidence we present a framework that delineates the key activi-
ties in this area. Avenues for additional research are presented. 
Introduction 
Why do auditors accept some companies as audit clients but not others? What 
types of information do auditors use when making client acceptance decisions? Once 
a professional relationship has been established, under what circumstances will an 
auditor terminate the relationship? These and related client acceptance and continua-
tion issues have received limited attention in both the academic and professional 
literature. The decision to accept an audit client or continue a professional relationship 
with an existing client is important because an incorrect decision may directly affect 
the financial viability of an accounting practice. 
We interviewed seven practicing audit partners who are responsible for making 
client acceptance and continuation decisions and reviewed audit firm manuals and 
professional standards. This paper presents preliminary findings on the task structure, 
the decision process and its participants, their incentives, and the types and sources of 
available information that shape such decisions. Our effort is exploratory—to sketch 
some of the more important issues that are of interest and concern to practitioners and 
academics alike. Sometimes it will appear that we have raised more questions than we 
have answered. This is deliberate and follows from our goal of identifying key issues 
and stimulating further research. 
The next section delineates the motivation and presents background information. It 
is followed by a section that describes the interview method. Then the descriptive 
information on how auditors make client acceptance and continuation decisions is 
presented in a framework that emerged as we analyzed the interview results. The final 
section enumerates some research opportunities. 
Motivation and Background Information 
Our primary motivation is to understand the client acceptance decision process—in 
its naturalistic setting—from the perspective of practitioners. The paucity of research 
* The authors were supported by a summer research grant from the Fisher School of Accounting. 
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and the importance of the client acceptance decision, suggested an exploration of that 
decision environment. The crucial role of such exploration in theory building is aptly 
demonstrated by work on accountability (Emby and Gibbins 1988; Gibbins and 
Newton 1993). In this regard, this exploratory study responds to calls to give adequate 
consideration to the nature of audit tasks, as a prerequisite to evaluating auditors' 
judgments or formulating theories of audit judgment (Felix and Kinney 1982; Wright 
1987; Burgstahler and Sundem 1989; Trotman 1992). Second, we elaborate on the 
guidance included in the professional standards and academic literature (e.g., Huss 
and Jacobs 1991; Stice 1991) pertaining to information sources, reliability of 
evidence, relative importance of different types of evidence, and the extent of informa-
tion search. We explain why auditors evaluate evidence from various sources 
differently, and why under certain circumstances (e.g., lapse of time) a discovery of 
lack of integrity on the part of management will be discounted by an auditor. 
Professional guidance on client associations is provided in the Statements on 
Quality Control Standards (QC) section QC 10 and paragraphs QC 90.23-.24. These 
standards require that an audit practice establish procedures for evaluating prospective 
clients and for reviewing the continuation of ongoing relationships. For prospective 
clients, suggested procedures include (1) obtaining financial statements, (2) 
performing third-party inquiries, (3) communicating with predecessor auditors, (4) 
evaluating independence issues, and (5) reviewing pertinent regulatory rules. For 
existing clients, the emphasis should be on identifying and evaluating significant 
changes in client circumstances. Examples of significant changes include changes in 
management, ownership, legal counsel, financial status, litigation status, type of busi-
ness, and scope of engagement. Whether dealing with prospective or existing clients, 
the standards require that firms designate a person to be responsible for each decision, 
inform all personnel of firm policies, and emplace a system for monitoring compli-
ance. Finally, these standards indicate that "the auditor would not necessarily include 
all the examples or be limited to those illustrated." In effect, the auditor's judgment 
determines the nature and extent of client acceptance procedures. 
Audit firm policies and procedures reviewed tended to restate the professional stan-
dards but with emphasis on administration and provision of a paper trail of 
compliance. At some firms, a lengthy form must be completed, typically consisting of 
numerous yes/no questions and requiring additional explanation for the no answers. 
Other firms utilize open-ended questionnaires that allow the auditors to summarize 
their efforts and findings. Firms differ in the level of approval (e.g., office managing 
partner or regional partner) that is required for obtaining or continuing any given 
client relationship. While our initial review of firm manuals indicated firm differences, 
our interviews suggested that the apparent differences were matters of form rather 
than substance. Further, procedures that were not explicitly discussed in the manuals 
were routinely undertaken in the actual decision process depending on the circum-
stances of the prospective client being evaluated. Therefore, our first proposition is 
that research on inter-firm differences in client acceptance decisions is not a viable 
opportunity. As a corollary, we propose that inter-engagement differences are more 
worthwhile to study. 
Interview Method 
Seven partners representing four international accounting firms were interviewed 
in their respective offices located in the same major metropolitan area. Each interview 
lasted one to two hours. Two of the researchers were present for each interview. The 
interviews followed a semi-structured format that allowed the interviewee the latitude 
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to convey anecdotal evidence. Prior to the interview, each participant was provided an 
interview fact sheet that illustrated some of the issues to discuss (see exhibit 1). They 
were told, however, to add or to delete from the list at their discretion—in effect they 
described the decision process in whatever way they desired. None of the participants 
referred to this sheet during the interview. A l l interviews were taped and transcribed.1 
Partners were chosen because they are responsible for the client acceptance decisions. 
Interview Results 
Overview 
A content analysis of the interview transcripts suggests that there are four distinct 
phases—practice development, acceptance analysis, acceptance decision, continuation 
analysis—of the client acceptance and continuation decision process. Figure 1 is a 
framework based on this finding. It takes the form of a flow chart.2 The process starts 
with practice development. The purpose of practice development is to disseminate 
information about the services provided by the firm and thereby cultivate potential 
clients. Practice development is usually continuous and low-profile, although it may 
be aggressive at times when specific target companies are identified and actively cul-
tivated.3 Typical avenues for practice development include involvement in civic, 
business, charitable, and social organizations; advertising; high-profile engagements 
and personal contacts. Size of company, audit fee, prestige, exposure, opportunity for 
consulting, and timing of the work are among the engagement attributes that 
accounting firms consider when targeting prospective clients. Successful practice 
development provides opportunities for auditors to offer their services to prospective 
clients, often in the form of a proposal.4 
Figure 1 
Flowchart Of The Client Acceptance And Continuation Decision Process 
Practice 
Development 
Opportunity 
to propose 
Acceptance 
Analysis 
Audit 
Continuation 
Analysis 
1 Transcripts of the interviews are available upon request. 
2 The relationship between practice development, acceptance analysis, and acceptance decisions may not be 
strictly temporal as implied by Figure 1. 
3 Cultivation of prospective clients must be done within the limitations imposed by the Code of 
Professional Conduct and the applicable state laws. 
4 A proposal is not an engagement letter. We use the term "proposal" to indicate the process by which audi-
tors inform a potential client that they would like to make their services available. An engagement letter is a 
contract between the parties listing the duties and responsibilities of each. It is completed during the plan-
ning phase of an audit. 
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No 
Do not propose. Is client 
Yes 
Propose 
Exhibit 1 
Interview Fact Sheet 
The AICPA Quality Control Standards Committee is responsible for developing the profession's quality 
control standards. It has identified nine elements of quality control for a professional practice. One of these 
standards pertains to the acceptance and continuance of clients. The purpose of this interview is to gather 
general information on (1) the guidance the AICPA provides CPA firms on the client acceptance decision, 
(2) your firm's client acceptance policies and procedures, and (3) the application of these policies and 
procedures to individual engagements. 
For the purpose of this interview, the term business risk refers to the probability that your firm will 
suffer loss or injury to its practice as a result of providing professional audit services to a particular 
company. Examples of loss or injury include litigation, tarnished reputation, sanctions imposed by regula-
tory bodies, lack of profit, etc. 
1. We would like to begin the interview by having you describe the process that led to you, as the partner-
of-record (partner-in-charge), to accept your newest audit client. It may help to review the client 
acceptance documents in that company's permanent file as you reflect on the process. This walk-though 
should include a rather specific description of how the firm's formal (as documented in the audit 
manual) and informal policies and procedures were applied. 
a. What types of information and evidence did you gather in order to make the decision? 
b. How did you document your reasoning? 
c. Who participated in the process besides yourself? What role did each play? 
2. Assume for the moment that a prospective client had approached you about providing audit services. 
a. In general, what characteristics of a prospective client would indicate that it should be accepted? 
b. What characteristics would make you hesitate or think twice about accepting it? 
c. What types of audit engagements would your firm not accept or would be accepted only under 
special circumstances? What are those special circumstances? 
d. What would be the most likely reasons that you would ultimately decide not to accept a prospec-
tive client? 
e. If during an engagement you become aware of facts or circumstances that would have caused you 
not to accept the prospective client, what would you do? 
3. One of the procedures suggested by the Special Committee on Proposed Standards for Quality Control 
Policies and Procedures was to consider the "riskiness" of the engagement in accepting and planning 
an audit engagement (guidelines attached). Is the Committee referring to business risk as defined earlier 
in the interview? (use revised definition of business risk through the rest of the interview) 
a. How does your firm assess business risk? 
b. What types of evidence is used to assess the riskiness of a prospective client? 
c. How reliable is each type of evidence? 
4. Describe an engagement you would consider to have a "high" business risk. 
5. Describe an engagement you would consider to have a "low" business risk. 
6. In what ways is audit planning affected by these initial assessments of business risk? Is the planning or 
conduct of the audit any different for those engagements that are judged to have a "high" business risk 
as opposed to those that are judged to have a "low" business risk? 
7. To this point in the interview, we have discussed only client acceptance decisions. The quality control 
standards also apply to client continuation decisions. How does the client continuation decision differ 
from the client acceptance decision? 
8. In your opinion, does the "Statement on Quality Control Standards No. 1 — System of Quality Control 
for a CPA Firm" and the "Quality Control Policies and Procedures for CPA Firms" (both are attached) 
provide sufficient guidance in the area of client acceptance? Explain. 
9. Are your firm policies more strict, equally as strict, or less strict than those embodied in "Statement on 
Quality Control Standards No. 1 — System of Quality Control for a CPA Firm" and the "Quality 
Control Policies and Procedures for CPA Firms"? 
10. Are there any other issues related to the client acceptance decision that we have failed to address or that 
you would like to clarify or discuss further? 
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When presented with an opportunity to propose, the auditor performs a series of 
procedures that we refer to as acceptance analysis. The acceptance analysis may lead 
to a decision not to propose, and the process would then stop. Alternatively, if the 
analysis does not reveal any significant negative information about the prospect, the 
auditor will submit a proposal. Therefore, we propose that a noncompensatory deci-
sion is used, and rejection decisions are influenced solely by negative evidence (Beach 
and Frederickson, 1989; Asare and Knechel, 1992). The proposal is a verbal or written 
offer to provide services; i f accepted by the prospective client, it signifies the "go 
ahead" to perform the audit.5 
The final activity incorporated in the framework is the continuation analysis. Once 
the auditor has completed the audit engagement, a decision must be made whether to 
continue the relationship with the client. There are a number of reasons why an 
auditor might choose to discontinue an existing client relationship.6 Participants indi-
cated that, the decision to disassociate from a client involves consideration of 
information that becomes available during the course of the audit that would have 
caused the auditor not to propose in the first place if available at the time of the accep-
tance analysis.7 If the auditor (and the client) decide to continue their professional 
relationship, they wil l enter into an indefinite cycle of auditing the company and 
reviewing the relationship. The rest of this section is a detailed discussion of the activ-
ities in the four phases: (1) practice development and identification of potential 
clients, (2) acceptance analysis, (3) acceptance decisions, and (4) continuation 
analysis. 
Practice Development and Identifying Potential Clients 
This phase is probably the least discussed in either the professional or academic 
literature. Nonetheless, all the participants highlighted it as a crucial component of their 
client acceptance decision process. The main role of practice development is to identify 
the set of prospective clients available to the firm now and in the future. Participants 
suggested that not all potential clients are a target of the firms' practice development. 
Specifically, they identified three constraints that defined which clients to cultivate. The 
first constraint is imposed by the environment. Firms consider only those engagements 
that they can service in accordance with professional standards (e.g., independence 
issues) and regulatory and governmental restrictions (e.g., mandatory auditor switch). 
The second constraint is firm imposed. Clients must meet certain minimum firm stan-
dards before they wil l be considered worthwhile candidates for acceptance. Some 
companies may be omitted from consideration because they are in a high risk industry 
(e.g., casinos, savings and loans), are potentially unlawful (e.g., an importer of cut 
flowers from Colombia), or of questionable repute (e.g., a 900 telephone service or 
5 A proposal may be either formal or informal. For example, a governmental organization may have a legal 
obligation to follow a very formal process whereas an owner-managed business may have an informal 
process. 
6 Clients may also choose to discontinue the professional relationship with a firm on the basis of the ex post 
information that they possess after an engagement is complete. The client may consider the fees unreason-
able, may dislike the personnel assigned to the engagement, or feel that quality service was not forthcoming 
from the auditing firm. Whatever the reason for such a client-firm split, we have omitted this case from our 
analysis because we are primarily concerned with the factors that affect the auditor's decision process. 
7 The decision to resign from an engagement can be made at almost any time, even during the course of an 
unfinished audit. However, withdrawing before completing an audit is obviously an extreme response to 
extreme conditions, such as discovery of major financial fraud. For the purposes of this paper, we do not 
exclude those types of events, but we will emphasize the less extreme conditions that would allow the 
auditor to complete the engagement but then choose to discontinue the relationship. 
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adult bookstores). The third constraint is auditee imposed. Not only do some clients not 
solicit bids, but also they are not amenable to the possibility of hiring the firm. 
Practice development entails the management and coordination of these constraints. 
Based on our findings, Figure 2 presents a useful framework for considering firms' 
practice development efforts. Each point in the Venn diagram is an individual audit 
engagement. Within the rectangle is every audit engagement to be completed by all 
audit firms within a specified time period. The area labelled "allowable" represents all 
audit engagements a particular firm is permitted to serve in the next period. That is the 
area defined by the environmental constraints. The area labelled "target" represents all 
engagements that have no obvious disqualifying characteristics. That area is fixed by 
firm imposed constraints. Finally, the area labelled "available" represents all clients that 
consider the audit firm a suitable candidate to provide services during the next 
period—the auditee imposed constraint. This set includes current clients, first-time 
audit engagements, and companies open to an auditor switch. 
Figure 2 
Determination Of The Opportunity Set 
The intersection created by the three constraints is the set of engagements the firm 
will include in its current acceptance or continuation analysis. We call this the oppor-
tunity set. Our findings and the framework suggest several interesting propositions. 
First, both nonclients and current clients are members of the opportunity set. Second, 
the size and content of the opportunity set changes over time because the number of 
possible engagements satisfying each of the three constraints changes each period. 
Third, the firm can influence many of the factors that alter the composition of the 
opportunity set. For example, it can broaden its allowable set by acquiring the neces-
sary expertise to service specialized industries, firm philosophies and goals can 
change in such a way as to broaden or narrow the target market, and successful prac-
tice development may increase the number of available companies. Finally, based on 
practice development efforts, potential clients are classified as desirable, undesirable 
or unknown. Desirable companies are those that the firm is aware of and, unless 
evidence to the contrary surfaces, would like to serve. These potential clients are culti-
vated. Undesirable companies are those that the firm is aware of (either individually or 
as a class) but, for any number of reasons, prefers to avoid (that is, they are not in the 
target set in Figure 1). Unknown companies are those that the firm is unaware of but 
that approach the audit firm for possible services. This latter group includes most 
start-up enterprises and presents the biggest challenge in terms of acceptance deci-
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sions. As described in the next section the extent of acceptance analysis is closely 
linked to this classification. 
Acceptance Analysis 
This phase is probably the most discussed in the professional literature. None-
theless, we unearthed several subtle issues. Acceptance analysis includes the activities 
undertaken by an audit firm to determine whether to submit a proposal. Seven key 
issues identified are: 
1. firm expertise and staffing, 
2. firm independence, 
3. client effect on firm reputation and image, 
4. client integrity, 
5. anticipated profitability of engagement, 
6. client financial status, and 
7. client accounting practices and control structure. 
The importance of each issue depends on whether the client is initially classified 
as, desirable, undesirable, or unknown. Table 1 summarizes some of the differences. 
Firm Expertise and Staffing: Professional standards highlight the importance of 
having the requisite expertise to handle a specific engagement. Presumably, i f the 
expertise is not present, a firm must turn down the prospective client. Many of the 
interviewees indicated that turning down work because of lack of expertise or 
adequate staff is rare since most staffing problems can be overcome by transferring 
personnel from other offices (in the short run) and by expanding recruiting efforts (in 
the long run). In some cases, the excuse that the accounting firm lacks expertise is 
offered as an explanation when the firm wants to refuse work for other, more 
derogatory reasons (e.g., the suspicion that the management lacks integrity). 
Firm Independence: G A A S requires that auditors maintain an independent 
attitude in both fact and appearance. A l l interviewees indicated that their firms had 
procedures for identifying potential independence problems. In some firms, 
independence is verified with a "negative confirmation." With this procedure, a list of 
clients is periodically distributed to all audit staff, but only those who have a conflict 
of interest with a client need respond. Other firms use a "positive confirmation;" the 
client list is made available to appropriate staff, who sign a form indicating that they 
are independent.8 Regardless of the system used, the interviewees felt independence 
problems caused by direct or indirect ownership interests can almost always be 
resolved. 
Client Effect on Firm Reputation and Image: A client can affect a firm's 
reputation. As one auditor stated, "We wouldn't want to be known as A l Capone's 
auditor." The issue of reputation goes beyond the possibility of adverse publicity from 
litigation.9 In assessing a potential client's effect on firm reputation, participants 
emphasized the need to evaluate the nature of the client's business or operations as 
8 One firm used a positive confirmation in the local office and a negative confirmation on a national basis. 
9 Wilson and Grimlund (1990), using SEC disciplinary actions as a surrogate for reputation effects, found 
that firms with bad reputations had their market share erode relative to other firms. Second tier firms (i.e., 
non-Big Eight) also had difficulty retaining clients when faced with SEC disciplinary action. Surprisingly, 
the same second-tier firms did not have a significant fall-off in their ability to attract new clients. 
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well as the reputation of the client's principal owners. For instance, a client may be 
turned down because the principal owners or managers have a negative reputation in 
the business community, and the firm may not want to be associated with that 
reputation. Auditors may also want to avoid companies in certain types of business 
because the overall reputation of the business is poor, e.g., adult book stores or penny 
stock schemes. 
Table 1 
Aspects of Acceptance Analysis 
Type of Potential Client 
Known, Desirable Known, Undesirable Unknown 
Expertise/ 
Staffing 
Exists or easily obtained via 
transfers or recruiting. 
Independence Rarely a problem. 
Reputation/ 
Image 
Integrity 
Profitability 
Financial 
Status 
Accounting 
Practices 
Predetermination usually made 
that this will be a positive 
effect which must be rebutted 
by contrary information. 
Predetermination usually made 
that this is unlikely to be a 
problem. Opinion may be 
changed by further 
information received during 
review but extent of review 
will be limited. 
Often pro forma consideration, 
as prospective client is 
assumed to be willing to pay 
reasonable fees and business 
risk is not a major concern. 
Ex post evaluation is more 
important. 
Often pro forma consideration 
since companies having 
financial difficulties are 
easily identified. 
May be a problem in certain 
industries. Firms may 
need to discuss their strong 
opinions with the prospective 
client. Control structure is 
rarely a problem. 
Lack of expertise may be used Will try to obtain if client 
as excuse to avoid turns out to be desirable. 
undesirable clients. 
Not pertinent. 
Predetermination usually made 
that this will be a negative 
effect that is difficult to 
rebut. 
Typically a major reason why 
the client is not desirable. 
Requires extensive rebuttal 
to overcome preconceptions. 
Not pertinent. No fee is 
high enough. 
May be a major reason why 
the client is not desirable. 
Not pertinent. 
Family relationships are more 
likely to be a problem. 
Will try to evaluate this with 
extensive research and 
investigation. Interpersonal 
references, media research, 
review of legal documents and 
client discussions may all be 
performed. Key concerns 
center on nature of business 
operations and reputation of 
management. 
Will try to evaluate with 
extensive research and 
investigation. (See 
"Reputation.") Also 
concerned with competence of 
management. 
Fees may be very important 
consideration. Can the 
client afford the work that 
is necessary to issue an 
opinion, given their records 
and control structure? Will 
the client grow and expand 
its demands for services? Is 
engagement timing beneficial 
to firm? Should fees be paid 
in advance? 
Important consideration since 
one-year clients are not desirable. 
Firm often concerned with 
competence of management, 
under-capitalization, nature of 
product and service, and 
existence of sound business plan. 
May be a problem in certain 
industries. Firms may need 
to discuss their strong 
opinions with the prospective 
client. Control structure 
may be a problem. 
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To assess possible reputation effects, auditors often search media sources, e.g., 
LEXIS, for news about the company, its owners, and its managers. Additionally, firms 
often contact existing clients as a matter of courtesy. This is particularly important if 
the prospective and existing clients are direct competitors, e.g., Coke and Pepsi. The 
existing client may object to the prospective client, and most firms are not willing to 
upset long-standing professional relationships for the sake of obtaining a new client. 
However, this is not always a problem because companies want to hire the "best" firm 
for their type of business. This often means that the "best" accounting firm is also 
auditing one or more of their competitors. The trade-off of confidentiality against 
industry expertise depends on the number of competitors in an industry or geographic 
region. Therefore, we propose that, the less concentrated an industry, i.e., the greater 
the number of direct competitors, the greater the willingness of companies to hire an 
accounting firm that does work for a competitor. 
Management Integrity: Without question, assessing management integrity was 
the biggest specific concern of the interviewees. In fact, the majority of procedures 
identified and discussed by the interviewees directly related to assessing management 
integrity. The focus of most client investigations is to try to determine if the client's 
management is trustworthy. Assessing management integrity involves communicating 
with management as well as with those familiar with management. If the auditor feels 
that the management is less than completely candid, uncomfortable feelings may exist 
about the accounting practices and procedures of the company. A "hard-nosed but 
honest businessman" or an "individual with the habit of suing for every imagined 
slight" would also be difficult to deal with; in these situations, taking on the client 
may not be worth the trouble. 
The interviewees identified many routine sources of references for prospective 
clients. For example, attorneys are routinely contacted. Information received from the 
current counsel of the client "must be carefully interpreted, however, since attorneys 
are hesitant to say anything negative about their clients." Other sources of reference 
are bankers, stockbrokers, ex-employees of the company, alumni of the accounting 
firm, business acquaintances of the company's management, other clients, colleagues 
in the firm (especially tax and consulting personnel), and mutual friends. Bankers are 
regarded as having a high reputation relative to attorneys. This finding, suggests that 
holding constant the information content of evidence, information obtained from 
bankers will be considered more reliable that those from attorneys. Availability of reli-
able references depend on the business environment. For instance, reliable references 
are difficult to obtain in a business environment where there are many transient entre-
preneurs or much foreign investment. 
Where such routine sources are lacking, participants stressed the use of more 
rigorous and formal investigations. They may review recent financial statements for 
obvious incongruities,10 obtain a Dun & Bradstreet report on the company, check with 
the SEC for complaints, review arrest records, or hire an investigation service. If these 
investigations reveal anything of importance, management is usually given the oppor-
tunity to respond or explain. One participant, recalled an investigation which revealed 
that a member of top management was a subject of criminal investigations several 
years ago. As explained by that participant, "transgressions that are ancient history do 
not help, but they sure are not fatal flaws." One partner indicated that he does not use 
1 0 One interviewee related a story of a retailer who had an inventory turnover ratio of one. The client was 
turned away because the auditor felt that there was probably something questionable going on in the business. 
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investigation services because, if he feels that uncomfortable about the potential 
client, he would simply choose not to propose. Attitude toward using investigation 
services, did not seem to be influenced by firm affiliation. 
The final source of information that was frequently mentioned was the predecessor 
auditor (when one existed). Communication between predecessor and successor audi-
tors is required by SAS 7. Auditors are usually fairly forthcoming, even when being 
replaced by another firm, because they realize that they may someday be on the other 
side. Contrary to SAS No. 7, however, formal communications may not always occur 
or may occur after the client has been accepted. SEC Form 8K filings, which detail 
the circumstances of an auditor change, are not always informative either. 
Anticipated Profitability of Engagement: The interviewees suggested that 
virtually all engagements result in little or no profit in the first year (i.e., lowballing). 
In submitting a proposal, firms focus not on first-year profits but rather on the 
prospect for future profits from repeat engagements and on opportunities for spin-off 
work, such as tax or consulting. Alternatively, i f most of the work can be performed at 
a time when staff are unassigned, the fees from the engagement may help cover some 
of the firm's fixed costs. 
Client Financial Status: The participants indicated that they are not interested in 
accepting a client who is on the verge of bankruptcy since such cases tend to end up in 
costly litigation and high up-front costs cannot be recouped. Accordingly, the client's 
financial status is thoroughly assessed prior to proposing. This does not mean that 
companies in financial difficulty are totally avoided. Auditors also evaluate 
management plans for dealing with the identified difficulties. In such situations, the 
key questions become: Is the business legitimate and does the product or service make 
sense? Is management competent and honest? Does the company have a reasonable 
business plan? Is undercapitalization the main cause of the company's difficulties? 
Although not interested in short-term clients, accounting firms stand to gain much 
from start-up companies with a reasonable plan because these may eventually require 
more accounting services. 
Client Accounting Practices and Control Structure: A key concern that auditors 
often address early in the decision process is whether the prospective client is 
auditable. As used here, auditability refers to whether the client's accounting practices 
and control structure are conducive to accurate and complete record-keeping. The 
interviewees indicated that they would be wary about submitting a proposal to 
management that had disagreed with its previous auditors on questions of accounting 
principles. This is especially true if the previous auditor was a "Big 6". 
Acceptance Decisions 
"Most of the (acceptance) decisions are fairly easy" and "95 percent (of the time 
we) are going to accept the client—it's a matter of documenting what we are doing" 
were comments made by audit partners interviewed. Auditors want to "get to yes." 
Turning away a client is a difficult choice for many to make since successful 
recruiting of clients is one criterion often used to judge the promotability of a manager 
to partner or to determine a partner's share of profits. But even the most aggressive 
auditor realizes that there are significant risks associated with accepting some compa-
nies as clients. Consequently, little negative evidence is needed to reject the client. 
This suggests that auditors can be characterized as "hungry" yet cautious. Being 
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hungry, the auditor adopts the operating hypothesis that all prospective clients are 
acceptable. However, because the auditor is cautious, very little negative evidence is 
required for this hypothesis to be abandoned. Asare and Knechel (1992) have tested 
and found support for this proposition. 
Continuation Analysis 
The decision to continue or terminate a professional relationship is similar to the 
decision to accept a client, but the sources of information for the decisions differ. 
After completing an engagement, the accounting firm has more information upon 
which to base its decision. This suggests that external sources of information, such as 
business or legal references, are less important when the firm has extensive first-hand 
information. The three key issues that auditors consider when deciding to continue a 
professional relationship are: 
1. Changes in client circumstances that are related to issues considered during the 
acceptance analysis, 
2. Audit results and status of client relations, 
3. Actual profitability. 
The interviewees indicated that a problem would need to be significant before most 
firms would resign. 
Significant Changes in Client Characteristics: Auditors cannot accept a client 
and then close their eyes to circumstances that might have caused rejection if 
previously known. Many of the interviewees indicated that the criteria they use for 
deciding to continue a client are the same as for accepting a client. The instances of 
disassociating from a client for reasons of reputation, financial status, expertise, or 
lack of independence are fairly rare; firms do a good job with their acceptance 
analysis in these areas. Issues related to management integrity are more likely to pose 
a problem since the auditor now has inside information about key management. For 
example, one interviewee related a case where he resigned because the president had 
been convicted of tax fraud even though the case did not involve the company. 
Audit Results and Client Relations: The performance of the audit wil l reveal 
information that is relevant to the continuation decision and may lead to conflict 
between the auditor and the firm personnel or management. Situations involving 
voluminous related-party transactions, client-imposed scope limitations, and 
accounting disagreements that cannot be satisfactorily or amicably resolved may lead 
auditors to conclude that they should withdraw from the client. Other situations may 
be more subtle, such as when management ignores management letter comments or 
when the control structure is deteriorating. The interviewees indicated that they would 
withdraw from an engagement if they are frequently at loggerheads with management, 
which may occur even i f the engagement is an otherwise profitable endeavor. 
Profitability: After an audit has been performed, the firm is able to analyze 
whether the engagement was profitable. Fees, costs, and expenses are all known with 
relative certainty at that point. The mechanism for determining profitability is the 
realization rate, computed by dividing the total fees collected for the job by the man-
hours employed. This rate is then compared to the "official" billing rates of the audit 
team. A job that is operating at less than 80 percent realization is being billed at a 
substantial discount. Realization rates in the first, and even second, year of an 
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engagement may be relatively low. The consensus of the interviewees was that 
realization should be close to 100 percent by the fourth year. Otherwise, the 
relationship wi l l be terminated unless there are extenuating circumstances for 
continuing to discount the job.11 
Research Opportunities 
Throughout the paper, we have identified testable propositions. In this section we 
will link some of our findings to the academic literature with a view to identifying 
more research issues. The unifying theme of this section is business risk. Business risk 
is the likelihood that an accounting firm will suffer a loss due to its association with an 
audit client in spite of complying with professional standards.12 Such losses include 
lawsuits, inadequate profits, and damage to a firm's reputation. Business risk may be 
best controlled by careful selection of the firm's clients.13 The interview results indicate 
that the purpose of the acceptance or continuation analysis is to assess the business risk 
associated with a current or prospective client. The purpose of this section is to illus-
trate how the client acceptance framework developed in this paper can be used to 
generate research questions. Table 2 presents a sample of specific questions. 
Business Risk: How Is It Assessed? 
The discussion of acceptance analysis indicates that auditors use many types and 
sources of information to assess business risk. No prescriptive or descriptive research 
has directly addressed the selection, weighing, or integration of the information avail-
able to assess business risk. However, several observations on how business risk is 
assessed and issues for further research are evident from the interview results. Table 2 
enumerates six questions related to this topic. 
First, the relative importance of cues and the information evaluation strategies of 
auditors when assessing business risk are areas amenable to research. Auditors weigh 
differently the relative importance of the seven types of information discussed in 
Section 4.2 when assessing business risk. For instance, the interview results suggest 
that auditor independence and firm expertise and staffing are directly controllable by 
the audit firm and should play only a limited role when auditors assess business risk. 
Of the factors that are not directly controllable by the auditor, management integrity 
and the client's financial status are the most important in the business risk decision. 
Further, these two factors may be evaluated configurally. If management integrity is 
low, the assessed level of business risk is likely to be high regardless of the client's 
financial status. But i f management integrity is high, the assessed level of business 
risk is directly related to the client's financial status. 
The information used to assess business risk comes from many sources, particu-
larly in acceptance analysis situations. The interview results indicate that information 
from current counsel is scrutinized closely, while information from bankers is consid-
ered very reliable. The credence attached to the predecessor auditor's communication 
appears to be affected by the reasons for the auditor switch. Thus, issues related to the 
11 Simon and Francis (1988) reported evidence that indicated fee cutting amounted to 24% in a new engage-
ment and 15% in years 2 and 3 of an engagement, with full fees being received by the fourth year of an 
engagement. 
1 2 Section AU 312.02, footnote 2, acknowledges the existence of this risk without giving it a specific name. 
1 3 Business risk is different from, and subsumes, the concept of audit risk (which represents the likelihood 
that the auditor will issue an incorrect audit report). Audit risk is controllable by the auditor via proper audit 
planning and compliance with professional standards. 
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effect of source reliability on business risk assessments is an area with research 
opportunities. 
Information search strategy is an important facet of the client acceptance analysis. 
The process can be quite costly, and investigation costs cannot be passed on to the 
client i f the latter is not accepted. Many factors can be expected to influence the infor-
mation search process, e.g., the economic outlook or whether the client is planning an 
initial public offering. The interview results indicate that the amount of information 
gathered varies considerably across engagements. The acceptance/continuation deci-
sion process is a context in which research on information search strategies is needed. 
Table 2 
Research Opportunities 
Business Risk: How is it Assessed? 
1. To what extent does the relative importance of the seven acceptance analysis issues 
vary with the classification of the prospective client in the practice development 
phase? 
2. Are business risk assessments influenced by auditor-specific factors such as a sense 
of professional responsibility and individual motivations? 
3. Given the same facts and circumstances, will the business risk assessment differ 
depending upon whether the potential auditee is a prospective or continuing client? 
4. What is the relationship between audit risk and business risk? How does informa-
tion obtained during the screening of clients affect audit planning? 
5. To what extent does a Firm's audit technology influence the assessment and mini-
mization of business risk? 
6. Are auditors well calibrated as to their ability to assess and control business risk? 
Business Risk: Whose Preferences Prevail? 
1. How effective are firm policies (or the partnership agreement) in providing effi-
cient risk sharing among auditor partners? 
2. Should firms allocate a greater portion of insurance liability premiums to higher 
risk clients? If so, how? 
3. How is the business risk of a firm affected by clients inherited through firm merger 
activities? 
4. Are auditors on repeat engagements willing to accept a higher (lower) level of 
business risk than would be accepted on a new engagement? 
5. To what extent does the possibility of spin-off work (e.g., consulting and tax) affect 
an auditor's tolerance of business risk? 
Business Risk: How is Audit Pricing Affected? 
1. How do business risk assessments affect pricing decisions? 
2. Does the classification of a prospective client during the practice development 
phase affect the extent of lowballing? 
3. Does a firm's tolerances of business risk affect their market position? 
4. Under what conditions should auditors use fixed fee versus cost plus contracts for 
pricing audit engagements? 
5. What influence do restrictions on practice development (e.g., advertising and solic-
iting) have on the opportunity set of potential clients and, ultimately the pricing of 
audit services? 
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Finally, the relationship among business risk, audit risk and audit planning needs to 
be unravelled. Preliminary evidence suggests that evidence obtained during the client 
acceptance process is used to reduce audit testing (Huss and Jacobs 1991; 
Hackenbrack and Knechel 1994). The pervasiveness and the appropriateness of such a 
strategy remains unknown. 
Business Risk: Whose Preferences Prevail? 
Although a firm may have a particular risk tolerance at a conceptual level, the 
actual business risk assessments are made at the office level and, within an office, at 
the individual partner level. Partners have different risk tolerances. For instance, newly 
promoted partners may pursue risky engagements more aggressively than would 
established partners. Partners who have recently been involved in litigation may be 
more conservative than they otherwise would be, reducing their risk tolerance. The 
diversity of such tolerances means that client acceptance decisions made by individ-
uals (or within local offices) may not coincide with the overall objectives of the firm. 
This observation has important implications for research that assumes a single set of 
risk preferences for decision making (e.g., Simunic and Stein 1990). 
Firms adopt a number of policies and procedures that are intended to reduce such 
variations in individual risk tolerances and, ultimately, client acceptance decisions. 
Examples include senior partner reviews and the use of standardized client acceptance 
checklists. At this point further research is needed to ascertain how effective these 
techniques are. 
Partially tempering these individual differences is the strong sense of partnership 
responsibility and duty to the accounting profession that was expressed by the part-
ners interviewed for this paper. Personal integrity, professional ethics, and interactions 
with peers would all contribute to an increase in the effectiveness of firm policies and 
procedures. The role these intangibles play in the individual partner's risk/return 
trade-off decisions is an important area for future research. Five questions related to 
this topic are listed in table 2. 
Business Risk: How Is Audit Pricing Affected? 
Auditors cannot simply choose companies to add to their client base. They must 
bid against their competitors for the opportunity to serve a particular company. 
Consequently, auditors' acceptance/continuation decisions subsume an assessment of 
the minimum fee they are willing to accept.14 The interview results indicate that these 
business risk and bidding decisions are not made in isolation. Rather, they involve 
comparing the net benefit that can be obtained by adding the company to its current 
client base. From this "portfolio" perspective, the decision to add a client to the firm's 
client base is based on the explicit consideration of its riskiness in relation to existing 
clients. Consequently, business risk plays an important role in an auditor's audit 
pricing strategy (see also, Simon 1985; Simon and Francis 1988; Simunic 1980). 
Prior research indicates that auditors use either a fixed fee or a cost-plus contract to 
price their audit (Palmrose 1989) and a tendency toward lowballing exists on some 
initial engagements (DeAngelo 1981; Turpen 1990). The conditions under which 
1 4 Simunic and Stein (1990) argue that the minimum bid level will include a recovery of direct costs, a 
recovery of opportunity costs, and a premium based on the perceived risk of the engagement. Simunic and 
Stein also argue that commonalities such as "client industry, geographic location and types of accounting 
principles" (p. 332) cause returns across audit engagements to be correlated. We would add the firm's audit 
technology to this list also. As a result of these commonalities, the decision to add a client to the firm's client 
base should be based on the explicit consideration of the return, risk, and covariation with existing clients. 
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either type of contract is used is not well understood, nor is it clear why auditors 
lowball on some engagements but not others. The interview results indicate that one 
possible explanation is auditors are more willing to use a fixed fee arrangement or 
lowball in situations of low business risk. Additional research that examines the rela-
tionship between lowballing or bidding strategies and business risk is needed.15 
Accounting firms will also assess business risk differently in similar situations 
because they have different cost and revenue functions. The cost of performing an 
audit can be expected to vary across firms with different audit technologies (Cushing 
and Loebbecke 1986), industry specialization (Eichenser and Danos 1981) or percep-
tions of the audit risks of the client at the global, account, or assertion levels. These 
variations directly affect the extent of audit effort necessary to obtain reasonable 
assurance that financial statements are free of material misstatements. 
The revenue a firm can expect to collect on an engagement will also vary across 
firms and wi l l depend on such factors as the firm's attitude toward lowballing 
(DeAngelo 1981; Schatzberg 1990), fee cutting (Simon and Francis 1988; Ettredge 
and Greenberg 1990; Turpen 1990), and their ability to generate spin-off work in 
consulting or tax (Simunic 1984; Palmrose 1986; Abdel-Khalik 1990). To the extent 
that these differences occur, firms will have different assessments of business risk and 
their bids wil l differ. The extent to which the cost and revenue functions of firms 
affect business risk assessments and audit pricing strategies is an important area for 
future research. We enumerate five research questions related to this topic. 
Concluding Remarks 
On the basis of a review of the professional literature, audit firm materials, and 
interviews with audit partners, we presented evidence on how auditors make client 
acceptance and continuation decisions. Our approach was driven by the lack of prior 
research, and has identified a number of research issues with practical significance. 
Auditors' assessments of management integrity is potentially the most rewarding area 
for further research. The dynamics of the client acceptance process and planning judg-
ments as well as the relative importance of the various information sources identified 
in professional standards are fertile research avenues. Conversely, inter-firm differ-
ences in client acceptance decisions does not appear to be a viable opportunity (cf. 
Huss and Jacobs 1991). 
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